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ABSTRACT
INTELLIGENCE VERSUS IMPULSE: WILLIAM H. SEWARD AND THE THREAT 
OF WAR WITH FRANCE OVER MEXICO, 1861-1867
by
Albert J. Griffin, Jr.
University of New Hampshire, May, 2003
This dissertation argues that U.S. Secretary of State William Seward conceived a 
diplomatic strategy that enabled the U.S. to oust the French and their puppet emperor, 
Maximilian, from Mexico in 1867. The genius in Seward’s approach lay in 
accomplishing this goal without committing U.S. forces. Using original diplomatic 
correspondence, this dissertation shows how Seward capitalized on both the weaknesses 
of the French, and the strengths of republican Mexico. It demonstrates how Seward 
bargained for the time needed for his strategy to work, even when many around him were 
pressing for precipitous action. It argues that Seward’s diplomatic strategy succeeded in 
spite of challenges from both foreign and internal critics. A review of Seward’s 
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine is included because the establishment of a 
monarchy in Mexico by France was the first major violation of the tenets of that 
pronouncement.
The dissertation is neither a Seward biography nor a hagiography. Many of 
Seward’s mistakes are catalogued, such as when he suggested to President Abraham 
Lincoln in April 1861 that foreign wars might be an antidote to national dissolution. It 
does assert, however, that in matters broadly related to foreign affairs during the 
administrations of Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson, Seward had a masterful 
command of both strategy and tactics.
xiii
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In a related vein, the dissertation endeavors to delineate the active role that 
republican Mexicans played in their own liberation, focussing on the efforts of President 
Benito Juarez and his Minister in Washington, Don Matias Romero.
Finally, a case is made for Seward’s prescience. An avowed expansionist, 
Seward saw the growing power of the U.S. in economic rather than military terms. 
Seward can be seen as the father of the concept of U.S. economic hegemony, in that he 
believed that an expanding industrial economy inevitably brings not only economic 
benefits, but also social and political ones, a concept that ultimately failed to resonate in 
Mexico. That fact leads to the question posed in the Conclusion: how could the amicable 
relations that existed between the U.S. and Mexico after France’s departure have 
deteriorated so badly through most of the twentieth century?
xiv
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INTRODUCTION
"Seward acts from intelligence, Grant from impulse. ”
Gideon Welles, June 16, 1865
At the end of its Civil War, the United States could have easily gone to war to 
expel the French from Mexico. That potential conflict did not take place largely due to 
the efforts o f William Henry Seward, Secretary of State to U.S. Presidents Abraham 
Lincoln and Andrew Johnson. Democrats in Congress were invoking the Monroe 
Doctrine as the rationale to physically evict the French, and the U.S. Army, with General 
Ulysses S. Grant in Washington and General Philip Sheridan along the Rio Grande, were 
ready and willing to do so. Republican Mexicans themselves were negotiating U.S. 
military involvement, although, as might well be expected, under terms favorable to 
Mexico. The French forces in northern Mexico supporting the soi-disant emperor, 
Maximilian von Hapsburg, were crumbling along with Maximilian’s Mexican supporters. 
From all accounts, particularly those of Sheridan himself, the military part of evicting the 
French would have been easy. Yet it did not happen, and this dissertation questions why.
At the time that this drama unfolded, those politically active in Mexico were 
divided into roughly two camps. The Liberals, led by President Don Benito Juarez, 
wanted a government based essentially on Enlightenment principles.1 They wanted the
1 The Juarez government is called Liberal, his supporters Juaristas. The Juarez government defeated the 
Conservatives under Miguel Miramon in the War o f  Reform, 1858-1861. When Maximilian arrived in 
1864, his government will be called the Empire and will co-exist with that o f  Juarez. Among the major 
works on D. (Don) Benito Juarez, sometime called the “Benemerito de las Americas" (the meritorious Latin 
American) are Justo Sierra’s Juarez: Su Obra y  Su Tiempo, a massive five-hundred folio pages published in 
1905-06. It is a compelling narrative, but its usefulness for the researcher is limited by its total lack o f 
footnotes. Ralph Roeder’s Juarez and his Mexico, in two volumes, published in 1947, has a bibliography
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
2rule of law, and freedom from the suffocating omnipresence of the Catholic Church in 
Mexico’s secular affairs. They also wanted an end to the excesses of the military and the 
extravagances of its leaders, both typified by General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.
They envisioned a Mexico freed from the constraints of a caste system based on slavish 
preconception of Spanish superiority. Finally, the Liberals wanted to be free of foreign 
intervention. They did not want the French to rule their country through the puppet 
emperor, Maximilian, but neither did they want the U.S. to dominate their affairs. Nor 
did the Mexicans want to lose any more land than that which had already been lost 
through the Mexican-American War and the Gadsden Purchase. Liberal Mexicans 
actively sought U.S. assistance in ousting the French, but they had no intention of trading 
a French intervention for an American one. The dissertation endeavors to show how such 
a delicate balance was ultimately achieved, in spite of contradictory actions by both sides.
The second Mexican group operated under the umbrella appellation of 
“Conservatives.” It consisted mostly of those who stood to lose wealth or power under 
Liberal reforms. The military in general, and supporters of discredited dictator, General 
Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, in particular, the powerful members of the Catholic 
clergy, and those who benefited directly from the caste system that provided preferences 
based on the degree of one’s “Spanishness,” numbered prominently among 
Conservatives. There were also the foreign speculators in Mexico’s financial affairs who 
stood to profit under Conservative rule. Whereas the Liberals turned to the U.S. for 
assistance, the Conservatives turned to Europe, especially to France. Thus the problems
and an index, but again lacks footnotes. Jasper Ridley’s Maximilian and Juarez, published in 1992, has 
endnotes, but both the Roeder and Ridley works read more like historical novels than monographs. Two 
monographs on Juarez that are well-footnoted are Ivie Cadenhead’s Benito Juarez, published in 1973, and 
Brian Hamnett’s Juarez, published in 1994. The latter provides considerably more analysis than biography. 
Fernando Benitez’s Un indio zapoteco llamado Benito Juarez, published in 1998, is essentially a 
hagiography, and Celerino Salmeron’s Lasgrandes traiciones de Juarez, whose tenth edition was 
published in 1986, sees Juarez as an anticlerical villain who targeted the Catholic Church, and made treaties 
with foreigners, particularly the U.S., that were inimical to Mexico. Juarez’s familial concerns find 
extensive expression in Benito Juarez, Archivos Privados de D. Benito Juarez y D . Pedro Santacilia, a 
compilation o f  messages between Juarez and his son-in-law. Full citations can be found in the bibliography.
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3that President Lincoln and Secretary of State Seward had to deal with in ultimately 
getting the French out of Mexico entailed multiple dissident layers in all of the countries 
involved.
Only one single study, now almost a century old, focuses exclusively on Seward’s 
role in developing and implementing a strategy to remove the French from Mexico 
without using military force.2 No published studies in English on the specific problem of 
the French in Mexico try to incorporate the Mexican perspective. In the late 1800s, it 
was fashionable among historical writers to view Seward as the exclusive architect of the 
salvation of republican Mexico. For example, in 1892, Henry Cabot Lodge wrote:
At home the disposition was to consider Seward over-cautious. Abroad, the 
reverse was the case. In reality Seward’s policy was both bold and aggressive, 
and yet was so tempered by prudence that it never degenerated into rashness. He 
convinced foreign powers of our readiness to fight, which was of inestimable 
value, and which enabled us better than anything else to keep clear of actual 
hostilities. This comes out very strongly in the treatment of the Mexican 
question.3
A few years later, Frederic Bancroft continued in the same vein:
This much is certain: to Seward belongs the chief credit for expelling those who 
were violating the Monroe doctrine, for restoring republicanism in Mexico, and 
for averting war with France that might have been no less terrible than the Civil 
War, and might even have led to a renewal of that terrible conflict.4 
An effort is made in this study to correct the misperception, exhibited in the 
foregoing citations, that Seward deserves all of the credit for expelling the French. There 
is also an effort to show that both presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson
2 James M. Callahan, Evolution o f  Seward's Mexican Policy, Morgantown: W. Virginia U. Press, 1909.
3 Henry Cabot Lodge, Historical and Political Essays, Cambridge, MA: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1892, 
p. 43.
4 Frederic Bancroft, The Life o f  William H. Seward, 2 vols., NY: Harper & Bros., 1900, II, pp. 441-42.
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4acceded to, but did not initiate, most of Seward’s diplomatic efforts, particularly those 
regarding Mexico. In so doing, the dissertation’s findings disagree with the opposite 
premise, contained in Jay Monaghan’s Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Affairs: A 
Diplomat in Carpet Slippers, and Dean Mahin’s One War at a Time: The International 
Dimensions o f the American Civil War.5
One note about method is in order. Working with diplomatic exchanges poses a 
unique set of problems, because document collections do not match up outgoing 
messages with incoming messages. Given the time lag of transatlantic correspondence of 
on average five or six weeks during the period covered by the dissertation, there is often a 
significant disjunction between an “Instruction” from Seward and a “Despatch” from 
William Dayton or John Bigelow in Paris. The diplomatic dialog is often overtaken by 
intervening events. This is particularly the case for events involving Mexico and the U.S. 
during the months when the Juarez government was in flight, and again just before 
Maximilian’s execution. The researcher frequently finds himself utilizing two or three 
adjacent microfilm machines to track outgoing and incoming messages. The problem 
became more complicated when Seward issued “Circular” messages that required 
responses from many U.S. legations.
Another problem was keeping diplomatic correspondence numbers in order.
Those emanating from the State Department, “Instructions,” kept the numbering order 
rather rigorously. By contrast, because of an early oversight, the “Despatches” of U.S. 
Minister to Mexico Lewis Campbell had to be renumbered, thus creating a researching 
nightmare when Seward referenced one of Campbell’s incorrectly numbered messages.
The complexity increases exponentially when trying to match U.S. initiatives and 
responses with those of other governments, where the same issues of time lags and
5 Jay Monaghan, Abraham Lincoln Deals with Foreign Affairs: A Diplomat in Carpet Slippers, Lincoln, 
NE: U. o f Nebraska Press, 1997, reissue o f 1945 edition, entitled Diplomat in Carpet Slippers', Dean 
Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions o f  the American Civil War, Washington, D.C.: 
Brassey’s, 2000.
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5sequential numbering of correspondence exist. Writing this dissertation has been a 
complicated enterprise of trying to triangulate the evidence contained in several stories, 
all happening more or less simultaneously - France in Mexico, Juarez’s reaction to France 
and Maximilian, and Seward’s response to both in the context of the Civil War and the 
early days of Reconstruction. Hence some overlapping and backtracking have persisted 
in the text, despite an effort to keep the treatment of these main threads in loosely 
chronological order.
A weakness in the study is that due to constraints of time and resources, it was not 
possible to travel to France to consult the French archives. It was possible to work 
around this problem, to some degree, thanks to Michele Cunningham’s Mexico and the 
Foreign Policy o f Napoleon III, in which she quotes liberally in French from the original 
sources. Using the original French of Napoleon Ill’s important July 1862 letter to his 
commander in Mexico, General Forey, outlining Napoleon Ill’s objectives, made 
possible a comparison with excerpts from the letter translated into English, contained in 
Alfred and Kathryn Hanna’s Napoleon III and Mexico.6 Complete hardbound copies of 
Matias Romero’s ten-volume Correspondencia de la Legacion mexicana durante la 
intervencion extranjera are also relatively rare. One was consulted at Special Collections 
of the University of the Americas library in Cholula, Mexico in the summers of 2000 and 
2001. However, Inter-Library Loan at the University of New Hampshire was able to 
acquire a microfilmed copy from the Library of Congress. Thomas and Ebba Schoonover 
have provided important excerpts from the Correspondencia, translated into English, in 
their Mexican Lobby: Matias Romero in Washington, 1861-1867? Both the microfilm
6 Michele Cunningham, Mexico and the Foreign Policy o f  Napoleon III, NY: Palgrave, 2001, p. 126; 
Alfred and Kathryn Hanna, Napoleon III  and Mexico: American Triumph Over Monarchy, Chapel Hill, 
NC: U. o fN . Carolina Press, 1971, Chapter 7.
7 Matias Romero, Correspondencia de la Legacion mexicana en Washington durante la intervencion 
extranjera, 1860-1868, lOvols., Mexico City: Imprenta del Gobiemo, 1870-92; Thomas Schoonover, 
Mexican Lobby: M atias Romero in Washington, 1861-1867, Lexington, KY: U. Press o f Kentucky, 1986.
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6copy of the Correspondencia, and the Schoonover text were used in assessing Romero’s 
observations.
The problem facing the Mexicans that represents the starting point for this 
dissertation was the sending of French troops to Mexico in the winter of 1861-1862 as 
part of a debt-collecting mission that included the British and Spanish.8 The Mexican 
government, under Liberal president Benito Juarez, had declared a general moratorium 
on debt payments, citing imminent bankruptcy and a suspicion of fraudulent practices in 
the previous Conservative administration. Britain held the bulk of Mexico’s public debt, 
but France was vigorously prosecuting the financial claims of some of its private citizens 
against the Mexican government. Lesser amounts were owed to Spain. All three signed 
an agreement in October 1861, referred to as the Convention of London (also as the 
Tripartite Agreement), under which the signatories would assume control of Mexico’s 
customs houses in order to collect the money due them. The Agreement specifically 
limited the expeditionary forces to the collection of debt and expressly forbade 
intervention in Mexican internal affairs [see Appendix III, Article II].
The U.S. had been invited to join the Convention, as American citizens had 
claims against Mexico as well, but refused. The U.S. had somewhat of an ambivalent 
policy regarding taking advantage of Mexico’s prostrate financial position. Aligning 
itself with the Tripartite Convention was out of the question, as it would be seen 
domestically as an unnatural alliance between republicans and monarchists to exploit 
Mexico. It would have been unwise for Lincoln to commit troops for debt-collection as 
manpower needs for the Union were about to escalate. Insofar as France and Britain had 
recognized Confederate belligerency, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and two of 
the three Tripartite powers were already strained. There were many reasons for the U.S.
8 The entire episode o f  France’s military presence in Mexico is referred to as the “French Intervention” in 
English, la intervencion francesa, in Spanish. See Ernesto de la Torre Villar, La Intervencion Francesay 
el Triunfo de la Republica, Tomo I, Mexico City: Fondo de Culture Economica, 1968. The entire title of 
Romero’s Correspondencia refers to the intervencion extranjera, “foreign intervention.” That was because 
it began, when there were three countries involved in the armed occupation o f Mexico’s customs houses.
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7not joining the debt-collecting mission, not all of them altruistic. Finally, the loans 
already offered to Mexico always had strings attached, generally in the form of Mexican 
land as collateral for American money.9
Seward was also troubled by the presence o f European troops on the southern 
border of the U.S. at a time of great internal upheaval. He could not object to the 
European mission on legal grounds, because the seizing of customs houses for debt 
repayment was an accepted practice in the nineteenth century. He additionally worried 
about the “permanency of the Mexican Republic,” and the implications that such a debt- 
collecting mission might have for other new republican governments in the Western 
Hemisphere. Accordingly, in September 1861, he wrote to his Minister in Paris, William 
Dayton:
This Government has learned from information which leaves no room for doubt 
that an armed movement is being prepared b y . . .  Great Britain and France to 
proceed to Vera Cruz with a view to make demands of some nature upon Mexico 
. . .  this Government takes so deep an interest in the permanency of the Mexican 
Republic that it is even not unwilling to render it some extraordinary good offices 
in its present emergency. . .  The President desires you to inform. . .  France that 
this Government looks with deep concern to the subject of the armed movement 
to which I have thus directed your attention, and to ask Mr. Thouvenel [French 
Foreign Minister] for such explanations of it as His Imperial Majesty [Napoleon
9 Negotiated in 1859, the McLane-Ocampo treaty would have loaned $4 million to Mexico to help with its 
debt problems. In return, the U.S. would have received “rights o f  way” for railroads in northern Mexico 
and across the Tehuantepec isthmus in the south. The “deal-breaker” for the Mexicans was the provision 
that U.S. troops could intervene, without Mexico’s consent, to protect these rights o f way. The “deal- 
breaker” for the Northerners was the possibility that slavery could be more easily extended via the railroads 
proposed for northern Mexico. In 1859, the Senate defeated the proposal 27-18. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A 
Diplomatic History o f  the United States, 4,h ed., NY: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1955, p 39 In. Upon 
taking office as Secretary o f  State, Seward authorized his Minister to Mexico, Thomas Corwin to buy Baja 
California in order to provide Mexico with quick cash. When Mexico refused to sell Baja, Seward and 
Corwin tried to arrange for loans to cover Mexico’s public debt. These loans all had “land-as-collateral” 
provisions and were unacceptable to the legislative bodies in both countries. They will be dealt with in 
greater detail in Chapter I .
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Ill] may feel at liberty to give with a view to the satisfaction of the United States
and the preservation of peace in this hemisphere.10
This first excerpt from Seward’s “Instructions” indicates several themes that will 
be repeated throughout the entire encounter with the French in Mexico. Seward initially 
referred to “information that leaves no room for doubt,” indicating he had sources, some 
official and some unofficial, and Napoleon did not have to know exactly who or what 
they were. Secondly, the message expressed “so deep an interest” in the welfare of the 
“Mexican Republic” that the U.S. was willing to “render it some extraordinary good 
offices.” Seward stated from the beginning that the survival of republican Mexico was a 
priority for the U.S. and that the U.S. would work actively to maintain its existence. 
Seward expressed “deep concern” regarding “armed movement” as a way of settling any 
disputes, a principle he would maintain throughout the French intervention. Finally, he 
politely asked for an explanation, through the proper diplomatic channels, because he was 
interested in “the preservation of peace in this hemisphere.” This last phrase indicated 
that Seward saw European intervention as not purely a Mexican problem. Seward was 
sensitive to the fate of the other new republics in the Western Hemisphere, and he wanted 
to be sure to underline that European armed intervention anywhere in the hemisphere 
would pose problems for the United States.11 In so doing, he made subtle reference to 
what had come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine, without invoking it overtly. Most 
of the elements of Seward’s subsequent policy towards the French in Mexico are 
contained here: the tone was polite, the devotion to republican governments underscored,
l0Seward to Dayton, September 24,1861, #60 (serial message number), National Archives, Diplomatic 
Records, Instructions, France: M (microfilm publication #) 77, R (record #) 56, pp. 57-8. Seward’s 
messages to his diplomats are preserved under “Instructions.” Replies from abroad are listed under 
“Despatches” and are catalogued by the country where they originated. See Diplomatic Records: A Select 
Catalog o f  National Archives Microfilm Publications, Washington D.C.: National Archives Trust Fund 
Board, National Archives and Records Administration, 1986. “Vera Cruz” is often used in the 19lh century. 
Veracruz is the modem usage.
11 Lester Langley, The Americas in the Age o f  Revolution 1750 -1850 , New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1996, 
Ch. 12, especially pp. 279-80
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diplomatic solutions rather than military ones affirmed.
There was also a straightforward presentation of the U.S. position. Seward was 
not unwise to the ways of diplomacy, but he was not consciously duplicitous in his 
official correspondence. This straightforwardness contrasted sharply with the diplomatic 
approach taken by Napoleon III, who had sent his army into Mexico for more than debt 
collection.12 He had an ulterior plan to set up a monarchy in Mexico that was pro-French, 
pro-Catholic and pro-military. This government would replace the republican 
government of Benito Juarez and his Liberals, which was based on just the opposite: 
independence from foreign domination, democracy, and strict limits on the military and 
the Catholic Church.
Hence the stage was set for the conflict between the Liberals who were seeking 
U.S. support, and the Conservatives who were already supported by France. Seward 
would steadfastly support Juarez and republican principles while Napoleon III schemed 
to restore monarchy and the primacy of the Catholic Church.13 By having sent troops to 
collect debts, Napoleon III made possible an eventual armed conflict between the U.S 
and France. Working in consultation with President Lincoln, it fell primarily to Seward 
and his diplomats to make sure that the situation in Mexico did not escalate into an armed 
conflict involving the U.S. that would have long-term negative ramifications for all three 
countries.
12 Bom Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (1808-1873), third son o f  King Louis and Queen Hortense of 
Holland. The nephew o f Napoleon I, called Louis Napoleon before proclaiming himself Emperor o f the 
French in 1852, visited the U.S. after being exiled from France for trying to overthrow King Louis Philippe 
in 1836.
13 Mexico’s eleven-year war o f  independence ended when Agustin Iturbide took over from Spanish 
representative Juan de O’ Donoju via the Treaty o f Cordoba in 1821. Less than a year later, he had himself 
named “constitutional emperor" by the Mexican Congress on May 19,1822. It is in this sense that 
Maximilian would have “restored" the monarchy. Ten months later, in February 1823, Emperor Agustin I 
abdicated in the face o f  military opposition. Strictly speaking, this means that Maximilian was independent 
Mexico’s second emperor. Meyer, Course o f  Mexican History, pp. 283-95.
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Seward’s fears were realized when the French finally succeeded in setting up a 
monarchy in 1864 under Austrian archduke Ferdinand Maximilian von Hapsburg. The 
U.S. had a policy in place for dealing with such a contingency since 1823. Articulated 
by President James Monroe in December of 1823 in his annual message to Congress, it 
asserted that:
The American continents. . .  are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for 
future colonization by any European powers.. .we owe it, therefore, to candor and 
to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to 
declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to 
any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the 
existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered 
and shall not interfere.14 
The policy was largely formulated by one of Seward’s predecessors as Secretary o f State, 
John Quincy Adams, as both a warning to Russia in Alaska and to the European powers 
not to try to reassert themselves in the newly liberated Latin American republics. 
European powers generally regarded the 1823 announcement as both arrogant and 
laughable, coming as it did from the U.S., a military midget at the time. It was not even 
called the Monroe Doctrine until 1853.15 It became a factor for Seward and Congress in 
their dealings with the French in Mexico, but Seward did not refer to the Doctrine by 
name in his official correspondence.
14 Dexter Perkins, A History o f  the Monroe Doctrine, Boston: Little, Brown, 1963, pp. 391. Perkins states 
that President Polk, in 1845, was the first to resuscitate the Doctrine regarding British in Oregon “precisely 
twenty-two years after the enunciation o f the original.. . ” Perkins notes that French Prime Minister 
Guizot was the first, in 1846, to denounce “the pretension o f  the United States to the hegemony o f the New 
World.” British opinion at the time echoed that o f Guizot. In the 1860s, Seward knew that publicly 
invoking the doctrine would only further irritate his European adversaries. Nevertheless, Perkins argues 
that the principles contained in the Doctrine, particularly that o f  European non-intervention in the New 
World, were the basis for much o f  Seward’s policy toward the French in Mexico. Dexter Perkins, The 
Monroe Doctrine 1826-1867, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933, pp. 87 & 117. See also Frederick 
Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History, NY: Vintage, 1966, pp. 14-17,204,206,220.
15 “For the first t i m e . . .  in the [Congressional] debates of 1853, the declaration o f 1823 becomes the 
Monroe Doctrine [italics in original]. In earlier discussions the references are almost invariably to 
‘principles’ o f  Mr. Monroe, or to the “ ’Monroe declaration’.” Ibid., p. 99.
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Seward revered John Quincy Adams, and there can be little doubt that he was 
completely familiar with the ideas that Adams had laid out when he served as President 
Monroe’s Secretary of State. Seward had visited Europe prior to joining the Lincoln 
Administration, and he may have known that citing the “Doctrine” would only 
antagonize those in power, particularly British Prime Minister Palmerston. He may have 
also chosen not mention the Doctrine by name in his initial correspondence with his 
counterparts in Europe because, at the outset, the avowed intention of the Tripartite 
Alliance was to collect debts, not to change Mexico’s political system. It was only with 
the installation of Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico in 1864 that the Doctrine received 
its most serious challenge in the four decades since its articulation.16
Under normal circumstances, the United States might have acted more quickly 
and forcefully when the Tripartite troops disembarked in Mexico in the winter of 1861- 
1862. However, by this time the U.S. was fully occupied with its own civil war, an 
enterprise so taxing for President Lincoln that he could not turn his full attention to 
Napoleon Ill’s schemes in Mexico. Indeed, in assessing cause and effect, it may have 
been that the Tripartite nations chose to move on Mexico when they did precisely 
because the U.S. was otherwise engaged. With the president primarily absorbed with 
domestic matters, the burden of formulating U.S. policy toward European intrigues fell to 
Seward. He was convinced that a European monarchy imposed on Mexico and kept in 
power by French troops could not last indefinitely. However, such a monarchy and the 
presence of French troops on the southern border of the U.S. could cause considerable 
trouble while the Civil War raged on. Seward’s principal dilemma was that the means at 
his disposal for removing these troops, and returning Mexico to constitutional 
government, were extremely limited during the war years.
16 He was named Emperor after a fraudulent plebiscite conducted by the French Army, see Jasper Ridley, 
Maximilian and Juarez, NY: Ticknor & Fields, 1992, pp. 156-7. Ridley notes that 6,445,564 Mexicans 
voted for Maximilian as emperor out of a total population o f  8,620,892, roughly a 75% turnout, clearly 
impossible in Mexico in 1864.
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He ultimately chose a two-step approach to pressure the French to leave Mexico 
without actually engaging them militarily. The first step utilized traditional diplomacy, 
“masterful inactivity” in the words of James Callahan.17 This approach, however, did not 
consist of doing nothing. Instead, Seward, in a series of messages, systematically erected 
the U.S. case against French activity in Mexico, first to French Foreign Minister Antoine 
Edouard Thouvenel and then to his successor, Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys. Seward re­
iterated that the U.S. would never accept in Mexico a monarchy installed by a foreign 
power. He tempered this approach with assurances to France that the U.S. valued its 
long-term friendly bilateral relationship. A theme that Seward emphasized throughout 
this phase was how foolish it would be for France and the U.S., whose ties of friendship 
went back to the American Revolution, to become enemies over what Seward described 
as an “embarrassment” in Mexico.
Seward was also careful not to affront French honor publicly. Seward had met 
Napoleon III twice before becoming Secretary of State, once in the U.S. and once in 
France, and sensed that challenging him directly, particularly where the honor of the 
French military was involved, would only cause Napoleon to become more intransigent 
about keeping his troops in Mexico. Seward was convinced Napoleon III would fight the 
U.S. over Mexico if French honor were publicly questioned, regardless of the costs. 
Mexican Minister Matias Romero, reporting to his government in 1864 on a conversation 
with Postmaster-General Montgomery Blair, wrote:
Blair mentioned that the United States government wanted to avoid involving the 
pride of the French nation in the Mexican conflict. Until now . . .  this war was 
unpopular in France. . .  if the French government is left to fight internal 
discontent and the opposition in the Corps Legislatif [French parliament], this 
government [U.S.] believes, it will soon find itself compelled to withdraw the
17 James M, Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations, NY: Cooper Square, 1967, p. 292. 
See also Callahan’s Evolution o f  Seward's Mexican Policy, Morgantown, W.V., W. Virginia U. Studies, 
1909.
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expedition. If the United States intervenes in the matter and requests withdrawal 
of the expedition, however, French national pride will be offended, and under 
these circumstances the emperor would find sufficient grounds not only to 
prolong his Mexican intervention indefinitely, but even to make war on the 
United States.18
When the Civil War finally ended in 1865, Seward moved to the second phase of 
his strategy: saber rattling. President Lincoln’s successor, Andrew Johnson, supported 
the efforts of both Seward and Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant, commander-in-chief of 
the U.S. Army, to intimidate the French.19 Seward ratcheted up the diplomatic pressure 
with the implication that military force was available and about to be used. Between fifty 
and one hundred thousand Union troops were sent to the Texas -  Mexico border under 
the command of General Philip Sheridan. Grant had ordered them to stay there and 
provide what assistance they could to the forces of Juarez without actually engaging in 
battle.20
In an endeavor motivated by domestic political considerations in the fall o f 1866, 
Seward and Johnson brought General Grant and Matias Romero, Mexico’s Minister to
18 Marias Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Affairs, Feb., 17,1864, vol. IV, pp. 52-3 in Correspondencia de la 
legacion mexicana en Washington durante la intervencion extranjera, 1860-1868, 10 vols. Mexico: 
Imprenta del Gobiemo, 1870-1892), Library o f Congress, Photoduplication Service, 1978, Shelf #70139, 
Reel #2.
19 I f  possible, Andrew Johnson had even less experience in foreign affairs than Abraham Lincoln. 
Moreover, he so quickly became enmeshed in the politics o f  Reconstruction that he was unable to spend 
much time on foreign policy. Like Lincoln, he relied on Seward for this. See Eric L. McKitrick, ed., 
Andrew Johnson: A Profile, NY: Hill and Wang, 1969, especially “Johnson and His Policy” by Howard K. 
Beale, pp. 78-111; see also Hans Trefousse, Andrew Johnson: A Biography, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1989, p. 270.
20 The higher figure is proposed by Robert B. Brown, Guns Over the Border: American A id to the Juarez 
Government During the French Intervention, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Ann Arbor, U. o f Michigan, 
1951, p. 231. Estimates on the exact number o f  troops vary. Gen. Grant talked o f  “sixty-thousand,” in 
Schoonover, Mexican Lobby, p. 59. See also P.H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs o f  P.H. Sheridan, General, 
United States Army, 2 vols., NY: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1888, especially vol. II, pp. 208-228. Grant’s 
5/17/1865 order to Sheridan putting him in Charge of the West, gave him command o f 25,000 from Gen. 
Canby, 12,000 from Gen. Reynolds, the 4th Army Corps at Nashville and the 25lh Army Corps at City 
Point, VA. Grant ordered Sheridan “to restore Texas, and that part o f  Louisiana held by the enemy, to the 
Union in the shortest practicable time, in a way most effectual for securing permanent peace.” Grant’s 
orders to Sheridan, including orders about policing the Rio Grande, are contained in Memoirs, pp. 208-9.
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Washington, along with them on a campaign tour that was dubbed, “The Swing Around 
the Circle.” 21 Many speeches were made in support of republican Mexico, and the 
presence of Grant was a testimony to his concurrence in the policy. In a further attempt 
to indicate potential U.S. military involvement in solving the Mexican issue, Seward also 
sent two prominent generals on diplomatic missions, General John Schofield to Paris in 
the fall of 1865 and General William Sherman to Mexico in November and December of 
1866. In both cases, the presence of U.S. generals on diplomatic missions was designed 
to remind Napoleon III that diplomacy was not the sole option open to the U.S.
For his strategy to work, Seward needed time, something for which he constantly 
bargained in the five years from the French arrival in January 1862 until their departure 
in March 1867. The Schofield mission to Paris in 1865 and the Sherman mission to 
Mexico in 1866, which will be discussed subsequently in some detail, can be seen in this 
context. From intelligence reports in Europe, Seward was convinced that time was on the 
side of the U.S. and the Juarez government. He knew that the French intervention in 
Mexico was putting a serious strain on the French treasury. He also knew that opposition 
to the intervention was growing in the French Parliament. Prussia was adopting a 
threatening presence on France’s northeastern border, further distracting the French 
Emperor. Finally, reports were filtering back to Seward, particularly from Minister John 
Lothrop Motley, that Maximilian might not be up to the task he would assume in Mexico. 
These were all factors whose importance in influencing U.S. and French policy would 
increase with the passage of time.
Seward was also concerned about the long-term bilateral relationship between the 
U.S. and Mexico. He told the Mexicans like Romero, who were lobbying for the U.S. to 
invade and oust the French, that getting a U.S. army into Mexico would be easy. Getting
21 Starting in Washington in. late August, 1866 the official party traveled by rail to Baltimore, Philadelphia, 
New York, West Point, Albany, Aubum (NY), Seward’s hometown, Niagara Falls, Buffalo, Cleveland, 
Toledo, Detroit, Chicago, Springfield, IL, Alton, St. Louis, Indianapolis, Louisville, Cincinnati, Columbus, 
Pittsburg, Harrisburg and Baltimore, arriving in Washington on 9/15/1866. Itinerary in Gideon Welles, 
Diary o f  Gideon Welles, vol. II, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1909, p. 588.
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99it out again might prove considerably more difficult. Seward was well educated and 
well traveled for his time. He had a sense of history and often took the long view. He 
feared that a U.S. force of liberation sent to Mexico could easily become a force o f 
occupation and did not want to play a part in the creation of a permanently hostile state 
on the U.S. southern border. From his perspective, an “American Intervention” would be 
little better than a French one.
Indeed, Mexican hostility towards foreigners had a long provenance. One of the 
roots for that hostility could be found in a xenophobia based on the three-hundred and 
fifty years of Spanish exploitation since Fernando Cortes arrived in Tenochtitlan (Mexico 
City) in 1519. In 1810, Father Hidalgo’s famous Grito de Dolores (Cry of Dolores), 
announcing the beginning of the struggle for Mexican independence, called for death to 
the “gachupines. " 23 Another root of hostility was the amount of Mexican territory 
ceded to the U.S. at the end of the Mexican-American War in 1848, even though the U.S. 
paid $15 million and assumed claims of American citizens worth another $3 million.
That two-year struggle resulted in Mexico losing roughly half of its territory, with the 
U.S. increasing its size correspondingly by a third [see map ii]. Another invasion, even 
for ostensibly good purposes, could rekindle the ill will in Mexico that emanated from 
that humiliating defeat.24 Even though the Gadsden Purchase, five years after the Treaty 
of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, was indeed a purchase, the U.S. paying $10 million for roughly 
20 million acres south of the Gila River, the Mexicans were annoyed by the alienation of
22 Matias Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Affairs, April 6,1866, #266 in Correspondencia, vol. VII, pp. 382- 
85: see also Schoonover, Mexican Lobby, p. 122.
21 Racial designations are often confusing for beginning students o f  Mexico. Europeans bom in Spain but 
living in Mexico were called "peninsulares" or, derogatorily, “gachupines.” "Criollos," creoles like Father 
Hidalgo, were also one hundred per cent Spanish, but bom in Mexico. Mestizos were a mix o f  Spanish and 
Indian. This whole range o f  racial hierarchies, called castas, derived from unions between Europeans, 
indigenous Indians and imported slaves.
24 See Peter H. Smith, Talons o f  the Eagle: Dynamics o f  U.S.-Latin American Relations, NY: Oxford U. 
Press, 1996, pp. 23-4; Lester Langley, Mexico and the United Slates: The Fragile Relationship, Boston: 
Twayne, 1991, pp. 4-5; Josefina Z. Vasquez and Lorenzo Meyer, The United States and Mexico, Chicago: 
U. o f  Chicago Press, 1985, chapter 3.
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yet more of their territory. The Liberals in Mexico were also infuriated that the money 
went to help the desperate Santa Anna regime that was persecuting them.25
Like Seward, Juarez and his supporters, the Juaristay, were also convinced that 
neither the French nor their puppet Maximilian would last very long. There were times 
when Juarista resources were almost depleted, and despite an early dramatic victory at 
Puebla in 1862, they eventually had to flee the better-organized and equipped French 
forces. They fought on nevertheless, using Mexico’s own topography to their advantage, 
and their own devotion to an independent and democratic Mexico as their motivation. 
Although Seward’s diplomacy was a critical factor in the French leaving when they did, 
the Juaristay themselves never doubted that the French eventually would. Matias 
Romero, who felt U.S. material and financial aid had been deficient, emphasized the 
“moral” nature of that assistance. From the Mexican perspective, the U.S. had not 
“saved” Mexico. Republican Mexico had saved itself with U.S. help. This difference of 
opinion does not necessarily reflect fundamental incompatibility. There were a number 
of factors that precipitated the French exodus, and Mexican, French and U.S. observers at 
the time tended to emphasize that which was most cordial to their own conceptions.
Despite the difference of these perspectives on the importance of the U.S. role in 
expelling the French from Mexico, there was no question that Seward faced enormous 
obstacles in managing the U.S. component of the policy that helped to bring it about. He 
did this while at loggerheads with many of his colleagues in the Cabinet and Congress.
In particular, Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, was among those distrustful of 
Seward in the Cabinet. He wrote venomously of Seward in his Diary, even though he 
occasionally accorded Seward begrudging praise.26 Radical Republicans in Congress
25 Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History o f  the United States, 4'1' ed., N Y : Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 
1955, pp. 324-27.
26 Gideon Welles, The Diary o f  Gideon Welles, 3 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909. The dissertation’s 
title comes from vol. II, p. 317.
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came to consider Seward apostate for putting union before abolition.27 He had 
complicated dealings with the military, particularly with General Ulysses S. Grant. 
Seward also had to contend with the diplomats in Washington whose goals or methods 
conflicted with his own. In that regard, his relationship with Romero was particularly 
complex. At one point in 1865, Grant and Romero were working together behind the 
scenes to contradict Seward’s policy directly. Another complicating factor was that, after 
Lincoln’s assassination, Seward soon found that Andrew Johnson possessed few of the 
former president’s exceptional qualities. He chose to remain loyal to him nevertheless, 
further alienating him from the Radicals in Congress, who detested Johnson. In so doing, 
Seward effectively terminated his own political career.
In addition to his political and diplomatic adversaries, Seward had an unwieldy 
State Department to contend with. He and his son Frederick labored to bring its 
personnel and facilities up to the level of competency necessary for a country fighting a 
civil war and engaging in complex diplomacy on several fronts. Seward upgraded 
intelligence activities, thus enabling him to form a more accurate view of European 
factors influencing Napoleon I l l’s actions in Mexico. He tried to introduce an element of 
professionalism in the U.S. diplomatic corps at a time when ministerial positions were 
just another component of the spoils system. His own diplomats often caused him as 
much trouble as his adversaries.28
27 “Radical Republican” was a term applied to a loosely organized coalition o f  Republican Senators and 
Congressmen who were united on their overall aims for emancipation even though they never fully agreed 
on tactics and timing. Charles Sumner was prominent among them, along with the other Massachusetts 
Senator, Henry Wilson, Benjamin Wade from Ohio, Zachariah Chandler from Michigan and Lyman 
Trumbull o f  Illinois. The were joined in the House by Thaddeus Stevens and Galusha Grow of 
Pennsylvania, Henry Winter Davis o f  Maryland, George Julian and Schuyler Colfax o f Indiana, John 
Kasson o f Iowa and most o f  the Representatives from the New England states. Their demands ultimately 
found expression in the Emancipation Proclamation, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution and in the Civil Rights Acts o f  1866 and 1875. In general, they became progressively 
hawkish on Mexico once Maximilian was enthroned in 1864, and many advocated defending the Monroe 
Doctrine militarily. See Hans Trefousse, The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard fo r  Racial Justice, 
NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969 and T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, Madison, WI, U. o f 
Wisconsin Press, 1941.
28 Robert L. Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900, Arlington Heights, IL, AHM 
Publishing Corp., 1975, pp. 31-3.
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Although he practiced realpolitik, Seward was not merely a pragmatist. As a 
lawyer, governor, and U.S. senator, he had a firm grounding in the U.S. Constitution and 
its principles. He was neither a pacifist nor an isolationist. He simply preferred 
extending U.S. influence by economic means or legitimate purchase whenever possible.29 
He supported Juarez because the Juarez government was democratic, and because 
supporting Mexican democracy was the right thing to do. He also felt that the 
government of Juarez and his Liberals would prevail against Maximilian and the French, 
and the U.S. would be in a better position to influence subsequent events there as a 
trading partner rather than as a liberating army. That being said, Seward clearly had no 
interest in having a French colony, either de facto or de jure, on the southern border of 
the U.S.
In order to function in the Western Hemisphere, the Maximilian government 
needed diplomatic recognition from the U.S., which it never received. Hence, when 
Seward was the guest of honor at numerous official banquets in Mexico City in 1869, 
those toasting him made frequent mention of his devotion to democratic principles both 
in the U.S and Mexico, the role he had played in an administration that finally abolished 
slavery, and his diplomatic success over the French. Seward was receiving praise for his 
central role in solving problems, “embarrassments” was a term he liked to use, that he 
would have preferred to have avoided in the first place.
29 Ernest Paolino, The Foundations o f  the American Empire, Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1973; Walter 
LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation o f  American Expansion 1860-1898, Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 
1963; Robert Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the New 1865-1900, Arlington Heights, IL, Harlan 
Davidson, 1975; Joseph G. Whelan, William Henry Seward, Expansionist, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
U. o f  Rochester, 1959.
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CHAPTER ONE 
“INSURMOUNTABLE EMBARRASSMENT”
Given the secession crisis following Abraham Lincoln’s election, Mexico was far 
from William Seward’s thoughts when he was preparing to assume office as Secretary of 
State in March 1861. It is equally reasonable to say that Mexico was among the last 
things he expected to be working on at the end of his tenure in 1869. Yet attending to 
Mexico and the problem of the French presence there consumed much of his time as 
Secretary of State. Ultimately avoiding war there with the French was one of his 
crowning achievements as a diplomat. He would call French insistence on staying in 
Mexico and putting Maximilian on the throne “an insurmountable embarrassment.”1 In 
one sense this phrase was a threat, for it implied that continued French presence in 
Mexico posed an affront to the U.S. The “embarrassment,” a term Seward loved, referred 
to the fact that the U.S. and France had a long, amicable relation that was being 
jeopardized by what Seward viewed as a totally misguided policy on the part of Napoleon 
III. His numerous “Instructions” to American diplomats on the French presence, cited 
throughout this chapter, especially those to William Dayton in France, make that clear.
Seward had to overcome a number of obstacles before he could effectively deal 
with the French presence and the prospect of an Austrian monarch replacing an 
indigenous Mexican president. Among those obstacles was domestic opposition to both 
his policies and his personality. Early on in the Lincoln Administration, Seward 
displayed a penchant for alienating many of his colleagues. This did not have so much to 
do with Seward’s personality per se, which almost everyone conceded to be charming 
and amiable, but rather from the deep political passions that fired the country, and the 
hard feelings left over from the Republican Party’s nominating convention, where
1 Seward to Dayton, April 27,1863, #338, Diplomatic Records, France, Instructions, France, M77, R56, p. 
368.
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Seward had almost inexplicably lost to Lincoln.2
Seward’s diplomacy was shaped in part by Mexican initiatives, especially an 
unexpectedly strong initial military resistance at Puebla in 1862. This resistance caused 
Napoleon Ill’s scheme to lose valuable momentum while the U.S. was distracted by the 
Civil War. Seward had to come to grips with the fact that France was, if not outright 
devious in its diplomatic correspondence concerning its intentions in Mexico, then 
something far less than straightforward. This became clear when a letter from Napoleon 
III to his commander in Mexico, General Forey, outlining the rationale for the French 
initiative, was published in January 1863. Part of the “embarrassment” was catching an 
old ally involved in such duplicity.
The main point, however, is that the “insurmountable embarrassment” was indeed 
surmountable, had Napoleon III been more perceptive. He had indications from the 
beginning that his scheme for Mexico would not work, and perhaps through pride or 
hubris, simply chose to ignore them. In 1871 when both were out of office, Seward 
confided to former French Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys that he could not 
understand how Napoleon III, who bad visited the United States, could have so 
completely misperceived his chances of success. When asked his opinion of Napoleon 
III, two years after the matter of the French Intervention had been resolved, Seward 
replied:
I do not allow myself, if I can avoid it, to judge statesmen any more than generals 
on the mere ground of their success. I was astonished when I saw the Emperor 
afterwards balancing so closely between the United States Government and the 
Rebellion [Confederacy], and finally throwing his sword into the scale by his 
expedition to Mexico. I had seen him when he was in exile in the United States; 
he talked with me at Compiegne [royal residence outside of Paris] about his visit
2 Seward was 71 [A  votes ahead o f  Lincoln on the first ballot, 3 'A on the second, losing on the third. 
Glyndon Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, NY: Oxford U. Press, 1967, pp. 224-5.
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there. I could not believe it possible that a European statesman who had visited 
the United States would fail to see that the combination of the States was 
impregnable, and that the American continent should never again be the theatre of 
European aggression or invasion.3 
Seward, on his account, correctly perceived the principal political facts from the outset, 
couched them in their historical context, and did not deviate from a strategy that 
ultimately left the U.S. “unembarrassed.”
Seward had mentioned Mexico in a few speeches in the U.S. Senate, but in the 
late 1850s, Mexico was not Seward’s primary concern.4 By then, Mexico had been in 
turmoil for half a century. It had taken over a decade of brutal fighting to achieve 
independence after Father Hidalgo’s call to arms in 1810. The new Mexican leader, 
Augustin Iturbide, had himself declared Emperor Augustin I in May 1822. By February 
1823, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna ousted Augustin I, but then proceeded to adopt some 
of the emperor’s megalomaniacal and opportunistic characteristics. He became the 
dominant figure in Mexican politics until he was replaced in the mid-1850s. There were a 
number of reasons leading to Santa Anna’s ouster, not the least of which was his 
mishandling of the Mexican-American War, 1846-1848. The cession of territory to the 
U.S. in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo resulted from that conflict. Needing cash, Santa 
Anna agreed to alienate more land via the Gadsden Purchase in 1853.5
After the demise of Santa Anna, a group of progressive reformers including 
Benito Juarez, the Liberals, took over the government. The Conservatives, who had been
3 Interview between Seward and Drouyn de Lhuys, August, 1871, reported in Frederic Seward, 
Reminiscences o f  a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, 1830-1915, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1916, p. 424; 
Van Deusen, Seward, p. 560.
4 J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico, NY: F.S. Crofts & Co., 1931, ch. 15. Rippy cites speeches 
in 1846,1850,1852 and a general speech about the whole Western Hemisphere in I860, p. 252.
5 The territory gained in the Treaty ultimately led to the states o f  California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona and 
parts o f  Colorado and New Mexico. The Gadsden Purchase in 1853 added territory in modem southern 
Arizona and New Mexico, suitable for extending a railroad line to the West Coast, see Samuel Flagg 
Bemis, Diplomatic History’ o f  the United States, 4'h ed„ NY: Holt Rhinehart and Winston, 1955, pp. 325-
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turned out of office, and the Catholic Church, which was losing property and power 
under the Liberals, fought back. The country tottered on the brink of bankruptcy, but that 
had been the situation for years.
Santa Anna, while still in power, had sent Juarez into exile, largely as a personal 
vendetta. This stemmed from an incident after the Mexican-American War (1846-48) 
when Santa Anna was in disgrace, and running from his enemies. He was denied refuge 
in the Mexican State of Oaxaca by then governor Juarez. When Santa Anna returned to 
power in the early 1850s, he remembered Juarez’s refusal and had him imprisoned in 
May 1853. Juarez was incarcerated in the infamous harbor prison of Veracruz, San Juan 
de Ulua, then put on a ship destined for Europe via Havana. In a twist of fate that had 
great consequences for both the U.S. and Mexico, Juarez managed to reship for New 
Orleans upon his arrival in Havana.6 A group of Mexican dissidents, called Liberals, 
had already assembled in New Orleans, and it was there that the seeds were sown for the 
project to overthrow Santa Anna, later called the Plan de Ayutla. Their platform called 
for social justice, and an end to military and Catholic Church privilege. Profoundly 
influenced by the Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions, these 
reformers advocated a republic and the rule of law.7 They were opposed, of course, by 
staunch Catholics and the military, neither of which wanted to change the status quo.
The subsequent success of the Liberals in the 1860s is remarkable in light of their 
pathetic start in exile. Historian Ivie Cadenhead described the conditions they faced in 
New Orleans as follows:
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct the feelings of frustration, 
homesickness, true illness, improvidence, and despair that this group of exiles
6 Ivie E. Cadenhead, Benito Juarez, New York: Twayne Publishers, 1973, pp 40-43. In New Orleans, 
Juarez encountered other Mexican revolutionaries who would play major roles in the upcoming War o f 
Reform and in Juarez’s Liberal government, Melchor Ocampo, Jose Maria Mata and Ponciano Arriaga. 
Juan Alvarez was a rebel fighter from Guerrero province, whose assistants, Ignacio Comonfort and 
Florencio Villareal published the Plan based on the New Orleans group’s ideas.
Jaime Suchlicki, Mexico: From Montezuma to the Fall o f  the PRI, Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2001, p.
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felt. They spent their time searching for good news from home, corresponding 
with friends in Mexico and the United States, seeking allies for the ultimate 
victory over Santa Anna and, all the while, trying to survive with what little funds 
were obtained from home and earned in the menial odd jobs available to a 
Mexican in New Orleans.8
Within a year and a half of Juarez’s exile to New Orleans, Santa Anna had 
resigned. General Juan Alvarez, a good soldier but poor political administrator, headed 
the new regime, but his War Minister Ignacio Comonfort handled personnel decisions.
He recalled Juarez, who was given the post of Minister of Justice and Public Instruction. 
His fellow New Orleans exile, Melchor Ocampo, became Minister of both the Interior 
and Foreign Affairs.
The overall political chaos existing in Mexico in the 1850s could be attributed to 
several causes. Mexico’s crushing defeat in the Mexican-American War (1846-1848) at 
the hands o f the “gringos” and the alienation of half of its territory in the subsequent 
peace treaty had devastated public confidence in Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Historian 
Michael Meyer questions Santa Anna’s role as a  megalomaniac and asks if “Santa Anna 
was the cause of Mexico’s problems or if Mexico was the cause of Santa Anna’s 
problems,” in light of Santa Anna having been president eleven times from 1823 to 1855, 
Meyer opts for the former.9 The Liberal Party was bom in opposition to Santa Anna’s 
excesses and Catholic Church’s perceived complicity in them.10
Insofar as Mexico had no tradition of a “loyal opposition” and no mechanism for 
the peaceful transition of power, a vacuum was created when Santa Anna was forced out 
in 1855, a vacuum that took until 1867 to fill. A Constitutional Convention, dominated
8 Cadenhead, Benito Juarez, pp. 40-1. Juarez himself got a job rolling cigars.
9 Michael C. Meyer, The Course o f  Mexican History, 6 ed., NY: Oxford U, Press, 1999,318.
10 The Liberals succeeded in what is called the Revolution o f Ayutla (1855), named after their 
pronouncement, the Plan de Ayutla, and, o f course, the Mexican city o f  the same name, as reform 
proposals, plans, were often named after the cities where they originated. Once successful, Juan Alvarez 
became President, Ignacio Comonfort, Secretary o f  War, Melchor Ocampo, Secretary o f  the Treasury, 
Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Secretary o f  Development and Benito Juarez, Secretary o f  Justice. Ibid., p. 362.
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by Liberals, was called to formulate the Constitution of 1857, which included a bill of 
rights, the abolition of slavery, the guarantee of the right to bear arms, and habeas 
corpus. Three very important provisions bore the names of their proponents: ley (law) 
Juarez, ley Lerdo, and ley Iglesias.11 Ley Juarez abolished special military and religious 
courts. The Liberals insisted that priests and soldiers face prosecution in regular courts 
just like other Mexicans and not have their own legal systems (fueros). Ley Lerdo limited 
the Catholic Church to owning only property used in its daily operations, with the 
government confiscating the rest and selling it, with a view to financing the Liberal 
political agenda. Finally, Ley Iglesias transferred the power of registering births, deaths,
adoptions and marriages from the Catholic Church to civil authorities and prohibited the
1*)
Church from charging fees for these services.
These three laws caused immediate tension not only between the Liberals and the 
Conservatives who supported Catholic Church and military privilege, but also amongst 
the Liberals themselves. Although agreeing on most issues, Liberals disagreed on the role 
of the Catholic Church, particularly after the Vatican weighed into the deliberations, 
threatening excommunication for those supporting the Constitution containing the above 
provisions.13 President Alvarez and several Liberal cabinet members abdicated, leaving a 
vacillating Ignacio Comonfort in charge as president.14 What ultimately precipitated the 
ensuing war was the fact that the Constitution agreed upon in 1857 did not establish the 
Catholic Church as Mexico’s official religion.
11 Another confusing factor for one researching this period o f  Mexican history is that there are two Lerdo 
de Tejada, Miguel (1812 -1861) and Sebastian (1823-1889). Miguel was an early supporter o f Juarez and 
served as his Minister o f  Finance. He died unexpectedly o f  typhus. Sebastian was less involved with 
Juarez early on, but became his principal adviser when the republican government was in flight in his 
capacity as Minister o f  Government and Foreign Relations. Romero’s correspondence from Washington 
was directed to Sebastian. Frank A. Knapp, The Life o f  Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada 1823-1889: A Study o f  
Influence and Obscurity, Austin: U. Texas Press, 1951, chapters V & VII.
12 Michael C. Meyer et. al, The Course o f  Mexican History, 6th ed., New York: Oxford U. Press, 1999, pp. 
363-4. Ley means “law” in Spanish. See also Jaime Suchlicki, Mexico:From Montezuma to NAFTA, 
Chiapas and Beyond, Washington: Brassey’s, 2001, chapter 10.
13 Meyer, Course, p. 366.
14 Ibid., p. 363. Comonfort had been Alvarez’s Minister o f  War.
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Juarez, Mexican Chief Justice since 1855, was not himself elected, having 
become president under a provision of the 1857 Constitution that effectively made the 
Chief Justice vice-president. As the fight over the new anti-clerical laws heated up, 
Comonfort, a compromiser at heart, resigned. Seeing no solution to the 
Liberal/Conservative standoff, he left office just before Conservative General Felix 
Zuloaga staged a coup d ’etat, dissolved the Liberal Congress, and arrested Juarez.
In one o f a series o f interesting escapes during this period of Mexican history, 
Juarez managed to escape from the Conservatives and flee to Queretaro, north of Mexico 
City. Given Comonforf s resignation, the Liberals who had fled to Queretaro proclaimed 
Juarez President of the Republic according to the constitutional provisions cited above. 
The Conservatives, of course, totally disregarded this proclamation. The armed struggle 
between the Liberals and Conservatives, called the War of the Reform (1858-1861), was 
on.
The Liberals left Queretaro and established themselves on the Gulf Coast in 
Veracruz. From there, the Juaristas conducted a brutal fight, made more bitter by its 
religious context.16 Like Lincoln with Grant, Juarez ultimately found two good field 
generals, Gonzalez Ortega and Ignacio Zaragoza, who could lead the Liberals to victory. 
The final battle took place at San Miguel Calpulalpan in December of 1860, where 
Ortega’s Liberal forces decisively defeated the Conservatives led by Miramon.
Victorious President Juarez returned to Mexico City for the first time in almost three 
years in early January 1861. The Liberals’ sense of euphoria was soon dissipated by the 
realization that practically no pesos remained in the national treasury. Juarez would have 
to temporarily suspend payments on Mexico’s foreign debt in order to keep his
15 “The War o f  the R eform . . .  was in many ways the culmination o f the ideological disputations, the 
shuffling o f  constitutions, the church-state controversies, and the minor civil wars that had shattered the 
peace periodically since Independence. Mexicans had not yet defined the kind o f society they wanted to 
the satisfaction o f  one another, and the intense passions o f  the age precluded the possibility o f  a 
rapprochement without still another resort to arms.” Meyer, Course, p. 367.
16 A good example o f  the ferocity o f  the conflict is that after one battle, Conservative General Marquez 
ordered shot the medical personnel who had treated some Liberal combatants.
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government afloat, an act that would precipitate a joint European debt collecting mission 
later in that year.
This, then, was the political situation in Mexico just prior to the Lincoln 
Administration taking office. As was the custom, Lincoln had stayed in Illinois between 
Election Day and the inauguration, while Seward, Secretary of State designate but still a 
U.S. Senator from New York, was in Washington trying to articulate the goals and give 
direction to the new administration. Whatever was happening in Mexico was much less 
pressing than the secession of southern states that had already begun.17 The tension was 
so high that Lincoln had to essentially be smuggled into Washington for the 
inauguration.18
Sensing a drift in Lincoln’s administration shortly after the inauguration,
Seward wrote an ill-considered note to the President in which he brought up the 
perceived lack of executive leadership and proposed a number of initiatives that would 
put Seward, not the President, squarely at the center of decision-making [see Appendix 
I].19 This memo is frequently cited by scholars partial to Lincoln as an example of 
Seward’s arrogance and lack of respect for the President.20 Those interested in the 
evolution of Lincoln-Seward foreign policy cite, occasionally in disbelief, Seward’s 
proposal that the U.S. initiate hostilities with a European power in order to redirect 
domestic anger toward a foreign foe, as an example of how misguided the Secretary of 
State could be:
17 S. Carolina Dec. 20, 1860, Mississippi, Jan. 9 ,1861, Florida, Jan. 10, Alabama, Jan. 11, Georgia, Jan. 19, 
Louisiana, Jan. 26., and Texas, Feb. 1, in James M. McPherson, The Battle Cry o f  Freedom: The Civil War 
Era, NY: Oxford U. Press, 1988, p. 235.
18 Ibid., p. 261-2.
19 Sometimes referred to the “April Fools” memo for the day in 1861 when it was given to the President: 
“Some Thoughts for the President’s Consideration” cited in Taylor, Seward, pp. 150-51: Van Deusen, 
Seward, pp. 282-84. It was not made public until the publication o f  the Hay & Nicolay biography of 
Lincoln in 1890.
20 Jay M onaghan,, Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Affairs, pp. 54-56; Mahin, One War at a Time, p.
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I would demand explanations from Spain and France categorically at once. I 
would demand explanations from Britain . . .  and send agents into Canada and 
Mexico and Central America to raise a vigorous continental spirit of 
independence on this continent against European intervention. And if satisfactory 
explanations are not received from Spain and France, we would convene 
Congress and declare war against them.21 
In fact, Spain was fomenting trouble in Santo Domingo and France was trying to re- 
occupy Haiti, neither a casus belli. Great Britain and Russia had likewise done nothing 
that would warrant a declaration of war. Although this dissertation will argue that 
Seward did his best to avoid war in Mexico in 1865 -  1867, it is ironic that the 
Secretary’s first advice to the new president was to advocate potential war on several 
fronts to take the country’s mind off of its domestic troubles.
Seward developed both skill and subtlety as he grew in his capacity as Secretary 
of State. This early memorandum to President Lincoln is an example of neither. In his 
defense, it can be argued that this was an internal memorandum designed to address the 
lack of political direction he perceived and to jolt the President into “energetic 
prosecution” of whatever policies were adopted. If the President did not want to take the 
lead in implementing such aggressive policies, Seward wrote that he “would seek neither 
to evade nor assume responsibility.” In his characteristically wry way, Lincoln began 
showing his mettle to his subordinate Seward by replying [see Appendix II]:
I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is 
adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason 
or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its 
progress, I wish, and I suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all of the 
Cabinet.22
21 John G. Nicolay & John H a y , Abraham Lincoln, a History, 10 vols., NY: The Century Co. 1890, 111, pp. 
445-447.
22 Ibid., pp. 448-9.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
28
His high-handed approach got Seward into trouble with his colleagues early on, 
although, according to Hay and Nicolay, knowledge of this particular episode between 
the President and the Secretary of State, never extended beyond the two of them at the 
time.23 There were, of course, other strong personalities in the Lincoln cabinet, and 
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles was among them. He took a particular dislike to 
Seward and accused him of meddling in Navy Department affairs in a number of 
instances:
It was a misfortune of Mr. Seward, and one of his characteristics, that he 
delighted in oblique and indirect movements; he also prided himself in his skill 
and management, had a craving desire that the world should consider him the 
great and controlling mind of his party, of the Administration, and of the country. 
He was intensely anxious to control and direct the War and Navy movements, 
although he had neither the knowledge nor aptitude that was essential for either.24 
Some cabinet members thought that Seward had arranged cabinet meetings in 
such a way as to preserve his pre-eminence. He was generally regarded as trying to 
perform the function of Prime Minister, not just the role of the most important cabinet 
member.25 Despite the April Fool’s Memorandum, Seward and Lincoln quickly ironed 
out their differences and settled into a good working relationship. Lincoln recognized 
Seward’s intelligence and foreign experience, and Seward soon developed an admiration 
for Lincoln’s wisdom. Just a month later, in May 1861, Seward wrote to his wife about 
Lincoln, “The President is the best of us.”26 According to Seward biographer Glyndon 
Van Deusen, Lincoln gradually found Seward indispensable for a variety of reasons, not 
the least of which was Seward’s advice about protocol matters about which Lincoln
23 Ibid., p. 449.
24 Gideon Welles, Diary o f  Gideon Welles, Secretary o f  the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, vol. 1 1861- 
March 30,1864, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1911, p.39.
25 In his August 1871 meeting with Drouyn de Lhuys, after both had left office, Seward indicated that he 
saw himself as Prime Minister. See Chapter 5, n. 36, p. 183.
26 W.H. Seward to Frances Seward, May, 1861, quoted in Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, p. 272.
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admittedly knew little. Within the first year of his administration, Lincoln developed the 
habit of leaving the White House and visiting Seward at home.27
Such a warm working relationship did not develop between Seward and his 
former abolitionist colleague, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sumner biographer David Donald writes that 
Lincoln considered Sumner “the one possible counterweight to Seward,” and consulted 
with him extensively in the spring and summer of 1861.28 Sumner disagreed with Seward 
on a number of important issues, notably appointments and the naval blockade of 
southern ports. His disagreement did not take the form of direct encounters. Sumner 
instead visited several of Seward’s interlocutors in Washington, or wrote letters to his 
friends in Europe showing disdain for the Secretary of State. Donald maintains that 
Sumner had a “mole” in the State Department in the person of Count Adam Gurowski, 
who owed his job as a translator to Sumner. By late spring 1861, Sumner had concluded 
that Seward was “not frank and straightforward; only a cunning contriver of little plots; 
and not a true man.”29
In late 1862, Sumner authored a motion in the Senate whereby a nine-member 
committee would meet with Lincoln and call for Seward’s ouster. The Union’s 
devastating defeats at Fredericksburg, Virginia in December 1862 exacerbated that 
tension. The Union disillusionment occasioned by those defeats may well have been the 
decisive factor pushing a group of Radical Republicans to call for Seward’s resignation, 
effectively using him as a convenient scapegoat. The allegations against Seward ranged 
from the petty to the serious, from Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles’s complaints 
about meddling to accusations that Seward sent out diplomatic instructions without
27 Ibid., Ch. 23, especially pp. 338-9
28 David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights o f  Man, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970, pp. 18-24. Among 
Sumner’s American correspondents were his best friend Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Seward’s 
successor as Secretary o f State, Hamilton Fish; in Britain he corresponded with the Duke o f Argyll, John 
Bright, Richard Cobden and W.E. Gladstone.
29 Ibid., p. 20.
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consulting the President. Sumner, who always thought that he would make a good 
Secretary of State, took particular offense at a confidential message Seward sent to 
Charles Francis Adams in 1861, when Seward had written that:
It seems as if extreme advocates of African slavery and its most vehement 
opponents were acting in concert together to precipitate a servile war -  the former 
by making the most desperate attempts to overthrow the federal union, the latter 
by demanding an edict of universal emancipation as a lawful and necessary, if 
not, as they say, the only legitimate way of saving the Union.30 
This sentence essentially put abolitionists like Sumner on a par with slave owners as 
obstacles to the successful prosecution of the war. When this was published in the annual 
sample of State Department correspondence, once again Sumner was both furious and 
aghast. Indeed, the message seems incongruous in that Seward wrote it at all to Charles 
Francis Adams, a U.S. official from Massachusetts with abolitionist leanings. The 
second mistake was allowing it to be published in a compendium of State Department 
correspondence in which other things had been edited out. Referring to this 
correspondence, Welles described the confrontation in the White House on December 19, 
1862 as follows:
During the discussion [between Lincoln, the Senate committee and all of the 
Cabinet members except Seward] the volume of diplomatic correspondence, 
recently published, was alluded to; some letters denounced as unwise and 
impolitic were specified, one which, a confidential dispatch to Mr. Adams, was 
read. If it was unwise to write, it was certainly injudicious and indiscreet to 
publish such a document. Mr. Seward has genius and talent, -  no one better 
knows it than himself, --but for one in his place he is often wanting in careful 
discrimination, true wisdom, sound judgment, and discreet statesmanship. The
30 Seward to Adams, Confidential, May 21,1861, #10, Diplomatic Records, Instructions, Great Britain, 
M77, R 76, pp. 406-13.
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committee believe [sic] he thinks more of the glorification of Seward than the 
welfare of the country. He wishes the glorification of both, and believes he is the 
man to accomplish it, but has unwittingly and unwarily brought upon himself a 
vast amount of distrust and hostility on the part of the Senators, by his endeavors 
to impress them and others with the belief that he is the Administration. It is a 
mistake; the Senators dislike it, -  have measured and know him.31 
Under Sumner’s guidance, a Radical caucus voted to send a delegation to the 
President to discuss with him the resolution they had adopted, “that a committee be 
appointed to wait upon the President. . .  and urge upon him changes in conduct and in 
the Cabinet which shall give the administration unity and vigor.”32 Sen. Morton 
Wilkinson accused Seward of “controlling” the President and “thwarting” other members 
of the cabinet. William Pitt Fessenden of Maine said that Seward exerted a “malign 
influence” and was joined in his condemnations by Senators Lyman Trumbull, James 
Wilson Grimes, Ira Harris and Samuel Clarke Pomeroy. An old family friend and 
colleague, Senator Preston King of New York, chose not to vote and went instead to 
notify Seward at home about what was transpiring. Showing his loyalty to Lincoln, 
Seward reportedly said “They may do as they please about me but they shall not put the 
President in a false position on my account.”33 He immediately wrote out his resignation, 
instructed his son Frederick to do the same, and had Frederick and Senator King deliver 
the resignations to the White House.
He made this move in order to pre-empt his senatorial critics and relieve the 
President of the necessity of defending him or of making any concessions in order to 
retain him. It was a bold stroke and proved central to the eventual resolution of the 
matter. It did, however, reveal to Seward just how far he had alienated the Republican 
Party, for, of the thirty-two Republican senators, only Preston King had not supported the
31 Gideon Welles, Diary o f  Gideon Welles, vol. I, p. 198.
32 Hendrick, Lincoln s War Cabinet, p. 331-47; David Donald, Charles Sumner, p. 92.
33 Hendrick, Cabinet, p. 333.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
32
resolution condemning him. If he had had any doubts before, he now knew that any 
hopes he harbored of ever becoming President were seriously compromised.
The Senators’ primary source for anti-Seward sentiment in the Cabinet was 
Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase, a former senator from Ohio long allied to the 
Radical cause. When publicly confronted about the whole issue by the President, Chase 
disavowed his complaints and felt compelled to submit his own resignation. Lincoln, 
showing characteristic political deftness in handling the situation, declined all the 
resignations and, by the following Monday, had decided that the Sewards and Chase 
would continue in their positions. Welles speculated on Lincoln’s thinking as follows:
It was announced yesterday morning [12/22/1862] that the President had 
requested Mr. Seward and Mr. Chase to withdraw their resignations and resume 
their duties . . .  Seward’s influence has often been anything but salutary. Not that 
he was evil inclined, but he is meddlesome, fussy, has no fixed policy. Chase 
chafed under Seward’s management, yet has tried to conceal any exhibition of 
irritated feelings. Seward, assuming to be helmsman, has, while affecting and
believing in his own superiority, tried to be patronizing to a ll The President
feels that he is under obligation to each and that both are serviceable. He is 
friendly to both. He is fond of Seward, who is affable; he respects Chase, who is 
clumsy. Seward comforts him; Chase he deems a necessity.34 
This was not a tempest in a teapot. During the second two weeks in December 
the Union had lost thirteen thousand soldiers at Frederickburg to the Confederacy’s five 
thousand. Radical Republican Senators brazenly challenged presidential authority, and 
the cabinet verged on disintegration. Morale could not have been lower and yet the war 
would have to be pursued with even greater vigor. Radicals felt doublecrossed by Chase, 
who failed to confirm his accusations against Seward when directly confronted by the 
president. One of the reasons for this was, of course, that Seward had not really done
34 Ibid., p. 205.
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anything wrong. He supported the president, and was working, as best he could, to 
conceive and implement a foreign policy that would win the war. As anyone in such a 
prominent position, forced to make many rapid decisions, Seward had made some 
bureaucratic errors, but nothing even close to the excesses of Simon Cameron in the War 
Department. Seward’s accusers nonetheless persisted in their view that Congress, 
particularly the Senate, should have greater control over the Executive in the prosecution 
of the war and its attendant diplomacy.
According to Welles, Seward had been sorely shaken by the confrontation. When 
Welles met with him to discuss what had transpired at the meeting where his resignation 
was discussed, he reported that Seward “tries to suppress any exhibition of personal 
grievance or disappointment, but is painfully wounded, mortified, and chagrined.”35 
Henceforth Seward would have to conduct his public affairs trusting essentially no one 
but his son, the President, and a few old friends like Bigelow and Sanford in Europe.
The more salient point here appears to be that all this internal tumult was taking 
place in late 1862, when Union fortunes looked very bleak indeed. In the spring, 
Stonewall Jackson had battered Union forces in the Shenandoah and Lee had forced 
McClellan to abandon the Peninsular Campaign. Lee had crushed Pope at the Second 
Bull Run in August. At the Battle of Antietam Creek in September both sides suffered 
heavy losses. It was hardly the time for cabinet infighting exacerbated by congressional 
meddling.
Sensing opportunity in this disarray, Europeans sought to take advantage of 
America’s troubles. British shipbuilders were busily providing craft for the Confederacy 
and British and French smugglers were moving cotton out of the Confederacy from the 
Mexican cities along the Rio Grande. British-U.S. bilateral relations had already been 
strained by the Trent affair a year earlier. In November 1861, two Confederate diplomats 
heading for their assignments in Europe, James Mason and John Slidell, were forcibly
35 Ibid., p 201
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removed from the British vessel Trent. Great Britain maintained that this action violated 
international law and strongly protested to Washington. On the other hand, the U.S. 
naval officer who had taken Mason and Slidell, Charles Wilkes, was viewed as a hero in 
the U.S. Tempers flared on both sides of the Atlantic and there was talk of war between 
the Union and Great Britain. This came at a particularly inopportune time for Seward, 
who was trying to keep Great Britain and France from according diplomatic recognition 
to the Confederacy. Despite public opinion, Seward finally gave in to the British and 
released the two Confederate diplomats, citing a legal technicality in the way the Trent 
was taken as his reason.36
Seward was simultaneously trying to keep France from formally recognizing the 
Confederacy, but France kept looking for ways to insert itself into the U.S. Civil War. 
Napoleon III offered his good offices as a mediator early in May, 1861. In order to 
evaluate the French emperor’s motives, Seward sent his trusted friend Henry Sanford to 
Paris to meet with French Foreign Minister Edouard-Antoine Thouvenel.37 Although 
designated as Minister-Resident to Belgium, Sanford was in Paris until the newly- 
appointed U.S. Minister William L. Dayton could arrive. France and Britain had 
recognized the “belligerent” status of the Confederacy, something that greatly annoyed 
Seward. Thouvenel told Sanford that the decision had been taken for economic, not 
political reasons. Thouvenel then added, “the emperor personally is deeply grieved at 
this war and its possible results. .  .and he has told me that he would willingly offer his 
services in mediation if he thought they could be useful toward securing a peaceful
36 Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, pp. 306-17, Norbert Ferris, Desperate Diplomacy: William H. 
Sew ard’s Foreign Policy, 1861, Knoxville: U. o f Tennessee Press, 1976, pp. 194-97; Ernest Paolino, The 
Foundations o f  American Empire: William Henry Seward and U.S. Foreign Policy, Ithaca: Cornell U. 
Press, 1973, pp. 14-15.
37 Henry S. Sanford had served at a number of U.S. legations in Europe and spoke several European 
languages. He became the disbursing agent for Seward’s informal intelligence network in Europe. Seward 
allowed him to travel extensively away from his post in Brussels to attend to various clandestine affairs. 
See Joseph A. Fry, Henry S. Sanford: Diplomacy and Business in Nineteenth Century America, Reno: 
University ofN evada Press, 1982, Ch. 3, especially pp. 38,41-45,50-1.
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termination of this unhappy difficulty.”38 Seward turned down that offer abruptly, seeing 
no reason for any European to become involved in what he viewed as a purely internal 
matter.
In the meantime, U.S. efforts to help Mexico financially were coming to naught. 
The McLane-Ocampo Treaty had been negotiated at the end of the Buchanan 
Administration to forestall Mexico’s creditors, but was voted down by both Mexico and 
the U.S.39 After taking office, Seward initially continued the approach taken by the 
Buchanan Administration to ease Mexico’s debt problems.40 The U.S. was willing to 
help Mexico with the interest payments on its roughly $62,000,000 of “public” debt. The 
problem here was that with so many changes of government, it was not crystal clear 
which Mexican government was responsible for contracting and discharging such debt. 
The Conservative Miramon government that had preceded the Liberal one of Juarez had 
issued Mexican government bonds through the Franco-Swiss banking house of Jecker 
with a face value of some $15,000,000. The Miramon government only received 
approximately $7,500,00 from the transaction, which is why Juarez’s government chose 
in January 1861 to suspend payments until questions o f fraud were answered. This was 
consistent with a proclamation that Juarez had issued when he was still fighting the 
Conservatives in 1859, that bonds issued by the Conservatives would not be redeemed by 
his government. Napoleon Ill’s half-brother, the Due de Momy, was a large holder of 
those bonds, and some historians have speculated that it was his financial stake in 
recouping his losses that led him to influence Napoleon III to try to forcibly collect the 
debt starting in 1862. The Due reportedly had considerable influence with his half­
38 Quoted in Lynn Case & Warren Spencer, The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy, 
Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania Press, 1970, p. 31. At this juncture, Sanford saw Napoleon III as essentially 
pro-Union. That would change shortly after French troops arrived in Mexico
39 See note #9 in this dissertation’s Introduction; see also Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History o f  the 
United States, 4,h ed., NY: Holt, Rhinehartand Winston, 1955, pp.388-95.
40 Mexico had two kinds o f  debt: claims by private citizens o f the U.S., France, Spain, and Great Britain 
largely because o f  the depredations o f warfare; and debt officially contracted by the Mexican government. 
For Juarez, the most pressing of these were loans contracted with the banking house o f  Jecker. See Hanna 
& Hanna, Napoleon III, p. 36; Cunningham, Mexico, pp. 81-2.
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brother, and he along with many close to Napoleon III stood to make considerable sums 
if the bonds were honored.41
The mechanism for collecting the debt was to be a tripartite force composed of 
British, French and Spanish soldiers and sailors. This force had been authorized by the 
“Convention of London,” (referred to as the “Tripartite Agreement” in some texts, see 
Appendix III). The three powers thereby agreed to a joint military debt-collecting 
mission, to begin at the end of 1861, to settle individual and governmental claims against 
Mexico. The key element of the Convention, as far as this dissertation is concerned, was 
its provision that there would be no involvement in Mexico's internal political affairs. 
The foreigners were in Mexico to mediate claims and collect funds for payment of those 
claims from coastal customs houses, primarily that in Veracruz.
At the eleventh hour, Seward sought to keep the Europeans from initiating this 
armed incursion into Mexico by offering a loan package that would pay interest on the 
public part of the debt. In a plan worked out with U.S. Minister to Mexico Thomas 
Corwin, Seward offered to buy Baja (lower) California from Mexico outright42 This 
• plan would have provided immediate cash to Mexico to placate France, Britain and 
Spain. It also promised the additional benefit of keeping the Confederacy from bidding 
for Baja California for its own purposes. This idea went nowhere. No matter what 
happened, Juarez would remain intransigent when it came to alienating any more 
Mexican territory. The territorial cessions to the U.S. in the Treaty of Guadalupe-
41 Hanna & Hanna, Napoleon III and Mexico, pp. 35-7; Michele Cunningham, Mexico and the Foreign 
Policy o f  Napoleon III, argues that reclaiming the bonds was not the chief factor in the European debt- 
collecting mission, p. 81-2. See also Percy F. Martin, Maximilian in Mexico: The Story o f  the French 
Intervention (1861 -  1867), London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1913, pp. 46-49 who maintains that 
profit from these loans was a motive in the French Intervention.
42 Thomas Corwin (1794-1865) Whig Governor o f Ohio 1840, U.S. Senator from Ohio 1844-1850), 
Republican U.S. Congressman 1858, U.S. Minister to Mexico 1861. Corwin was most famous for an 1847 
speech in the Senate opposing President Polk and the Mexican-American War. Basic biographical 
information taken from the web version o f  James G. Wilson and John Fiske, Appleton's Cyclopedia o f  
American Biography,6 vols., NY: D. Appleton and Co., 1887-1889, supposedly the “most quoted” 
biographical source for 19lh and early 20lh century America: 
http://www.virtualoIogy.com/nelsonappletonmiles/
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Hidalgo had been a major factor in Santa Anna losing his political leadership of Mexico, 
and Juarez was not going to repeat that mistake.
It cannot be denied that Seward’s first efforts to aid Mexico appeared less than 
altruistic. He was not responsible for the provisions of McLane-Ocampo, but he did bear 
much of the responsibility for the negotiations carried on by Corwin. Offering to buy 
Baja was consistent with the Pierce Administration’s Gadsden Purchase, but it still 
retained the formula of land for money. The direct loan from the U.S. to Mexico that 
would have enabled that country to fend off its creditors for five or six years also required 
access to mineral rights in northern Mexico as collateral. Given independent Mexico’s 
troubles repaying its debts through the first fifty years of its existence, there was reason to 
believe that default after five years was essentially a foregone conclusion, had the loan 
been approved.
Unfortunately, Mexico’s critical need for money coincided with the beginning of 
the Civil War and the vastly increased U.S. expenditures necessary to conduct it. The 
loan proposal encountered serious problems in the U.S. Senate, which demanded mineral 
rights as collateral. For their part, the Mexicans were loath to pledge public lands and 
mineral rights for a loan that had a good chance of ending in default, even though land 
was the only collateral they had. The Europeans also dismissed the proposed deal, 
maintaining that the U.S. loan would cover only the $62 million of Mexico’s public 
(“funded”) debt, and would provide no compensation at all for the numerous outstanding 
individual claims. The various loan proposals were defeated, bringing Seward’s first 
attempts to help the Juarez regime to naught. These defeats also showed Seward that 
Congress, particularly the Senate, would make it exceptionally hard to pass formal 
treaties with Mexico, or treaties with other countries about Mexico.
Admittedly, the loans to Mexico would have been the first officially authorized to 
another government by the U.S., and thus represented uncharted waters for many 
members of Congress. Secondly, Civil War passions erupted around any initiative
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concerning land where slavery might be extended, or the building of railroads or other 
public works that might make the extension of slavery easier. In the following chapter, it 
will be shown how Mexican Minister to the United States Matias Romero essentially 
came to the same conclusion. If Mexico was to get any material aid from the U.S., it was 
probably not going to come through official channels. The self-serving nature of the Baja 
purchase proposal and the land/mineral rights provisions of the Corwin loan proposals 
have led certain Mexican historians to question whether or not Seward was trying to 
serve Mexico’s interests or those of the U.S.43 It is not disingenuous to say that he was 
trying to serve both. He soon realized that without Congressional backing, he would be 
able to serve neither.
Meanwhile, while the Corwin loan proposals were bogged down in the U.S. 
Senate, the first contingent of Convention of London troops, a group of Spanish soldiers, 
arrived off Veracruz in December 1861, followed by the French in January 1862 and the 
English shortly thereafter.44 However, within two months of their arrival, it became clear 
to Spanish General Juan Prim and English commissioner Sir Charles Wyke that the 
French were using the debt-collecting mission as a pretext for occupation. Although all 
forces were supposed to stay in Veracruz either on ships or at the customs house, the 
prevalence of malaria resulted in requests to the Mexican authorities that the forces move 
inland. This step was crucial to Napoleon III getting his troops permanently established 
with a protected supply line to the main port of Veracruz. Once established inland, the 
French proposed repayment terms that the Juarez government refused to accept, and the 
Spanish and English departed, angry about being involved in French subterfuge.45
By March 1862, Secretary Seward felt it necessary to delineate to U.S. diplomats 
the Lincoln Administration’s policy toward the debt-collecting mission and presence of
43 Josefina Z. Vasquez and Lorenzo Meyer, The United States and Mexico, Chicago: University o f  Chicago 
Press, 1985, pp. 64-67.
44Dabbs, The French A m y  in Mexico 1861 - 1867, pp. 18-20.
45 Hannah & Hannah, Napoleon III, pp. 42-45; Martin, Maximilian in Mexico, pp. 88-90.
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European troops in Mexico. He also addressed the rumor that a foreign prince would be 
installed there:
The President. .  .deems it his duty to express to the allies [Britain, France and 
Spain] the opinion that no monarchical government which could be founded in 
Mexico, in the presence of foreign navies and armies, in the waters and upon the 
soil of Mexico, would have any prospect of security or permanence . . .  Secondly, 
that the instability of such a monarchy there would be enhanced if the throne 
should be assigned to any person not of Mexican nationality. That, under such 
circumstances, the new government must speedily fall unless it could draw into its 
support European alliances, which..  .would in fact make it the beginning of a 
permanent policy of armed European monarchical intervention, injurious and 
practically hostile to the most general system of government in the continent of 
America and this would be the beginning rather than the ending of revolution in 
Mexico.46
This message was a good representation of the first step of Seward’s two-step approach 
to the French in Mexico. It was polite and did not specifically blame the French, but was 
addressed to the “allies.” Secondly, it showed sensitivity to Mexican concerns, noting 
that according the throne to someone who “was not of Mexican nationality” would lead 
any such government to “speedily fail.” Seward continued:
In such a case, it is not to be doubted that the permanent interests and sympathies 
of this country would be with the other American republics ..  .It is sufficient to 
say that . . .  the emancipation of this continent from European control has been the 
principal feature in its history during the last century. It is not probable that a 
revolution in a contrary direction would be successful.
46 Seward to Dayton, March 18,1862, #121, Diplomatic Records, Instructions, France, M77, R 56, pp. 
118-20.
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Seward thus extended his argument to the other “American republics,” saying that 
any monarchical intervention would run counter to the new forms of government being 
established, and would constitute “revolutions” in them. He finally underlined the long- 
view: movement toward republicanism had been going on for a “century” and any 
attempt to move in a “contrary direction” would probably fail. Seward was articulating 
the underlying principles of the Monroe Doctrine here without making explicit reference 
to it. Consistent with his September 1861 directive, this message was polite but not 
deferential, logical, historical, and devoted to republicanism. Nevertheless, it was 
unmistakable in its warning to Napoleon III.
A brief review of the exact process whereby the French stayed in Mexico while 
the other “allies” chose to leave might be instructive. Spanish and British troops were 
already in Veracruz when Seward wrote the above message. Given the various time lags 
attendant to diplomatic correspondence in this era, it seems unlikely that Seward knew 
exactly what was going on with the debt-collecting mission when he issued his statement, 
which would not have arrived in France until the end of March.47 Yet the “instability” of 
any “monarchical intervention” was already beginning to reveal itself. British, French 
and Spanish commanders could not arrive at an agreement on how to proceed after 
moving their forces to higher ground from pestilential Veracruz48
In what became known as the Preliminaries of Soledad or the Convention of 
Soledad, signed in February 1862, Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Doblado got the 
three European powers to agree that their mission had no “ulterior intention to interfere 
with Mexican sovereignty,” thereby echoing the key provision of the Convention of 
London49 Napoleon was displeased that Admiral Jurien de la Graviere had signed the
47 See Introduction, p. 20.
48 Jack Dabbs, The French Army in Mexico: A Study in Military Government, The Hague: Mouton & Co. 
1963, p. 24.
49 Ibid, p. 22; Michele Cunningham, Mexico and the Foreign Policy o f  Napoleon III, NY: Palgrave, 2001, 
p. 93. The meeting was held in Soledad (a Mexican city west o f Veracruz) and called “Preliminary” 
because a subsequent meeting scheduled between all the parties to finalize matters had been scheduled to 
take place on April 15, 1862 in Orizaba.
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Convention of Soledad, and replaced him with the more aggressive Charles Ferdinand 
Latrille, Count de Lorencez. When Lorencez came ashore in March, he brought with him 
several Mexican Conservatives who had previously fought the Juaristas and who had 
prices on their heads, notably Juan Alamonte and former president Miguel Miramon.50 
The presence of these Conservatives clearly indicated to the Juarez regime the political 
thrust of the French presence. This politicization of the mission was not lost on the 
Spanish commander, General Juan Prim, and the head of the British delegation, Sir 
Charles Wyke.51 They had consistently argued with the French during the first three 
months of the joint exercise, particularly over what they viewed as France’s inflated 
economic demands on Mexico. The insertion into Mexico of Miramon and his associates 
under French cover convinced Spain and Great Britain that France was not proceeding in 
good faith. Taking all this into consideration, Wyke and Prim, after a stormy session in 
the Mexican mountain town of Orizaba on April 9,1862, withdrew from the coalition and 
sent their forces back to Europe.
This debacle appeared to bear out Seward’s warning that European intervention 
would be the “beginning” and not the “ending” of “revolution” in Mexico. The French 
began their unilateral encounter with the Mexicans less than a month later, failing 
miserably in their attack on Puebla on May 5,1862. This Mexican victory confounded 
Napoleon III and gave Seward’s policy towards Mexico another year to mature.52 
Between 1862 and 1863 arch-Catholic Mexican conservatives exiled in Europe were 
searching for ways to oust the Liberals from power in Mexico. They would ultimately 
convince Napoleon III and his Spanish-born wife, Eugenie de Montijo, that Archduke
50 This was the same Miramon who as Conservative president had agreed to the Jecker loans.
51 Prim, forty-seven at the time and considered by some to have liberal sympathies, later spoke out publicly 
in a number o f  places condemning the French in Mexico. He met with Seward, and attended a banquet in 
his honor at Delmonico’s in New York. Some historians have noted that his marriage to a young Mexican, 
the niece o f  M exico’s Minister o f  Finance Gonzales Echeverria, might have influenced his perceptions, 
Cunningham, Mexico, p. 81; Ridley, Maximilian, p. 81.
52 Michael C. Meyer et. al., The Course o f  Mexican History, 6th ed., New York, Oxford U. Press, 1999, pp. 
374-76. This Mexican victory is the basis for the modem celebration o f  Cinco de Mayo.
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Ferdinand Maximilian von Hapsburg would be the ideal choice to become Emperor of 
Mexico. After the 1862 Battle of Puebla, however, Napoleon III could have cut his 
losses and ordered his troops home. Pride and a misperception of the extent of Mexican 
bravery and persistence caused him not to. He blamed the defeat at Puebla on French 
commanders, not on the commitment of the Juaristas. After receiving extensive 
reinforcements, the French did take Puebla in May 1863 and Mexico City shortly 
thereafter. The plan to put Maximilian on the throne and install a European-backed 
monarchy in Mexico proceeded, even though intimations that such a plan would fail 
abysmally were already evident on the Cinco de Mayo.
The messages Seward wrote in September 1861 and March 1862 laid the 
groundwork for the policy he was to follow for the next five years. Always a good 
lawyer, Seward did not object to the European collection of debts, because such activity 
was customary under international law. Political involvement and the possible 
acquisition of control over Mexican territory, however, were entirely different matters, 
and the U.S. committed its “extraordinary good offices” to preserve Mexico’s integrity. 
According to Seward, history was also on the side of republican Mexico. The Juarez 
regime may have appeared both incompetent and chaotic to editorialists like Horace 
Greeley, but, so far as Seward was concerned, it was the legal government of the 
Mexican people. This republican regime was consistent with a century-long trend 
towards emancipation from European rule that, according to Seward, would not be 
denied.
More than just a prominent member of the Republican Party, Seward was a true 
republican. He firmly believed that once monarchies were overthrown, they could not be 
re-established. He stated that any European-sponsored “intervention by monarchical 
Europe” would be both “injurious” and “inimical” to the governmental systems already in 
place in America.53 In short, any plan to set up a neo-colonial government run by a
53 British controlled Canada was an obvious exception.
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“person alien to Mexico” was doomed to failure. From his reading of history, Seward 
felt that no monarchy in Mexico would last long and fighting such a monarchy would not 
be worth American lives and treasure. Once the Civil War was over, many other U.S. 
citizens would not feel the same way, and Seward would have to work hard to avoid 
bloodshed. Finally, Seward viewed the installation of a European-inspired monarchy in 
Mexico as constituting a “revolution.” Napoleon III and Maximilian may not have 
considered themselves revolutionaries, but, when it came to Mexico, Seward did. Their 
scheme promised to overthrow what Seward and the U.S. government recognized as 
Mexico’s legitimate government. Had Napoleon III reflected more deeply on Seward’s 
message and the implications of the defeat of his forces at Puebla, he could have saved 
himself, Maximilian, and Charlotte from this unfolding debacle.
After the French occupied Mexico City in 1863, new U.S. strategies were called 
for to deal with new facts on the ground. Initially, Seward had to face the fact that 
Napoleon III had lied about his intentions in Mexico. That was not necessarily a surprise, 
but greater circumspection would now be necessary in assessing French initiatives. At 
the same time, Seward had good reason for not wanting to antagonize France over 
recognition. France remaining neutral in the Civil War was one of Seward’s principal 
diplomatic goals. Specifically, he did not want France or Great Britain to recognize the 
Confederacy.
However, with the French resident in Mexico City, and reinforcing their troops to 
expand their control, Seward had few options. He initially promised U.S. neutrality in 
any struggle involving the French and the Liberals they were now fighting. However, he 
also called for the French to reciprocate this neutrality and not become involved in the 
Civil War. Finally, the matter of diplomatic recognition was about to assert itself. The 
U.S. had traditionally recognized as legitimate the power that controlled a country’s 
capital. Whatever government the French now saw fit to put into place in Mexico City
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would demand diplomatic recognition. It would break precedent for the U.S. to continue 
recognizing the Liberal government of Juarez that had fled north.
A promise that the French would not take advantage of their position in Mexico to 
influence the Civil War was important to Seward. The Confederacy had to import most 
of its war materiel. The Union naval blockade was a strategy designed to interdict this 
importation. It was, however, inevitable that some smuggling took place given the 
relatively few Union ships available for implementing the blockade. One particularly 
active location for smuggling was along the Rio Grande on the Texas-Mexican border.
If France recognized the Confederacy, exportation of cotton from this area would no 
longer be the province of a few smugglers, and France could insist on carrying on 
commerce with a country with which it had formal diplomatic relations. With regular 
cotton commerce at least partially re-established, the Confederates would have a reliable 
revenue stream to purchase war materiel and to use as collateral for loans. These two 
contingencies alone would prolong the war in Seward’s view. Hence, in the short term, 
neutrality was the price that Seward chose to pay to avoid having the French supply the 
Confederacy with war supplies in exchange for cotton.
Still, the military occupation by the French of a country bordering the U.S., 
having as its aim the installation of a puppet monarchy there, was a bold gambit. Why 
would Napoleon III take such a risk? Ultimate control of a future canal across southern 
Mexico, or a railway linking the Atlantic and Pacific, would potentially be of enormous 
geopolitical advantage to the country in Charge of it. It was the duty of a Catholic 
country like France to try to stop an erosion of the Catholic faith if it was being 
challenged within Mexico by the Liberals and without by the largely Protestant American 
settlers on Mexico’s northern border. The French Emperor outlined his reasons for 
taking the risk in a letter to Major General Elie Forey. Written in July of 1862, the letter 
reveals a French vision for Mexico that was essentially the antithesis of Seward’s and is 
worth quoting in its entirety:
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There will not be lacking people who will ask why we are going to spend men and 
money in this enterprise [intervention in Mexico]. In the actual state of the 
civilization of the world, the prosperity of America is not indifferent to Europe, 
for it nourishes our industry and gives life to our commerce. We are interested in 
seeing the United States powerful and prosperous, but we have no interest in 
seeing that republic acquire the whole Gulf of Mexico, dominate from this 
vantage point the Antilles and South America, and become the sole dispenser of 
the products of the New World. Mistress of Mexico, and consequently, of Central 
America and of the passage between the two seas, there would henceforth be no 
other power in America than the United States. If, on the contrary, Mexico 
conquers its independence and maintains the integrity of its territory, if a stable 
government is constituted there by the arms of France, we shall have posed an 
insuperable barrier to the encroachments of the United States, we shall have 
maintained the independence of our colonies in the Antilles, and of those of 
ungrateful Spain, and this influence will radiate northward as well as southward, 
will create immense markets for our commerce, and will procure the materials 
indispensable for our country.54
Several important points emerge from this letter. Initially, Napoleon III revealed 
no intention o f ever accepting the limits of the Convention of London that had 
“authorized” the tripartite debt-collection mission to Mexico in the first place. That 
Convention specifically precluded involvement in Mexico’s internal affairs. Nor did he
54 Napoleon III to Forey, July 3,1862 quoted in Hanna & Hanna, Napoleon III and Mexico: American 
Triumph over Monarchy, Chapel Hill: U. N. Carolina Press, 1971, p. 80 and Cunningham, Mexico, p. 126. 
The original French version: Maitresse du Mexique et par consequent de I 'Amerique centrale et du 
passage entre les deux mers, il n 'y aurait plus desormais d  'autre puissance en Amerique que celle des etats 
unis. Si au contraire le Mexique conquiert son independance et maintient I'integrite de son territoire, si un 
gouvernement stable s 'y constitue par les armes de la France, nous aurons pose m e  digue infranchissable 
aux impietements des etats unis, nous aurons maintenu I 'independance de nos colonies des Antilles et de 
celles dc I ’ingrate Espagne; nous aurons etabli noire influence bienfaisante au centre de I ’Amerique et 
cette influence rayonnera au nord comme au Midi, creera des debouches immenses a notre commerce et 
procurera les matieres indispensables a notre Industrie.
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feel himself bound by the subsequent Convention of Soledad between France, Great 
Britain, Spain, and Mexico that further underscored the intervention’s non-political 
nature. The letter clearly pointed out that one of the real reasons for the French presence 
in Mexico was that Napoleon III considered it France’s duty to prevent the U.S. from 
becoming the sole power in North America and possibly the entire hemisphere. He 
unabashedly asserted that French aims would be accomplished militarily and that a 
government in Mexico would be constituted “by the arms of France.”
Another motivation for the intervention was the economic benefits that would 
accrue to France, among them silver from the Mexican State of Sonora, cotton, and 
revenues and geopolitical advantages stemming from either a canal or railway connecting 
the Atlantic and Pacific. The edited version of this letter made available to the public in a 
compilation of diplomatic correspondence published in January 1863, introduced an 
additional theme of restoring “Latin culture” to Central America. In the edited version 
Napoleon III argued that if France was successful in Mexico, “We shall have given back 
to the Latin race on the other side of the ocean its force and its prestige.”55
The importance of the “Latin race” motivation for Napoleon Ill’s intervention in 
Mexico is a matter of some historiographical debate. Historians Alfred and Kathryn 
Hanna point out that it was not part of the original letter to Forey, and that the Austrian 
Maximilian would not have been the best choice to advance “Latin” culture. In the most 
recent published work on the French Intervention, historian Michele Cunningham 
dismisses the importance of the idea that the “Latin race” in Mexico was very significant 
to Napoleon III.56 Whether or not it was important to Napoleon III himself, U.S. 
diplomat Henry Sanford reported hearing the “Latin race” argument as a motive for 
French involvement “ad nauseam in Parisian Salons.”57 Racialism was a dominant
55 Hanna & Hanna, Napoleon III, p. 80.
56 Cunningham, Mexico, pp 3-4, 126-27; Hanna & Hanna, Napoleon III, pp. 80-1; Martin Quirarte, 
Historiografia sobre e l imperio de Maximiliano, Mexico, D.F.: UNAM, 1970, p 88.
57 Sanford to Seward, August 13, 1862, reel 95, box 140, folder 10.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
47
aspect of nineteenth-century thought, and Napoleon III may have promulgated the idea of 
re-introducing the “Latin race” to eventually rule Central and South America as a way of 
stimulating popular support in France for his policies in Mexico.
Whether it contained support for the “Latin race” and Catholicism or not, 
Napoleon Ill’s vision for Mexico would initially be carried out on the ground militarily 
by Forey and later by his successor Major General Achille Bazaine. New French Foreign 
Minister Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys was charged with carrying out its diplomatic 
components.58 According to Sanford:
The change in the Department of Foreign Affairs I do not consider 
disadvantageous to us on general principle, for I do not know what M. Drouyn de 
Lhuys personal opinions are touching us. He is a diplomat of the old school, of 
thorough training and education in his career, and would be apt to look at our 
affairs from the more elevated point of high political consideration, than that of 
his predecessor [Thouvenel], who seemed to think cotton and trade of more 
importance than the preservation of our Union.59
In late October 1862, Drouyn de Lhuys’ first diplomatic step was to try to insert 
European powers into the Civil War by offering the good offices of France, Russia and 
Great Britain to broker a truce.60 At first blush, this seemed like a peaceful proposal, but 
Seward saw it for what it really was: a way for France to accord de facto recognition to 
the Confederacy. The political arrangements outlined in Napoleon Ill’s letter to Forey 
would have had a better chance of taking hold if the Confederacy could function as a 
buffer between the French and Union forces. Seward was angered that the three
58 He replaced Thouvenel in the fall o f 1862 when the latter’s policy toward Italy displeased Napoleon III.
59 Sanford to Seward, October 17, 1862, Reel # 95. Seward had an interview with Drouyn de Lhuys after 
both o f them were out o f  office in 1871. The interview, recorded by another American and reported by 
Seward’s son, revealed some o f  Seward’s thinking as the crisis with France over Mexico developed. It’s 
cited in greater detail in the Conclusion.
60 Case and Spencer, The U.S. and France, pp. 355-63.
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European powers had been discussing an armistice without consulting the U.S. He made 
his displeasure clear in the following message sent to Dayton on November 30,1862:
In regard to the main subject [offer of armistice] my instructions will be very 
simple and short. An inconclusive conference concerning the United States has 
been held between three powers, all of whom avow themselves as friends of the 
United States and yet the United States were carefully excluded from the 
conference. .  .The United States have constantly said to all Europe that they 
know that the saving of the American Union depends on the American people 
themselves, and not at all on the policies of foreign states severally or combined.61 
In the same message, Seward, uncharacteristically, departed from the florid diplomatic 
language he normally used to remind France that:
Foreign nations scarcely need to be reminded that family quarrels are always of 
short duration, that the very scandals which they bring operate as an incentive to 
reconciliation. Much more does the unavoidable apprehension of foreign 
interference work in that direction. The emissaries of treason [Confederate 
diplomats and agents] who now remain in European capitals will very soon 
disappear and the whole American people will forever be asking who among the 
foreign nations were the most just -  and the most forbearing to their country in its 
hour of trial?
Drouyn de Lhuys continued to press for some sort of involvement in a cease-fire or 
mediation, which Seward continued to resist, writing to Dayton in February 1863:
I must be allowed to say also that Mr. Drouyn de L’Huys errs in his description of 
the parties to the present conflict.62 We have here in a political sense no North 
and South, no Southern and Northern States. We have an insurrectionary party 
which is located chiefly upon and adjacent to the shore of the Gulf of Mexico; and
61 Seward to Dayton, Nov. 30, 1862, #263, DR, Instructions, France, M77, R 56, pp. 297-300. Note that 
referring to the U.S. in the plural was customary until after the Civil War. Seward always uses the plural.
62 The name is variously spelled “L’Huys” and Lhuys. Most o f  the works cited use the latter form.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
49
we have on the other hand, a loyal people who constitute not only Northern 
States, but also Eastern, Midland .Western and Southern States.63 
Seward was attempting to explain to Napoleon III and his Minister of Foreign 
Affairs that their perception of the American Civil War was fundamentally flawed and 
that the Union would inevitably prevail. He would repeat this to Drouyn de Lhuys when 
they met informally in Paris in 1871, underscoring that he was astounded that Napoleon 
III, who had visited the U.S., did not appear able to see this. It would not be in France’s 
best interests to be perceived in the victorious U.S. as having fomented political trouble 
on the southern border. In April 1863 Seward felt it necessary to reiterate the point that 
foreign intervention in Mexico had no future:
I do not care to speak often upon the war of France against Mexico. The 
President confidently believes that the Emperor [Napoleon III] has no purpose of 
assuming in the event of success, the government of that republic. Difficult as the 
exercise o f self-government there has proved to be, it is, nevertheless, quite 
certain that the attempt to maintain foreign authority there would encounter 
insurmountable embarrassment.64
Seward’s diplomacy, as outlined in this chapter, might well be called his 
“lawyerly” phase. He was building his case against France, writing out the theoretical 
basis that would support his future actions. Yet Seward never had the luxury of 
approaching his problems in a leisurely fashion, as there were always the exigencies of 
the war, and the assaults of his internal critics. Nevertheless, he wrote, gathered 
evidence, and sifted intelligence. Meanwhile, representatives of foreign governments 
involved in the conflict were just as busy, vying to achieve what was deemed best for 
their own countries, whether their policies were consistent with those of the Union or not.
63 Seward to Dayton, Feb. 6 ,1863, #297, DR, Instructions, France, pp. 328-336.
M Ibid., Seward to Dayton, April 27, 1863, p. 369
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One of those representatives was Matias Romero, indefatigable in his pursuit of ultimate 
success for the Juaristas.
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CHAPTER TWO 
MATIAS ROMERO -  JUAREZ’S MAN IN WASHINGTON
Seward’s principal Mexican interlocutor was Matias Romero (1837-1898), the 
main connection between the Liberal government in Mexico headed by President Benito 
Juarez and the administration of President Abraham Lincoln. Romero was twenty-two 
when he first took up official duties in Washington and almost everyone he dealt with 
officially was at least twenty years his senior, thirty-six in Seward’s case, twenty-eight in 
Lincoln’s. Romero was a diplomatic prodigy who was promoted from Secretary of the 
Mexican Legation to Charge d’Affaires and finally to Minister, all within eight years of 
his arrival in Washington during the Buchanan administration in 1859.1 Republican 
Mexico was relying on Romero to gain from the U.S. the political, military and economic 
support essential for ousting the French army from his country and evicting a foreign 
prince from its throne. Romero’s central role in defending republicanism in Mexico was 
marked by a political sophistication and tenacity unanticipated from one so young. At the 
outset of his assignment, he received mostly moral support from his government, his 
paycheck being late or non-existent for months at a time. Yet it is hard to imagine how 
Mexico could have survived as a republic in the 1860s had it not been for his efforts.
His connection to two Mexican presidents, Benito Juarez (1806-1872) and 
Porfirio Diaz (1828-1915) stemmed from the fact that all three came from Oaxaca in 
southern Mexico. Romero was a criollo, someone of one hundred per cent Spanish 
ancestry bom in Mexico. In mid-nineteenth century Mexico, he would have been socially 
superior to the men he devoted his life to, Benito Juarez, a one hundred per cent Zapotec 
Indian, Mexico’s first indigenous leader since Cuauhtemoc, and Porfirio Diaz, also an
' Thomas Schoonover, Mexican Lobby: Matias Romero in Washington, 1861-1867, Lexington, KY: 
University Press o f  Kentucky, 1986, p. ix; see also Harry Bernstein, Matias Romero, 1837-1898, Mexico 
City: Fondo Cultura Economica, 1982, pp. 42-3.
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Indian from Oaxaca.2 At different times, all three attended Oaxaca’s Institute of Sciences 
and Arts (El Institute Secular de Ciencias y  Artes), an independent school actively 
promulgating reformist ideas of the early nineteenth century. The reform idea dearest to 
Juarez was equality before the law. For his part, Romero saw the nefarious influence of 
the monolithic Catholic Church in Mexico, and, although a Catholic, advocated religious 
pluralism throughout his career, eventually marrying an American Protestant.3
But it was a love of foreign affairs as they pertained to Mexico that was the 
Institute’s abiding legacy to Romero. Before he was twenty, he was studying Mexican 
customhouse statistics on revenues collected to pay off debts to Britain. He sent letters to 
the Treasury Secretary in the Santa Anna government about how to retire the debt. His 
suggestions were never acknowledged, but the very fact of an eighteen-year old 
provincial advising the central government on fiscal policy was indicative of Romero’s 
willingness to do exhaustive research and write on public policy issues, a skill he honed 
throughout his life.4
However, in 1853, the brilliant future awaiting the young Oaxaqueno seemed 
considerably less probable, seeing that his mentor Benito Juarez had been banished from 
Mexico.5 Yet Santa Anna’s days in power were numbered, and he had to flee a Liberal 
revolt led by Juan Alvarez, whose government brought back the New Orleans exiles by 
1855.6 By November of 1855, Romero had contacted his fellow Oaxaqueno Juarez and
2 The last Aztec leader, Cuauhtemoc, son o f Moctezuma II (sometimes misspelled as Montezuma) was 
hung by Cortes in 1525. See also David Hannay, Diaz, NY: Henry Holt and Co., 1917, pp. 1-5; also Daniel 
Cosio Villegas, The United States Versus Porfirio Diaz, translated by N. L. Benson, U. o f  Nebraska Press, 
1963.
3 Romero married Lucretia “Lula” Allen o f Philadelphia, an Episcopalian, on July 15,1868; see Bemstein, 
Matias Romero, pp. 154 and 159.
4 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
5 Juarez became Romero’s mentor initially through their Oaxacan connection and the fact that both had 
attended the Institute o f  Science and Arts there, Bemstein, Matias Romero, p. 8.
6 Ivie Cadenhead, Jr., Benito Juarez, NY: Twayne, 1973, pp. 42-3. Cadenhead also points out that Santa 
Anna agreed to the Gadsden Purchase (Tratado de la Mesilla in Mexico) in order to use the $ 10 million 
from the sale to stay in power. See also Brian Hamnett, Juarez, NY: Longman, 1994, p. 150, “Juarez was 
determined to avoid the surrender o f Lower California to the United States, an action which he thought 
would bring down upon his administration the same opprobrium that had fallen upon Santa Anna after the 
Mesilla Treaty.”
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offered his services, without pay, to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Juarez 
introduced him to Minister Ocampo, thus beginning Romero’s almost forty-five years of 
public service to Mexico. His initial duties in the Ministry were pedestrian, answering 
letters and filing diplomatic papers. But he took advantage of his surroundings to start 
writing a diplomatic history of Mexico that he called Tabla sindptica de los tratados (An 
Index o f  Mexican Treaties). It was an exhaustive summary of all of Mexico’s treaties that 
he finally published before his departure to the U.S. in 1859.
Romero had been too young to accompany his heroes into exile in New Orleans, 
so upon his arrival in Mexico City from Oaxaca in 1855 he addressed himself to the study 
of law and was admitted to the bar in 1857 at the age of twenty. He accomplished this 
while simultaneously performing his “internship” at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Minister of Justice Juarez congratulated the newly-admitted lawyer, citing the great honor 
Romero’s achievements brought to Oaxaca, referring to him as “mi muy apreciable 
ahijado (my very noteworthy protege [literally godson].”7
Throughout the battle with the Conservatives, the twenty-year-old Romero proved 
his courage, his patriotism, and his personal devotion to Juarez. He met and impressed 
those who were a generation older who would lead the fight for Liberal reform for most 
of the next decade. This explains why he was sent on such an important diplomatic 
mission to Washington at such a young age. It may also explain why he worked so hard 
on his country’s behalf. He had survived the crucible of what was to become an ongoing 
battle, with the French and Maximilian taking the place of the Conservatives. He knew 
first hand what the stakes were, which may explain his subsequent impatience when 
Seward did not seem to be moving fast enough for him. Others may have found fault 
with him, or questioned his training for the job, but his “constituency of one,” Benito 
Juarez, never did.
7 Bemstein, Matias Romero, p. 13.
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Juarez saw Romero as far more valuable as a diplomat, even though his protege 
expressed a desire to fight as a soldier in the War of Reform. If the truth be told, Romero
Q
was slight and prone to hypochondria his whole life. Once assigned to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, he began angling for a position in London and had accordingly started 
learning English. His English lessons took an odd twist when he found out in 1859 that 
he had been appointed instead as Secretary of the Mexican delegation in Washington to 
serve under Minister Jose Mata. Romero arrived in Washington on Christmas Eve, 1859, 
armed with a smattering of anglicized English and far more devotion to the Liberal cause 
than training or preparation for diplomacy.
Romero would find himself working on Mexico’s chronic need for cash with a 
Buchanan Administration that was presiding over the unraveling of the Union. A note 
about how the Buchanan Administration came to recognize the Juarez regime is in order, 
as it partially explains ongoing suspicions about U.S. initiatives on Mexico’s behalf. The 
Conservatives had partially regained power in Mexico in early 1858 under the leadership 
of Felix Zuloaga. They controlled the capital Mexico City, whereas Juarez’s Liberals had 
been in Charge in Veracruz since May 1858. At this time, the U.S. government 
recognized Zuloaga, and continued to try and negotiate transit rights across the southern 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec, as well as to purchase Lower California and parts of the 
northern Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua. The Buchanan Administration broke 
off diplomatic relations with Zuloaga and the Conservatives in October 1858, after that 
government imposed a one per cent property tax “on all residents including foreigners.”9 
No government had recognized Juarez in 1858, and his emissary to Washington, 
Jose Maria Mata, whom Romero ultimately replaced, failed in his attempts to gain either 
loans or recognition from Buchanan and his Secretary of State, Lewis Cass. However, 
the desire for acquiring Lower California was still strong in the U.S., and Juarez and his
8 Ironically, death on land may have been preferable to the incapacitating seasickness to which he was 
prone, Bemstein, Matias Romero, p. 43.
Hamnett, Juarez, pp. 148-9.
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Foreign Minister Melchor Ocampo gave Buchanan’s special envoy to Mexico, William 
Churchwell, the impression that they might be willing to negotiate the sale for $10, 
000,000. It was at this point that Buchanan, feeling that such an acquisition might boost 
his chances in the 1860 election, sent Maryland Senator Robert McLane to recognize the 
Juarez government and negotiate what came to be known as the McLane-Ocampo 
Treaty.10 Recognizing the Juarez government broke with precedent, because it did not 
control the capital, the determining factor in the U.S. according recognition in the past. 
This would become very important later on, when, in spite of Maximilian being firmly in 
control of the capital Mexico City, the Lincoln Administration insisted that the official 
government of Mexico was that of Benito Juarez. Given the domestic political 
motivations of Buchanan in sending McLane-Ocampo to the Senate, there was little 
chance of its passage. In the words of historian Brian Hamnett, it became “a political 
football between slave and anti-slave states.”11
The recognition of Juarez by the U.S. did have one immediate tangible benefit. 
The Conservatives under Miramon were putting great pressure on the Liberals at 
Veracruz, but needed naval support to tighten the noose. They contracted for this in the 
form of Spanish ships in Havana. Juarez called on the U.S. for assistance, and the U.S. 
Navy prevented the ships from leaving Havana, in what has become known as the Anton 
Lizardo incident. In this instance U.S. help was critical in helping Juarez’s Liberals 
avoid political extinction, a role the U.S. would repeat in various ways over much of the 
next decade.12
Romero’s first major diplomatic assignment, therefore, was to deal with Secretary
of State Lewis Cass and his successor Jeremiah Black on the ramifications of the defeated
11
McLane-Ocampo treaty. Chronic unrest had made it virtually impossible for Mexico to
10 Ibid., pp. 148-50; also note #9, p. 7, Introduction.
11 Ibid., p. 152.
12 Ibid., p 152.
13 Cass would leave early in 186lover Buchanan’s refusal to reinforce Ft. Sumter in South Carolina, 
leaving the State Department in administrative limbo under caretaker Secretary o f  State Jeremiah Black.
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borrow on the international market, and poor practices and maintenance had resulted in 
the deterioration of the once-lucrative mining industry, thus making Mexico’s minerals 
less attractive as collateral. Just prior to the victory of Juarez’s Liberals in the War of 
Reform, the Conservative government o f Miramon had concluded a usurious loan with 
the Swiss financial house o f Jecker.14 Once the Liberals were back in power, Juarez 
refused to recognize that loan or its terms, thus setting in motion the Convention o f 
London and its expeditionary force. It was precisely to avoid this European intervention 
that the McLane-Ocampo Treaty had been proposed in the first place.
Unfortunately, land and mineral rights were the only things of real value that 
Mexico had to offer as collateral at this time. Given Mexican hypersensitivity to 
alienating any more of its territory after the Mexican-American war, the treaty could not 
be ratified in Mexico.15 Insofar as some of the land proposed for collateral was 
contiguous to Texas, some U.S. senators from the north disapproved of the treaty because 
it might allow for the extension of slavery into the territories acquired via Guadalupe 
Hidalgo. Hence Romero’s first exposure to international diplomacy was a failure. More 
importantly, he learned that Mexico’s political future was to a large extent dependent on 
its ability to raise money.
This would be an enduring lesson for the Liberals. Romero would become 
Mexico’s Treasury Secretary {Hacienda), and Porfirio Diaz, the Liberals most successful 
general, would serve as president for four decades with the exception of one term. Both 
worked assiduously to develop Mexico economically. The tenure of Diaz, referred to as 
the Porfiriata, has been roundly criticized for the preferences it gave to foreigners, and
Black, in turn, deferred to longtime clerk William Hunter for administrative guidance, Frederick W. 
Seward, Reminiscences o f  A War-Time Statesman and Diplomat 1830-1915, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1916, p. 142.
14 A backer o f  this loan was Napoleon I ll’s illegitimate half-brother, the Due de Momy, who stood to make 
a fortune if the deal went through.
15 In 1853, Santa Anna added to the insult o f the Treaty o f  Guadalupe Hidalgo by agreeing to the Treaty of 
Mesilla (known as the Gadsden Purchase in the U.S.) Mexico gave up fifty-five thousand acres in what 
are now southern New Mexico and Arizona for $10 million. Santa Anna was strapped for cash to fight his 
Liberal opponents. The U.S. wanted the land for railroads, see Suchlicki, Mexico, pp.79-80.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
57
for the repressive tactics it used to maintain order. Nevertheless, Mexican historian 
Josefma Vazquez maintains that the Porfiriata “brought the country decades of peace and 
permitted it to place itself on a sounder financial footing, promote economic growth, and 
occupy an honorable and respected place among nations.”16 She also points out that at 
the beginning of the Porfiriata, Mexico had 640 kilometers of railroads, and “almost 
twenty thousand” at the end. According to Vazquez, U.S. investment had reached 
$646,200,000 by 1911.17 One lesson that the Liberals had drawn from the humiliation of 
chronic national indebtedness was to establish a firm economic footing, and for Mexico 
to achieve, then maintain, an international credit rating. It is also true that the Porfiriata 
did so at a price so great as to lead to revolution. It is no wonder, then, that in the 
diplomatic maneuverings between the U.S., France, and Mexico in the 1860s, money was 
always an issue.
Romero’s primary diplomatic involvement would be with the administrations of 
Lincoln and his successor Andrew Johnson. At Juarez’s behest, Romero undertook a 
visit to Lincoln in Illinois two months after the 1860 election. Traveling by train to 
Springfield in January of 1861, Romero met with Lincoln and explained the dire situation 
facing the Liberal government. In his diary, Romero characterized Lincoln’s reaction as 
follows:
He [Lincoln] told me that during his administration he would try to do everything 
in his power to advance Mexican interests ..  .and for him Mexico was like a 
brother in friendship.18
The new diplomatic team that would deal with Mexico was now being put in 
place. After Lincoln’s inauguration, Seward replaced Black as Secretary of State and
16 Josefma Z. Vazquez and Lorenzo Meyer, The United States and Mexico, Chicago: U. o f  Chicago Press, 
1985, pp. 72-3.
17 Ibid., p. 92.
l8Matias Romero, Diario personal, p. 378; see also J.G. Randall, Lincoln The President: Springfield to 
Gettysburg, 4 vols., N Y : Dodd, Mead & Co., I, p. 249. Among the “notables” listed by Randall, Romero 
appears to be the only foreigner.
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Thomas Corwin of Ohio replaced Robert McLane as Minister to Mexico. Corwin was 
among Lincoln’s first diplomatic appointees and received congressional confirmation 
quickly because he had served as a Whig senator from Ohio.19 His son, William H. 
Corwin, went along as Secretary to the U.S. Legation. Thomas Corwin’s connection to 
Mexico went back to a speech he had made in the Senate in 1847 opposing the Mexican- 
American war:
If I were a Mexican I would tell you [the U.S. army], ‘Have you no room in your 
own country to bury your dead men? If you come into mine we will greet you 
with bloody hands, and welcome you to hospitable graves.’20 
Although Corwin’s speech, which was consistent with Whig policy in 1846, did not in 
any way alter the Democratic president Polk’s plans to acquire Mexican territory, it did 
leave a lasting positive impression on Whig Congressman Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln 
also vigorously opposed what he saw as a land-grab on the part of President Polk.
Hence in 1861, all involved in Corwin’s nomination anticipated a warm reception 
for him in Mexico because of his earlier stand. He threw himself right into negotiating 
loan agreements that would have enabled the Liberals to forestall their European 
creditors. Observers noted, however, that whereas Corwin had opposed the Democrat 
Polk’s acquisition of former Mexican territory as a prelude to the extension of slavery, he 
was not averse to negotiating Mexican land as collateral for the loan agreements. 
Corwin’s proposal had focused on a rail connection in southern Mexico between the 
Atlantic and Pacific via the Tehuantepec isthmus. It also proposed extraterritorial power 
for U.S. military forces in Mexico, ostensibly to maintain order. The Corwin/Seward 
plan would pay the Europeans three percent on Mexico’s public debt for five years, 
considered adequate by Seward to hold off the Europeans and reestablish financial order. 
Should Mexico default after five years, the U.S. would have “a lien on public lands and
19 Dean B. Mahin, One War at a Time, p. 110-115; Schoonover, Dollars Over Dominion, pp. 17-21.
20 Congressional Globe, 29,h Congress, 2lul Session, Appendix, 211-218.
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mineral rights of Lower California and three other provinces in northern and western 
Mexico.”21 After another year of default, the land would become U.S. property.
Facing civil war, and still unsure about opening more land to slavery, the U.S. 
Senate tabled the Corwin/Seward proposal. It is a matter of conjecture whether or not the 
U.S. would have been willing to enforce the terms of the proposal had Mexico defaulted. 
Regardless, Romero, now two years on the job, had still not been able to generate any 
financial help from the U.S. for his struggling government. He began to develop a 
mistrust of Seward, seeing him as obstructionist when it came to helping Juarez. Unused 
to the workings of a separation-of-powers government, Romero could not understand 
why the Secretary of State could not do something to expedite the loans. This, perhaps, 
explains his willingness, later in the decade, to accord the U.S. credit only for its “moral” 
support in evicting the French.
Though this process was disappointing and painful, Romero gained invaluable 
insights into the U.S. political system via these diplomatic encounters. In essence, he 
became a lobbyist and started to understand the nuances underlying the U.S. political 
system, and the vagaries of electoral politics. If he expected quick results in achieving the 
Mexican Republic’s goals, it would be insufficient to talk directly with the Chief 
Executive, as he had with Lincoln. Seeing that money bills originated in the House and 
treaties had to be approved in the Senate, he would have to cultivate key members of 
Congress. Moreover, he saw the necessity of influencing public opinion, for he was 
beginning to realize the importance of the press in mid-nineteenth century politics. To 
have Mexico’s voice heard amidst the din surrounding the Civil War was not going to be 
easy, and would probably be expensive. Yet Romero had to undertake these tasks when 
he often did not have a peso in his pocket.
21 Van Deusen, Seward, p. 366. Van Deusen quotes U.S. Minister to Great Britain, Charies Francis Adams, 
characterizing this proposal in a dispatch from London as “the preliminary to an entry for inevitable 
foreclosure.”
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Given contemporary foreign affairs security, it can be difficult for the modem 
student of diplomatic affairs to grasp how easily Romero gained access to the most 
sensitive of government communications. He cultivated contacts at the highest level of 
the government. Indeed, his pre-inauguration visit to Lincoln shows a willingness to go 
right to the top to get what he wanted. Among his early contacts within the Lincoln 
cabinet was Montgomery Blair. Blair had left the Democratic Party in opposition to the 
repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854, and he presided over Maryland’s Republican 
convention in 1860. Lincoln appointed him as Postmaster General in 1861, primarily 
because the Blair family had extensive political influence in two critical border states, 
Maryland and Missouri. As early as June 6,1861, Romero reported to Juarez on 
conversations with Blair:
I have had the satisfaction of finding Blair very well instructed about Mexican 
affairs, about the cause of our constant revolutions, and entirely in favor o f a 
popular, liberal government. His influence in the cabinet could be very useful to 
us, if one knows how to exploit it. I propose therefore to cultivate an 
acquaintanceship with him.23
Romero got his information on how the Corwin loan proposal was proceeding 
within the administration from a number of sources. Blair favored Romero “with his 
friendship” and was “more communicative than Seward.” On September 9,1861, 
Romero reported that his meetings with Blair offered him “the opportunity to learn what 
otherwise would escape me.”24 Blair went on to explain the thinking behind the Corwin 
loan proposal, saying that in the present circumstances “it is the most we could have 
done.” He then told Romero that if the Juarez government could not re-establish
22 Burton J. Hedrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1946, p. 70. Lincoln considered 
the maintenance o f  Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland and Delaware in the Union as critical to his strategy.
23 Quoted in Bernstein, M atias Romero, p. 72, from Romero’s Correspondencia, Vol. 1, pp. 411-413: "Su 
influencia en el gabinete podia ser muy util para nosotros, si sabemos usarla, y  me propuse seguir 
cultivando relacidnes con el. ”
24 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, Sept. 9,1861, #34, in Correspondencia, vol. I, pp. 732-33; see 
also Schoonover, Mexican Lobby, p. 9.
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financial order during the six year term of the loan, then intervention in Mexico, either by 
the U.S. or Europe, was probably inevitable.
This sort of off-the-cuff oral discussion was not uncommon among diplomats and 
government officials. By December 1861, however, Romero was asking Blair for copies 
of documents circulated among Cabinet members.25 Regarding U.S. participation in the 
Tripartite Agreement to collect debts, Blair and Romero disagreed with Seward. In 
November and early December 1861, Romero and Blair were advocating that the U.S. 
become involved “solely to introduce discord and to hasten disagreement among 
European powers, thereby impeding the realization of their plans.”26 Blair had written a 
memo to Seward outlining this approach, and Romero had reason to believe that it was 
discussed in the Cabinet based on a conversation with Seward in late November. Romero 
now asked Blair for a copy of the memo, which Blair declined because he said he had not 
retained one. Blair did not seem offended or outraged by the prospect of providing a 
secret Cabinet document to a foreign diplomat, and the two remained on very good terms. 
Seward rejected the idea of the U.S. becoming involved with the Europeans, even if only 
to sabotage their mission. He still thought buying them off with the proceeds of the 
Corwin loan was preferable, although that strategy was bogged down in the Senate.
One of Mongomery Blair’s pet projects was to ship southern Negroes somewhere 
outside of the United States.27 To this end, he discussed Mexico as a destination with 
Romero several times. Mexico had abolished slavery in 1829, and Romero, echoing 
Juarez’s unwavering stand, said that the Mexican Republic would never allow the re- 
introduction of slavery, although a government set up by the French might. Blair did not 
want slavery re-introduced into Mexico, but the presence of a group of former American 
slaves on Mexican soil might raise problems for Mexico’s government. Montgomery’s
25 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, Dec. 4,1861, # 349, vol. I, pp.620-1; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 10.
26 Ibid.
27 As “negro” was the te m  used in the 19th century, this dissertation uses it as the term Seward, Blair and 
all other leading Union officials would have used.
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brother, Frank, Jr., a Congressmen from Missouri and later a Union General, proposed 
the acquisition of the island of Cozumel off the Yucatan coast as a possible site for Negro 
transmigration.28 A ruse could thereby be maintained that slavery was not being re-: 
introduced into mainland Mexico. Their father, Frank, Sr., became involved in Mexican 
affairs some years later when he proposed, prior to Appomattox, that some former Union 
and Confederate forces unite to oust the French from Mexico.29 It could be argued that 
the Blairs’ interest in Mexico and their close association with Romero was not totally 
disinterested, as several of the Blairs’ schemes had potential for both profit and political 
advancement.
Romero now knew enough about the U.S. government to know that financial aid 
for Mexico had to be approved in Congress. Following the technique he used with 
President Lincoln, Romero went straight to the person who could help him most there, 
Senator Charles Sumner, Republican from Massachusetts. As noted earlier, Lincoln 
usually deferred to Seward in matters of foreign affairs. Seward’s counterpart in the 
Senate was Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. By mid- 
December 1861, Romero was cultivating Sumner directly, agitating for the passage of the 
Corwin loan. Although deliberations of the Senate Committee were mostly secret, 
Sumner informed Romero that the loan would probably be defeated. Romero pleaded for 
more time, and asked that the matter be tabled until after the Christmas recess, inviting 
Sumner to dinner to further press Mexico’s case.30 Even though the terms were awful 
from Mexico’s perspective, Juarez desperately needed money and may have felt that, 
once the crisis passed of European intervention passed, the terms could be re-negotiated.
28 This is the same Cozumel that is now a destination for cruise ships in the G ulf o f  Mexico. A brief 
discussion o f  several o f  these ill-fated colonization schemes can be found in McPherson, Battle Crv, pp. 
508-9.
29 According to McPherson, Francis Preston Blair, Frank, “badgered Lincoln to give him a pass through the 
lines to present this proposal to Jefferson Davis. Lincoln wanted nothing to do with Blair’s hare-brained 
Mexican scheme, but allowed him to go to Richmond to see what might develop.” McPherson, Battle Cry,
pp. 821-22.
Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, Dec. 22,1861, #378, vol. I, pp. 659-60; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 12.
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Whereas many high officials in Washington trusted Romero, Seward did not, a 
feeling that was reciprocated, at least initially. Although their official relation was very 
complex, covering a whole range of bilateral issues, the principal source of friction 
between them at this juncture was Seward’s commitment to neutrality towards the French 
in Mexico. Once the Tripartite forces arrived in Mexico, the nature of Romero’s 
concerns changed from the forestalling intervention to evicting those who had already 
intervened.
Romero was infuriated by what he viewed as the pretense of U.S. neutrality. He 
maintained that U.S. neutrality would be fine if it were truly neutral, which was decidedly 
not the case according to him. Romero cited as an example the case of former Mexican 
congressman, Juan Bustamante, who had been authorized by some of Mexico’s central 
states to purchase arms, as long as he coordinated his work with Romero. He finally 
managed to obtain some in Belgium, but Treasury Secretary Chase held up their 
transshipment through New York, citing neutrality as his reason.31 Insofar as Mexico had 
no arms industry, prohibiting arms sales and shipments effectively put the U.S. on the 
side of the French in Romero’s estimation. Romero pointed out in late 1862 that the 
French had acquired in New York and New Orleans mules, wagons, and other support 
material to support their military efforts while such assistance was being denied to 
Mexico.32 Romero had a point. Seward argued that there was no prohibition from the 
French buying war materiel and shipping it themselves. It was only when Americans 
became involved in the process, as had been the case with the Bustamante arms’ 
shipment, that U.S. neutrality laws came into play. Romero believed this to be another 
example of how Seward was splitting hairs in order to keep France out of the Civil War.
31 Romero and Bustamante pointed out to  Chase and Seward that the arms were incompatible with either 
those o f  the Union or the Confederacy and were, therefore, “entirely useless to the United States Army.” 
Marvin L. Ritzman, Matias Romero, Mexican Minister to the United States: His Problems and Difficulties 
During the French Intervention, unpublished M.A. thesis, Mexico City College, June 1952, pp. 3-5.
32 Ibid., p. 13.
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Romero’s perception of Seward’s intransigence on the issue of neutrality 
motivated Romero to seek other ways to plead his case. By February 1862, the Senate 
was contemplating a new approach to the Mexican situation, a resolution on Mexico 
seeking to limit further European involvement. At a dinner attended by both Romero and 
Sumner, Romero managed to get the essence of the resolution even though Sumner 
maintained that he could not show Romero the resolution because “Senate rules strictly 
prohibited that.”33 From another source not named in his report, Romero said that he 
managed to obtain Seward’s instructions to Minister Corwin about the Senate considering 
paying the interest on the Mexican debt to the Europeans, and that this should be enough 
to precipitate their withdrawal. Part of successful intelligence is getting crucial 
information into the hands of one’s government quickly enough to be prepared for 
overtures from other parties. Romero succeeded in this case, as his report to Juarez on 
Seward’s instructions to Corwin was sent on the same ship as the originals to Corwin 
himself.34
Historian Thomas Schoonover points out that Romero had progressed from 
diplomatic interviews and discussions over dinner to getting “confidential U.S. 
government documents” by the fall of 1862. On September 13,1862, he reported to his 
government that he had seen Corwin’s report from Mexico. On October 10, he reported 
seeing the U.S. government’s instructions to Corwin about not recognizing any new 
government established in Mexico.35 By early December, some of the American press 
was skewering American Minister to Mexico Corwin for his meddling in a loan 
negotiated through the banking house of Jecker, a loan that Juarez was flatly refusing to 
honor. Romero had lost faith in Corwin by this time, sensing that he was in collusion with
■’■'Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, Feb. 19, 1862, #52, vol. II, pp. 55-6; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 22.
34 Romero to Minister o f Foreign Relations, Sept. 13,1862, #305, vol. II, pp. 383-4; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 26.
35 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, Oct. 10,1862, #324, vol. II, p. 72; see also Schoonover, Lobby,-
p. 26.
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the French. In order to discredit Corwin further, Romero sought a Congressional 
resolution censuring Corwin’s conduct in the affair. Working through one of Corwin’s 
political adversaries from Ohio, Representative Jacob Cox, Romero drafted the resolution 
and had Cox submit it. Romero reported that the resolution “was approved without 
discussion .. .[the] fact that Cox, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
submitted the resolution..  .should produce some effect on Corwin. He will be, perhaps, 
more cautious in the future.”36
Romero sought a private interview with Lincoln to explain how the situation in 
Mexico had deteriorated since the arrival of the European troops. He did this because he 
felt that because Seward valued French neutrality so highly that he was not actively 
trying to help Mexico. In order to do this, Romero had to find a way to circumvent 
normal diplomatic channels, which would have run through Seward. He already knew 
the President, and using his normal modus operandi, went right to the top.
The way Romero managed to see Lincoln alone may not put him in the best light, 
but he insisted that “although my character near this government is not the most 
appropriate for possessing the right to be received by the president, I have determined to 
commit this small irregularity for my country’s sake.”37 Lincoln’s son, Will, had died in 
February, and, under the guise of expressing his condolences, Romero used the occasion 
to warn Lincoln of French designs on Mexican territory. He also said that he would visit 
the president “in an unofficial capacity” on occasion because Mexican affairs were so 
important. When policy is at stake, a diplomat does not visit the President of the country 
to which he is accredited “in an unofficial capacity.” Romero was clearly trying to get 
the President’s ear when Seward was not in the room. From Seward’s perspective, the 
Mexicans’ defeat of the French at Puebla on May 5,1862 removed the necessity of any
36 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, Dec. 22,1862, #410, vol. II, p. 735; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 27.
37 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, May 16,1862, #162, vol. II, p. 73; see also Schoonover,
Lobby, p. 25.
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immediate U.S. action. It would take a while for Napoleon Ill’s plans to gestate there, 
and in the meantime Seward had to deal with several other very pressing matters.
Seward was a career politician and a cagey chess player when it came to foreign 
policy. Romero, on the other hand, was a passionate republican who had a great sense of 
duty to the government he served. In the spring of 1862, the disparity in these two points 
of view caused friction between the two men, and motivated Romero to seek aid for 
Mexico through channels other than the State Department. Two years later, Romero even 
began to become involved in U.S. electoral politics in an effort to deny re-nomination to 
Lincoln. He provided background information to Senator McDougall of California, who 
had already publicly chastised Seward’s Mexican policy. Romero reported that those like 
McDougall, who wanted U.S. military intervention in Mexico to oust the French, “are 
quite confident that they can prevent Lincoln’s reelection. They are now directing all 
their efforts to this task.”38 Seward’s and Romero’s goals for Mexico were, in fact, not 
significantly different, but their methods of achieving those goals were. When the French 
were finally gone and republican, democratic government restored in Mexico, the two 
struck up a friendship. Between 1862 and 1866, however, they were polite adversaries in 
contests that Seward was winning most of the time.
Despite his setbacks, Romero was proving himself very valuable to his 
government. He was gifted with the ability to obtain access to high officials in 
Washington, a skill that is still valued. He appeared self-deprecating and unassuming to 
his interlocutors, but listened carefully to all that was said, and wrote prodigious notes. 
His success, however, came at the price of significant financial sacrifice. Romero had 
offered his resignation in December 1861, on the grounds that, in his opinion, he did not 
have sufficient resources to conduct republican Mexico’s business in the U.S.39 
Frustrated at the prospect of getting no real assistance from the U.S., he returned to
38 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, July 31, 1864, #180, vol IV, pp. 282-3; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 47.
39 Harry Bernstein, Matias Romero, p. 77.
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Mexico in May 1863 and remained until October. He complained to his government that 
he was exhausted. As much as Romero wanted to return to Mexico, he dreaded the trip, 
as he suffered from seasickness. Arriving at the Gulf port of Tampico, he headed 
overland to Juarez’s seat of government in San Luis Potosi. There he told the president 
that he did not want to return because the climate in Washington did not agree with him, 
and that he would rather serve in the army under General Porfirio Diaz. But if  there was 
no one willing to go to Washington and the Juarez government insisted, “I would return, 
making a genuine effort to go there, because there was no sacrifice that I was unwilling to 
do for this country.”40
One can argue that Romero’s resignation was a ploy on his part to bring the 
seriousness of his situation in Washington to the attention of Juarez. Romero was only 
twenty-four and fervently patriotic, so according him the benefit of the doubt may be in 
order. Obviously Juarez was not about to transform someone who displayed a real flair 
for diplomacy, spoke English, and had established varying degrees of access of the U.S. 
President, Secretary of State, and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
into a foot soldier, patriot or not. The request was denied, Romero was promoted to 
“permanent Charge,” and his salary was increased, with guarantees that it would arrive 
on time in the future. Moreover, his “expense account” was augmented, thus enabling 
him to extend his lobbying activities to New York City, where more readily available 
financial support for Mexico might be found.
If Romero was not having much luck with either Seward or Lincoln in 
Washington in getting money and material for his government, it might seem improbable 
for him to extend his efforts to Seward’s own back yard. Romero obviously knew that 
Seward had been Governor and two-term U.S. Senator from the Empire State. Seward’s 
political adviser, Thurlow Weed, was nationally prominent in Republican affairs and
40 Romero, Diario, p. 528
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called “The Dictator” in New York, although not to his face.41 After all, it was still some 
twenty years before the passage of the Pendleton Act, and Seward and Weed were in a 
position to distribute innumerable political jobs and favors42 However, Seward’s 
influence in New York waned after his failure to obtain the Republican presidential 
nomination in 1860, and Weed, his campaign manager, had lost his aura of political 
omnipotence with that defeat. In fact, Seward’s influence was primarily upstate, near his 
Auburn home and Rochester, and Weed had worked his magic in Albany.
New York City was a different story. There, where immigrants were discovering 
the power of the vote, Democrats held sway. On one hand, the benefits of fighting a civil 
. war and completely disrupting the American economy had never been clear to many very 
wealthy New Yorkers. On the other, staunch abolitionists thought that Seward was 
backtracking from his former anti-slavery stand, to a position closer to Lincoln’s, 
whereby saving the Union took precedence over everything.
Romero, in any case, had legitimate business in New York City, trying to procure 
arms and money for his countrymen. He would simply have to find ways to beat the French 
at their own game, even if it did contravene U.S. neutrality. Even amidst the Civil War and 
the French Intervention, businessmen were proposing commercial deals for railroads and 
the exploitation of natural resources that merited the attention of the Mexican Charge. In 
fairness, Romero did not actively seek out Seward’s adversaries in New York; they found 
him. As noted earlier, Romero learned almost immediately that Mexico’s future would be 
linked to American money, and, if  public sources were difficult to obtain in Washington, 
private sources might be more forthcoming in New York City. There was also a lot of 
unofficial political activity in New York, and Romero encountered there political activists 
from other Central American countries who underscored the importance of Mexico
41 Van Deusen, Thurlow Weed, p. 109.
42 Passed in 1883 and named for its sponsor, Sen. George Pendleton D-OH, it sought to limit the political 
“spoils system” by making certain federal positions open only through examination. It was popularly 
called the “merit system” to distinguish it from using political appointments as paybacks, as Seward, and 
especially Weed, had done throughout their careers.
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remaining a republic if democracy was to flourish elsewhere in Spanish-speaking 
America.43 Finally, it would be necessary to spend a fair amount of time in New York City 
once Juarez sent his family there for security reasons in August 1864.44
The locus of much of Romero’s activity was one of the city’s finest restaurants, 
Delmonico’s on Fifth Avenue. There he often met with his New York friends and 
colleagues, such as Robert McLane, the former U.S. Minister to Mexico, and Edward L. 
Plumb, who had also worked for the U.S. State Dept, in Mexico and Washington.45 It 
was at Delmonico’s in June of 1862 that Spanish General Prim publicly denounced 
French actions in Mexico. This made the headlines, because Prim had been the 
commander of the Spanish forces authorized by the Convention of London. He headed 
the Spanish third of the debt collecting mission and left Mexico almost immediately 
when he saw what the French really intended. Now married to a young Mexican woman, 
Prim was publicly espousing the cause of Mexican liberalism. When Prim later met with 
Seward in Washington, Romero acted as the interpreter.
Progressively, Romero found his greatest support among New York City’s most 
prominent businessmen. James Beekman, from one of the oldest families of New York 
of Dutch descent, became his closest confidant. Through Beekman, Romero met Hiram 
Barney, administrator of the Port of New York, and as such, the source of a wealth of 
information about shipments to Mexico. Beekman exercised his influence over wealthy 
members of the New York Republican Party through the Union League Club. Beekman 
was no friend of Seward or Thurlow Weed, and he was more than willing to help Romero
43 Romero’s acquaintances included Jose Antonio de Irisarri, a prominent Guatemalan thinker who 
emphasized M exico’s regional importance to Romero. He also frequented Thomas Mosquera, former 
president of Colombia, who offered military aid to Juarez, which he probably could not deliver. Bernstein, 
Romero, pp. 82-3.
44 Cadenhead, Juarez, p. 99; some o f  Juarez’s deepest thoughts were revealed in letters to his son-in-law 
Pedro Santacilia who accompanied Juarez’s wife, Dona Margarita, to New York. Romero kept close watch 
on the family and did everything in his power to assure their welfare.
45 Prof. Schoonover speculates that Plumb, along with Robert Chew and Henry Roy de la Reintrie were his 
confidential sources within the State Department, Schoonover, Lobby, p. 13. When the French Intervention 
was over, Plumb would become very involved in investment schemes in Mexico, see Pletcher, Rails, Ch. 1 
and especially Ch. 2.
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organize a public relations campaign to seek a more active role for the U.S. in opposing 
French aggression in Mexico. Beekman introduced Romero to William H. Aspinwall, 
head of the Panama railway; banker William Dodge, one of the wealthiest people in New 
York; and Generals George B. McLellan and John A. Dix.46 All of these individuals 
were in a position to help Mexico, either by providing arms and money, or by favorably 
influencing public opinion. The guest lists for a series of dinners given at Delmonico’s 
and other places around New York City give some indication of the degree to which 
Romero had penetrated the upper reaches of New York City society and finance 47
By 1864, Romero was in a position to accomplish something tangible for Mexico. 
He had powerful friends in New York and had cultivated influential members of 
Congress. His government had promoted him, and he now had sufficient rank to be taken 
seriously by those who considered such things important. He had some money to work 
with, and his banker friends in New York were showing him how private loans might 
work if the U.S. government persisted in denying Mexico official assistance, although 
they had yet to transfer any real cash.
Romero needed to be in a position to act, because in the spring of 1864, the 
French Intervention was about to become permanent in the form of Emperor Maximilian. 
When offered the crown by Mexican Conservatives, Maximilian agreed on the condition 
that a plebiscite be held, confirming his approval by the Mexican populace, an ironic 
gesture towards democratic procedure by someone about to become emperor, but
46 McClellan was the Democratic presidential candidate in 1864, Dix replaced John Bigelow as Minister to 
France in December, 1866, Bigelow, Retrospections, vol. Ill, p. 656.
47 Robert Miller, "Matias Romero: Mexican Minister to the United States during the Juarez-Maximilian 
Era," Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. XLV, May, 1965 #2, p. 233. Guests included: William 
Cullen Bryant, poet and editor o f the New York Evening Post, John W. Hammersley, prominent New York 
City lawyer, William H. Aspinwall, promoter o f the Panama railroad, George Bancroft, historian, along 
with the President o f Columbia University, and the mayor o f  New York. There was a similarly 
distinguished guest list for Romero's farewell dinner at Delmonico's in 1867, as recounted in J. K. 
Wilkerson, Matias Romero, 1867, Mexico City: U.S. Embassy, 1988. Seward did not attend this banquet in 
person, but sent a message describing Romero as a "highly respected and esteemed friend," who was 
blessed with "ability, fidelity, frankness, and courtesy." Seward might not have been quite as willing to be 
so laudatory o f  Romero between 1862 and 1866.
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indicative of Maximilian’s contradictory nature. Mexico had no experience with such a 
political process, but the French military contrived something acceptable under the 
circumstances, which the naive Maximilian accepted as popular endorsement.48 Once the 
plebiscite demanded by Maximilian was complete, and the terms of his responsibilities to 
Napoleon III were spelled out in the convention of Miramar (named after Maximilian’s 
castle near Trieste) [Appendix IV], the way was clear for departure for Mexico.
Indeed, this call for a plebiscite can be viewed as emblematic of Maximilian’s 
ineptitude and his total lack of comprehension of the situation on the ground in the 
country he was about to rule. Since independence in 1821, and indeed for the eleven 
years before that, political power in Mexico had been determined by force. In fact, as 
Maximilian was calling for the plebiscite, political power was once again changing by 
force, thanks to the presence of French troops. Only force could keep Maximilian in 
power once he arrived. Conversely, the force of the Juaristas led to his execution. The 
plebiscite was a polite fiction for a European prince who was unnerved by the sight of 
blood. It was one of the many fraudulent premises on which Maximilian based his 
regime, another being the complete support of the Catholic Church; a regime erected on 
such a flimsy foundation was doomed. Seward had an overall strategy for getting the 
French out of Mexico that called for diplomacy and subtle military threats. From June 
1864 onward, the presence of the incompetent Maximilian on the Mexican throne would 
add greatly to the chances of that strategy’s success.
Other principal provisions of the Treaty, signed on April 10,1864, called for 
Maximilian to pay for the French troops, twenty thousand who were to remain in Mexico 
until 1867. Maximilian was also to pay all of the claims that precipitated European 
intervention in the first place. He also agreed to pay the French loans that Juarez had 
refused to pay on the basis that such loans were illegal and not binding on Mexico.
48 Cunningham, Mexico and the Foreign Policy o f  Napoleon III, pp. 174-76; see also Jasper Ridley, 
Maximilian and Juarez, NY: Ticknor & Fields, 1992, pp. 156-7.
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Wittingly or unwittingly, Maximilian thus tripled Mexico’s foreign debt before ever 
setting foot in the country. Given his other egregious misjudgments, one would have to 
assume that Maximilian did so “unwittingly,” overlooking the crucial element that he 
would be beholden to France for a very long time, even if his enterprise succeeded. 
Indeed, two years later, Napoleon III used Maximilian’s inability to live up to the 
financial terms of the Miramar Treaty as his ostensible reason for removing French
49troops.
Maximilian, his Belgian princess wife Charlotte, and their entourage left Trieste 
in April and arrived in Veracruz on May 28,1864. Once Juarez fled north, the French 
established a caretaker government. The extinction of Mexican republican and 
democratic principles seemed imminent when Maximilian triumphantly entered Mexico 
City on June 12,1864. Meanwhile, Juarez was still trying to hold his forces together 
while moving from San Luis Potosi, to Saltillo, to Monterrey, and finally to Chihuahua 
[see map p. iii]. Before reaching Chihuahua, the Juarez government was physically 
situated on horseback and in carriages.50 Even once in Chihuahua Juarez was forced to 
flee twice to Paso del Norte (now eponymously called Ciudad Juarez) on the U.S. border 
across from El Paso, Texas.
Since its expulsion from Mexico City, the Juarez government had sent its official 
foreign correspondence from the ambulatory regime by ship through Guaymas on the 
Gulf o f California. Once Maximilian’s forces took Guayamas, official correspondence 
had to travel through Texas in the Confederacy, to Santa Fe, to Kansas City, then onto 
Washington. The overland process took six weeks and was quite unreliable. As a result 
of this, Romero was often operating without any direct instructions at all from his 
government during this period. Yet during all this time only once was he reprimanded. 
That reprimand related to Romero’s next big diplomatic problem.
49 Hannah, Napoleon III, p. 126-7.
50 Cadenhead, Benito Juarez, pp. 99-101; Knapp, Life o f  Sebastian, ch. VII.
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Maximilian and the French were pushing hard for official recognition of 
Maximilian’s regime as the true government of Mexico. On the surface their arguments 
were relatively persuasive. The U.S. had traditionally recognized governments that 
controlled capitals, and Maximilian was firmly entrenched in the Mexican capital of 
Mexico City. Given that Juarez was running for his life in Mexico’s northern deserts, it 
was hard to make a case for the legitimacy of the Juarez government. As might logically 
be expected, European monarchies had recognized fellow monarch Maximilian right 
away. The matter was being discussed openly in Congress and the press, even though 
Lincoln and Seward stuck adamantly to Juarez. This of course meant that the U.S. 
Minister to Mexico, Corwin, no longer had a government to negotiate with, as he chose 
not to flee with the Juarez government to San Luis Potosi. Given his embarrassing 
situation, Corwin requested that he be permitted to return to the U.S., which was 
approved.51 By this time Romero suspected that Corwin had developed pro-Maximilian 
sympathies, something rumored, but never proven. By November 1864, Seward had 
received a request from Maximilian requesting recognition, but the request had not been 
acted upon.
The whole issue of recognition was always central to the unfolding drama 
between the U.S., France and Mexico. Early in the Civil War, Seward had instructed 
Minister Dayton in Paris to adopt a conciliatory tone towards France, as he did not want 
to goad it into recognizing the Confederacy. For his part, Napoleon III expected an 
independent Confederacy to recognize whatever puppet regime he might establish in 
Mexico. Now the most important part of Napoleon’s plan had come to fruition with the 
installation of Maximilian and his recognition by most European states. If the Union 
recognized Maximilian, his claim to legitimacy would be validated. More importantly, 
recognition would effectively repudiate the Juarez government. This would have had
51 William H. Corwin to Seward re departure o f Thomas Corwin, 6/30/1864, DR, Despatches, Mexico, 
M97.R31
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grave consequences for Romero, who was desperately trying to float loans and buy arms 
for Juarez. Whatever credit on the financial markets the Juarez regime might still have 
would be effectively negated by the recognition of Maximilian.
Seward had already given an indication of his position in his instructions to 
Minister Dayton in Paris, concerning Maximilian’s visit there in February 1864:
If the Archduke Maximilian appears in Paris only in his character as an imperial 
prince of the house of Hapsburg, you will be expected to be neither demonstrative 
nor reserved in your deportment towards him. If he appears there with any 
assumption of political authority or title in Mexico, you will entirely refrain from
» •  o
intercourse with him.
From Spain, U.S. Minister Gustav Koemer likewise asked how Maximilian’s emissaries 
should be treated. Seward told Koemer to “hold no official intercourse with any 
representative at Madrid or any revolutionary government that has been or shall be 
established against the authority of the United States in Mexico.”53
But Napoleon III was persistent, as was his protege. Maximilian tried to increase 
his chances for recognition by sending two emissaries to the U.S., Miguel Arroyo and 
Mariano Degollado. The former was Maximilian’s Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs; 
the latter had served as one of Santa Anna’s diplomats in Washington. They had a 
number of influential friends and funds at their disposal to influence public opinion. 
Seward would have none of it and never did meet, formally or informally, with 
Maximilian’s two envoys.54
There was an anomaly in U.S. law at the time that did not require exequatur for 
consuls.55 Hence Arroyo set up an office on Broadway and announced that he was the
52 Seward to Dayton, Feb. 27,1864, DR, Instructions, France, M77, R57.
53 Seward to Koemer, April 7,1864, DR, Instructions, Spain, M77, R  143.
Robert W. Frazer, Matias Romero and the French Intervention in Mexico, Ph .D. dissertation, Los 
Angeles: UCLA, 1941, pp 435-440.
55Exequatur, written recognition o f  a consul by the government or state in which he is stationed, 
authorizing him to exercise his powers
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official commercial agent for Maximilian, a function formerly performed by the French 
consul. In essence, Arroyo was establishing a “front” from which efforts for 
Maximilian’s recognition could be mounted. Romero protested to Seward, but Seward 
said that there was nothing illegal in such an arrangement under U.S. law. Arroyo and 
Degollado mounted a rather vigorous campaign on behalf of Maximilian, but it came to 
nothing.56
However, Romero was not privy to all of the intelligence available to Seward, and 
he remained very nervous that the U.S. would recognize Maximilian. This fear led him 
to the only serious gaffe of his diplomatic tenure in Washington. Romero floated a 
proposal to Seward that the Mexican states of Baja California and Sonora might be up for 
sale if recognition of Maximilian were definitively denied, thereby using the only real 
collateral Mexico had. He did not initiate this overture on his own, but in tandem with 
Juarista General Manuel Doblado, who happened to be in the U.S. soliciting guns and 
money.57 When apprised of these overtures, Juarez sternly reminded both men that their 
diplomatic latitude did not extend to jeopardizing the “integrity and independence of the 
national territory.”58 Despite Romero’s fears, Seward remained good to his word and 
Maximilian remained unrecognized.
By 1864, Congress was focusing more on Mexican affairs. Although Seward had 
avoided overt mention of the Monroe Doctrine, several members of the House and Senate 
called the French intervention in Mexico a clear violation of that policy. These included 
California Senator James MacDougall, and Representatives John Kasson of Iowa and 
Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, the latter Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. A House resolution on April 4,1864 stated that the U.S. “will never consent 
to the erection of a monarchical government under European influence upon the ruins of
56 Frazer, Romero and French Intervention, p. 439-40.
57 This is the same Manuel Doblado who negotiated the Convention o f  Soledad with the Tripartite 
Governments reaffirming non-involvement in Mexican internal political affairs during the debt-coliecting 
mission.
58 Cadenhead, Juarez, p. 104.
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an American republic.”59 When apprised of this resolution, French Foreign Minister 
Drouyn de Lhuys reportedly asked U.S. Minister Dayton, “Do you bring us peace or 
bring us war?”60 Romero was further reassured by Lincoln’s message to Congress on 
December 6,1864. This was the first time the President had directly mentioned Mexico 
in his annual message, and he said simply:
Mexico continues to be a theater of civil war. While our political relations with 
that country have undergone no change, we have at the same time strictly 
maintained neutrality between the belligerents.61
This formulation indicated that the struggle was no longer between France and 
Mexico, but between warring factions in Mexico, and the U.S. had already officially 
recognized one of those factions as legitimate, even while maintaining a public posture of 
neutrality. Disapproving of Seward’s temporizing with the French, Congress used the 
“power of the purse.” The House Appropriation bill of December 15 provided funding 
for a diplomatic presence only in the Republic of Mexico. There would be no funds for a 
legation to Maximilian’s Empire.
After what must have seemed to Romero like an eternity, events were now 
tending in his direction. Congress was on his side, as was public opinion. The U.S. press 
had entered the fray on the Mexican issue, in general coming down squarely on the side 
of Juarez’s Liberals. This was proving to be a political liability for Lincoln and Seward 
in an election year. Romero himself liberally provided notes and background information 
to editors who showed a friendly disposition to the Liberal regime. A “Defenders of the 
Monroe Doctrine” Club was formed in New Orleans in late 1864. The club sponsored 
essay contests, and published and distributed those that won. The club caused enough 
trouble for the French Charge to protest to Seward about its actions.62
50 Congressional Globe, April 4 ,1 8 6 4 ,38lh Cong., Is1 Sess., p. 1408.
60 Van Deusen, Seward, p. 368.
61 J.D. Richardson, A Compilation o f  the Messages and Papers o f  the Presidents, 1789-1897, vol. V, New 
York: Bureau o f  National Literature, 1897, p. 3444.
62 Perkins, M onroe Doctrine, 1933 ed., pp. 448-9.
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Without U.S. recognition, Maximilian was now viewed as a “revolutionary.” The 
domestic political situation in France was festering, and Prussia was menacing its 
borders. An uprising in Poland against Russian rule threatened the European balance of 
power. Russia had been the sole European power to show overt sympathy for the Union. 
Historian D.P. Crook notes that “bungling European policy might bring together the 
beleaguered colossi of east [Russia] and west [the U.S.], allowing them to achieve the 
primacy on the world stage to which their resources entitled them.”63 Michele 
Cunningham cites similar instances of political upheaval in Europe, including trouble in 
the Danish duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, as the reason “many historians have claimed 
that it was the turn of events in Europe during 1863, most notably the uprisings in Poland 
and later the conflict over the Danish duchies, that forced Napoleon to begin reducing 
France’s involvement in Mexico.”64 She maintains, however, that these European 
developments were not decisive, because “Napoleon never intended that France should 
have a lengthy involvement in Mexico.”65 Whether Cunningham is correct or not, it 
cannot be denied that a great deal was going on in Europe that had implications for 
France, its military and its treasury. Napoleon III was going to have to think hard about 
the allocation of his resources.
The elevation of U.S. Grant as Lieutenant General of the Union Army in the 
spring of 1864 provided an additional boost for Romero.66 Grant was Romero’s highest- 
ranking confidant and a strong public supporter of the Mexican Liberals. Romero was 
now convinced that republican Mexico would prevail. Romero was beginning to believe
63 D.P. Crook, Diplomacy During the American Civil War, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1975, pp. 122.
54 Cunningham, Mexico, p. 155.
“ ibid., p. 155.
66 This rank had only been held previously by George Washington. Lincoln added “General in C hief’ to 
the title, McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 718
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that it was only a matter of time. Seward also had hopes for republican Mexico’s long­
term future, but in the short run found himself beleaguered by internal critics and political 
intrigues.
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CHAPTER THREE 
PARTISANSHIP IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Diplomats do not work in a political vacuum and William Henry Seward was no 
exception. Whereas Seward’s handling of external threats to the Union was the subject of 
preceding chapters, this chapter will analyze how Seward managed to resist forces within 
the U.S. government that opposed him personally and his handling of foreign policy in 
general. One group wanted his ouster, as much for reasons of personal jealousy as for 
policy. The other wanted a more aggressive approach to removing the French from 
Mexico. The fact that the former group was largely composed of colleagues with whom 
he had fought tough battles in the U.S. Senate broke his heart and effectively ended his 
presidential aspirations. The latter group gained adherents as it became clearer that the 
Union would win and that the military resources at the Union’s disposal could easily be 
put to use against the French. This group wanted a public reaffirmation that the Monroe 
Doctrine was national policy, and that no new European-inspired monarchies would be 
allowed in the Western Hemisphere.
Among Senators, an irony surrounds the role played during the French 
intervention by Senator Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. Sumner was one of Seward’s greatest rivals and persistent behind-the-scenes 
critics, yet he ended up actually supporting Seward’s Mexican policy by his repeated 
tabling of Senate resolutions calling for more aggressive action against the French. 
Meanwhile, Mexican Minister to Washington Matias Romero reappeared, trying 
ceaselessly to get U.S. Congressmen to support his call for U.S. armed intervention in 
Mexico to dislodge the French.
Seward endured much in the four years between Lincoln’s inauguration and the 
physical attacks on April 14,1865 that left him scarred and the president dead. He 
experienced the betrayal of his former colleagues in the Senate and his co-workers in the
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cabinet. He was attacked in the press for Union military failures that were not 
specifically of his making. His manhood and patriotism were called into question on the 
Senate floor. In confronting the growing criticism of his policy of neutrality towards the 
French in Mexico, he felt profoundly misunderstood by the general public and the radical 
members of his own political party. Yet Seward was nothing if not persistent and lucky, 
an invaluable asset in politics. In spite of all the obstacles, both public and personal, he 
ended up prevailing over his political foes.
Almost immediately after President Lincoln’s inauguration, dissatisfaction with 
Seward had begun to grow in Congress and within the Cabinet, some of it for good 
reason. Sumner, perhaps the government’s greatest expert on foreign affairs after Seward 
and the Minister to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams, had been working to 
undermine Seward from the beginning of the Lincoln Administration. Seward and 
Sumner had been friends in the Senate and likeminded combatants in the struggle against 
the extension of slavery in the 1840s and 1850s. However, Sumner’s personal jealousy of 
Seward’s prominence in the Lincoln administration, along with his growing differences 
over foreign and domestic policy, caused a rift between the two that rapidly widened.
For his policy to succeed, Seward would have to find a way to resist growing calls 
for action from Congressmen who were touchy about their prerogatives in foreign affairs, 
and those who were beginning to view Seward’s refusal to act aggressively in Mexico as 
synonymous with cowardice. By early 1863, Democratic Senator James A. McDougall of 
California was taking Seward’s Mexican policy to task on the floor of the Senate on the 
grounds that it was pusillanimous. Fending off both the general dissatisfaction and 
specific criticisms of his former friends and colleagues in Congress would occupy much 
of Seward’s time from late 1862 to 1865.
Upon assuming his position as Secretary of State in March 1861, Seward left the 
Senate. Had he remained, he would have continued to collaborate with Sumner and 
Senators like Henry Wilson from Massachusetts, Benjamin Wade of Ohio, Zachariah
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Chandler of Michigan, and Lyman Trumbull of Illinois. Having served as U.S. Senator 
from New York since 1849, Seward, unlike Lincoln, was a known quantity to these men. 
With the nation’s largest number of electoral votes (thirty-five in 1860), New York had 
always been central to U.S. politics. Lincoln, coming from Illinois with its eleven 
electoral votes, was somewhat of a cipher to the national leadership in 1861, having 
served only one term as a Whig congressman from 1847 to 1849. His fellow 
congressmen considered Seward an abolitionist and were familiar with many of his 
classic anti-slavery speeches. Seward was anathema to pro-slavery southerners. Indeed, 
in his first major address to the Senate, known as his “higher law” speech, he argued 
forcefully that California should be admitted as a free state:
The Constitution regulates our stewardship; the Constitution devotes the domain 
to union, to justice, to defense, to welfare, and to liberty. But there is a higher law 
than the Constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain, and devotes 
it to the same noble purposes.1 
This controversial appeal to a “higher law” interjected an element of moral imperative 
into the debate over slavery in the territories, one consistent with the abolitionist position 
that slavery was sinful and therefore must be ended immediately, thereby precluding any 
bargaining about it. Conversely, it infuriated those, particularly in the South, who felt 
that in political matters there was no “higher law” than the Constitution.
Seward’s 1858 “irrepressible conflict” speech, in which he spoke of the 
impending “collision” between economic systems dependent on either slave or free labor, 
elaborated on this theme:
Shall I tell you what this collision means? They who think that it is accidental, 
unnecessary, the work of interested or fanatical agitators. .  .miss the case 
altogether. It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces,
1 Seward speech in the U.S. Senate, 3/11/1850, cited in Glyndon Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, NY: 
Oxford U. Press, 1967, p. 123; see also “Great Union Names: William Henry Seward,” Union College 
Magazine, vol. 94, #1, summer 2001.
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and it means that the United States must and will, sooner or later, become either 
entirely a slaveholding nation, or entirely a free labor nation.2 
These words are congruent with those of Lincoln in his famous “house divided” speech, 
also delivered in 1858, in which he said “I believe this government cannot endure, 
permanently half slave and half free.”3 From these and other public utterances, it would 
appear that, at least at the time of the election in 1860, Lincoln and Seward were in 
accord with those in Congress who, because of their inflexible pro-abolition stance, 
would come to be known as Radical Republicans.
John Bigelow had known Seward well since 1856, and had served as U.S. Consul, 
then Minister, to France during the period when French withdrawal from Mexico was 
actually being negotiated. A writer, Edward Pierce, had written to Bigelow in 1892 
asking his impressions of Seward. Bigelow replied in length, putting Seward’s 
achievements in the political context of their time, explaining to Pierce why they were so 
extraordinary under the circumstances:
He was the first antislavery man in the country who had and retained a national 
party behind him. If he did not march as fast as some, he always kept ahead of his 
troops, but never so far that they could not hear his word of command. There 
were many earnest and able antislavery men in the Senate while he was Senator, 
but Seward was the one who was usually held responsible by the slaveholders for 
all the antislavery agitation, and it was against him that their guns were always 
turned in controversy. This was an unconscious homage to his sagacity as a 
leader of the phalanx of freedom, which was paid to no other Northern Senator.4 
In one sense, the rift that proceeded to develop between Lincoln and Seward, and 
the Radical Republicans, was one of timing. Once it was clear that the Union would not
2 George E. Baker, ed., The Works o f  William H. Seward, V vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1888, vol. 4, 
pp. 56 & 292.
Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works o f  Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols., New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers U. 
Press, 1952-55, vol. II, pp. 465-66.
4 Bigelow, Retrospections, vol. 3, pp. 627-8.
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win the Civil War quickly, Lincoln and Seward entertained various ideas about 
temporizing over slavery in order to save the Union. This approach was perhaps best 
summarized in Lincoln’s famous reply to Horace Greeley’s “The Prayer of Twenty 
Millions,” a pro-emancipation editorial appearing on August 20,1862 in Greeley’s paper 
the New York Tribune'.
My paramount object in the struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save 
or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do 
it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save 
it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that.5 
This approach, shared by Seward, was anathema to the Radicals, who wanted not only 
immediate emancipation, but also citizenship and the vote for freedmen.
Based on his senatorial experience and public utterances, Seward should have 
been able to work with the Radicals even while his position in the administration became 
progressively more moderate. Once on board, however, and once Lincoln made clear to 
him after the April Fool’s memorandum that he, the President, was in Charge, Seward 
hove to the moderate line. That policy, with its emphasis on saving the union at any cost, 
up to and including bargaining over slavery, estranged Seward from his former Radical 
colleagues. They viewed this shift as tantamount to betrayal, and their disaffection with 
Seward began shortly after he showed that he would follow the President’s lead.
There was also congressional disagreement over foreign policy. Sumner 
particularly disapproved of what he viewed as Seward’s saber rattling with England and 
France over their recognition of the Confederacy’s “belligerent” status. Shortly after the 
European pronouncements, Seward drafted a message to Minister Adams in London that 
threatened war “between the European and the American branches of the British race” if 
several provisions were not met. Referred to subsequently as “Despatch No. 10,” it was 
supposed to be delivered directly to the British Government and called for the British to
5 Basler., Collected Works, vol. V, 388-89.
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do a number of things. Initially, Britain was to adhere to the Union naval blockade of 
southern ports, British privateers were to be treated as pirates, and the British had to 
agree not to deal in any way with representatives of the Confederacy.6 Lincoln showed 
this draft to Sumner, who was appalled at its high-handedness, and both men edited the 
message to tone it down. Adams was instructed not to read the message verbatim but 
simply to make British Foreign Minister John Russell aware of its contents.7 Adams 
biographer Martin Duberman states that “Adams could hardly believe the dispatch when
rt
he received it.” Charles Francis Adams, Jr., in his biography of his father, hypothesizes 
that:
It is not difficult to imagine what would have been the effect of a dispatch 
couched in these terms delivered in June, 1861, to a British government of which 
Lord Palmerston was the head, with England then acting in full understanding 
with France. The Confederacy would have been recognized, and the blockade of 
its coast, at that time hardly more than nominal, would have been disallowed 
almost before the American minister had rattled out of Downing Street.9 
Seward had also been overheard at a number of social engagements taking a very 
bellicose tone towards Britain. It is well documented that Seward loved dinner parties, 
fine wines, brandy and cigars. On these occasions he could be garrulous, and maybe let 
slip things in conversation that he thought were confidential, but these things were 
repeated nevertheless, perhaps out o f context. This is almost certainly what happened in 
the case of his offhand comment to the Duke of Newcastle in November 1860 during 
dinner that he “would have to insult Great Britain when he became President or Secretary 
of State.” The Duke made much of it and reported it to Prime Minister Palmerston and
6 Seward to Adams, May 21,1861, #10, DR, Instructions, Great Britain, M77, R76, pp 406-13; see also 
Burton J. Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet, Boston: Little, Brown, 1946, pp. 193-98: John Taylor, William 
Henry Seward, p. 179-80.
7 Donald, Sumner, pp. 20-1.
8 Martin B. Duberman, Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961, p. 268.
9 Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Charles Francis Adams, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1900, p. 193,
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Foreign Minister Russell. Seward himself disavowed the statement and Thurlow Weed, 
who was present, dismissed it as “an attempted pleasantry.”10 The remark was reported 
in the British press and gave Seward a reputation in England for being a loose cannon.
Regardless of the circumstances, Sumner, who had heard about these occasions 
from some of his many close British correspondents, disapproved of such offhand 
comments from someone who was in a position to become Secretary of State in the 
Lincoln administration. Seward’s truculence may have been “reckless” as Sumner 
alleged, or calculated to give the English second thoughts about just how far they could 
go in exploiting the situation in North America. Sumner’s biographer David Donald 
writes:
It seems never to have occurred to Sumner that Seward might not be crazy but 
cunning. The Secretary’s irritable jingoism was carefully calculated, so that the 
British and French would do nothing that might upset such a seemingly volatile 
official.11
Donald’s assessment of Seward’s approach remains rather convincing. There 
was “method in his madness,” although such an unorthodox approach to diplomacy 
would likely only been shared with his son Frederick. After all, Seward had vastly wider 
international experience than all but Sumner, Henry Sanford, and Charles Francis Adams 
among his political counterparts. He had met Queen Victoria, Lords Palmerston and 
Russell, Gladstone and Nassau Senior in May 1859. He had formed an opinion of them 
and may have calculated that a certain amount of saber rattling would cause them to back 
off or at least think twice.12 Whatever his motivation, the strategy worked on one level 
in the case of the Confederate representatives in London, who were no longer given 
official access to the Palmerston government.13
10 Van Deusen, Seward, p. 260.
11 Donald, Sumner, pp. 22-23.
12 Van Deusen, Seward, pp. 211-12; Taylor, William Henry Seward, p. 113.
The shipping issues proved considerably thornier. Indeed, claims concerning the depredations caused by 
the Confederate steamers Florida and Alabama were not resolved between the U.S. and Great Britain until
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However, any apparent loss of mental poise for the Lincoln administration’s 
second most powerful official certainly had an unsettling effect on Seward’s colleagues 
in the cabinet and Congress. It is hard to know whether this episode is proof of Seward’s 
intelligence. He would do something similar in 1866 regarding Napoleon Ill’s decision 
to change the timetable for French troop withdrawal. In both cases, he created a brief 
diplomatic firestorm that gave his opponents pause, and enabled him to buy a little time 
while his adversaries pondered the unanticipated consequences o f challenging the U.S. 
Secretary of State. In both cases, he achieved the result he sought.
Seward was very intelligent, but he was neither a saint nor infallible. He made 
many mistakes early in the Lincoln Administration, some of which have been detailed 
here. He may have wanted to appear bellicose on purpose in the case of Great Britain.
As Donald speculates, it might have been advantageous for Seward to be perceived as an 
“unpredictable” Secretary of State. However, he was not hypocritical and definitely not 
self-serving. He was loyal to a fault, and he accepted his subordinate position to Lincoln 
with nary a complaint once he accepted Lincoln’s response to his ill-advised April Fool’s 
memo. Unlike Chase, Seward did not use his position in the cabinet to further any 
presidential ambitions for 1864. He was never accused by anyone of taking advantage of 
his political position, or of not being totally devoted to duty. Before the term was coined, 
he was a workaholic.
Were meddling, a general highhandedness in tone, and a bureaucratic oversight 
enough to call for the dismissal of so central an official at such an important time? It 
would seem not, but Radicals in the Senate were still upset enough to call for the 
resignation of Lincoln’s most important adviser at one of the darkest hours of the war. 
Jefferson Davis would have certainly welcomed news of chaos in the cabinet so soon 
after Fredericksburg.
well after the Civil War, see Martin Duberman, Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886, Cambridge, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961, Ch. 24.
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It can be argued that Seward inadvertently made people jealous. That sentiment 
comes through in the way Welles characterizes him in his Diary. He was very close with 
the President, and the President often walked across Lafayette Park in the evenings to 
visit Seward, not vice-versa. Sumner and Chase took exception to this closeness and 
perhaps resented the fact that Seward did nothing to hide it. Lincoln found him totally 
reliable, as did Andrew Johnson later, something that could not be said for Chase or the 
Radicals in Congress.14
Another explanation for contradictory views of Seward may be found in the old 
maxim used by President Kennedy, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, to the effect that victory 
has a thousand fathers but defeat is an orphan. In late 1862, Radicals simply could not 
accept that the Union was losing, and they were casting about for scapegoats. Militarily 
it meant George B. McClellan, and politically the logical villain was Seward, who had 
functioned as Lincoln’s most important cabinet officer for the first year and a half of the 
war. Whatever the complex reasons for senatorial dissatisfaction with Seward, such an 
outright rift at the highest level of the Republican leadership left animosities that in some 
cases never healed.
A related question is why the animosity was directed at Seward and not Lincoln. 
In the 1870s, Welles and Charles Francis Adams were to fiercely debate the relative 
merits of the President and the Secretary of State.15 But at the beginning of 1863, 
Lincoln was more disdained than hated. Lincoln was characterized by Orestes 
Brownson, one of Sumner’s correspondents, as “thick-headed” and “obstinate as a mule” 
rather than malicious and devious like Seward.16 Disappointment and disillusionment 
with, as opposed to hatred for, the President surfaced in several of Horace Greeley’s 
editorials for the New York Tribune. Greeley was a close friend of Sumner, and the
14 Hans Trefousse, Andrew Johnson: A Biography, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989, p. 270.
15 Gideon Welles, Lincoln and Seward: Remarks upon the Memorial Address o f  Chas. Francis Adams, on 
the Late Wm. H. Seward, Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1969, originally published in 1874.
16 Donald, Sumner, p. 89.
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Tribune shared the viewpoint of Radical Republicans. There was, of course, irony in this 
disillusionment, as Lincoln had succeeded as the Republican nominee in Chicago in large 
part because Greeley had vigorously opposed Seward.17
However, wanting Seward out did not mean wanting Lincoln in, and Greeley had 
but lukewarm enthusiasm for Lincoln once it was shown that his own choice, Old Whig 
Edward Bates of Missouri, could not win. After the inauguration, Greeley’s tepid support 
of Lincoln turned sour due primarily to Union defeats on the battlefield and the soaring 
costs of the war. Historian Glyndon Van Deusen noted that Greeley was convinced of 
Lincoln’s “incompetence” and felt the country, in need of a heroic leader, was instead 
saddled “with such a mediocrity at such a critical time.”18 Yet Greeley and the Radicals 
shared a respect for the office of the Presidency and recognized that Lincoln had been 
elected for four years. Despite what some viewed as his somewhat “uncouth” manners, 
Lincoln was eminently likeable. His alleged “incompetence,” though lamentable under 
the circumstances, did not engender personal hatred from Republicans. That was not the 
case with Seward; the venom directed toward him was visceral, ad hominem, and 
organized.
It was amidst all these strained political and personal relations that public sniping 
on the Seward Mexican policy began. No sooner had the cabinet crisis passed at the end 
of 1862, than Democratic Senator James McDougall of California took Seward to task.
In a long speech on Februaiy 3, 1863, the senator stated that U.S. policy toward French 
“interference” in Mexico was nothing less than cowardly and that French avowals of 
innocent intentions there were worthless. In proposing resolutions to the Senate, he 
minced no words:
17 Glyndon Van Deusen, Horace Greeley: Nineteenth Century Crusader, Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania 
Press, 1953, pp. 245-48. Greeley, Seward and Thurlow Weed had originally worked together advancing 
issues o f  mutual importance in New York. According to Seward and Weed, Greeley had asked Seward for 
a political favor that was denied. His animosity reportedly stemmed from that rejection, and he opposed 
both his former colleagues henceforth.
18 Ibid.,p. 282.
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I have affirmed in these resolutions [which McDougall was proposing to the 
Senate] that the movement of France against Mexico is in violation of the known 
Mid recognized rules of international law, in violation of the treaty made at 
London between England, Spain, and France, in violation of repeated assurances 
given by France to this Government; I now further affirm .. .that both the treaty 
and the assurances of which I speak were made on the part of France with the 
definite purpose of misleading and deceiving this Government; that they were 
designed as a fraud upon us, and, that we have been misled, deceived, and 
defrauded to the very point of jeopardy by the Machiavelli who is now Emperor 
of the French.19
McDougall then went on to cite as one of the proofs for his assertion a translated 
section of the Napoleon III letter to Forey, which had been published in the morning 
newspapers.20 He called the French “interference” the “most flagrant robber outrage that 
has been attempted by any modem civilized State; an outrage that demands our 
interference.” McDougall asserted that the plan to put Maximilian on the throne had long 
been in the works and was essentially a European monarchical scheme that totally 
disregarded the welfare of Mexico. He then stated that war with France was not out of 
the question, and that the U.S. Minister in France and the Secretary of State had been 
duped: “We can anticipate nothing less than war . . .  I insist that she [France] is waging 
substantive war upon us now.” He then went into a long description of how vulnerable 
California would be to French attack.
In the same speech, McDougall introduced the idea that the French “interference” 
violated the Monroe Doctrine. Seward had avoided referring to the doctrine in his 
correspondence and public pronouncements, but McDougall stated that the forty-year old 
policy was more valid than ever:
19 Speech o f  Hon J.A. McDougall o f  California, in the Senate o f  the United States, February 3,1863, 
Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, pp. 94-100.
20 See Ch. I, p. 53, note #54.
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If the rule laid down by Mr. Monroe in his messages of December 1823 and 1824 
is a wise and just consideration both of our rights and interests, it follows by a 
much stronger reason that the duty is now devolved upon this Government to 
protest against and, if necessary, to resist by force of arms the extension o f the 
power and policies of France, with the monarchical institutions of Europe, over 
the neighboring republic o f Mexico.
McDougall continued that “if the Monroe doctrine had been firmly asserted in the fall of 
1861, there would be no French troops now in Mexico and no danger of a French 
invasion of our own territories.”
His criticism then became ad hominem as he turned on Seward who, according to 
McDougall, had been deceived by the blandishments of Napoleon III. He likewise 
condemned Senator Sumner, who, as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, had 
not let the McDougall resolutions (numbers 13 and 36) come up for a vote. He said that 
Seward was patterning himself after the cunning French diplomat Talleyrand and 
admired “that skill by which words may be used to conceal our thoughts, and that, in a 
too great effort to imitate his example [Talleyrand’s], he has failed to say anything; 
therefore, perchance, nothing has been said.” McDougall wondered out loud if the 
Secretary and the Chairman “are not smitten with judicial blindness; if they can observe 
anything of the public movements of the day, they cannot fail to see that equally with the 
leaders o f the rebellion in the South, the Emperor of France is our determined and 
dangerous enemy.”
As a senator from the only Union State then bordering on Mexico, McDougall 
had cause for concern, even if his fears of French land and sea invasion of California 
bordered on lunacy. As mentioned earlier, Romero deduced rather quickly that he needed 
allies in the legislative branch to implement his plans for aiding Mexico. He had found 
in McDougall someone willing to publicly champion republican Mexico’s cause and to
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confront Seward and thus liberally aided the senator with background information.21 
Seward’s policy was simply too dilatory in their estimation. The result was this speech, 
the first major assault by an elected official on Seward’s cautious policy that emphasized 
words over actions.
As stated, Sumner had indeed kept the two resolutions that accompanied 
McDougall’s speech bottled up in committee.22 This was not as a favor to Seward, whom 
he continued to dislike and distrust, but out of sensitivity to republican Mexico’s fate. 
Sumner, like other Radicals, felt that the Juarez’s regime, with all its flaws, was infinitely 
preferable to a monarch in Mexico installed and maintained by France. In this particular 
case, however, he agreed with Seward’s assessment that, in early 1863, the time was not 
right for needlessly alienating France. This apparent contradiction is explained by the 
fact that Union military fortunes at this juncture were such that U.S. threats could not 
have been backed up. Threatening France when the Union could not even subdue Robert 
E. Lee was pointless, and both Sumner and Seward knew it. Undeterred, Romero sought 
out other legislators to introduce similar resolutions condemning the French.
By January 1864, Romero had an ally in the House, John Kasson of Iowa, whose 
thoughts were consistent with McDougall’s.23 Kasson’s resolutions stood a good chance 
of passage because they were initially supported and ultimately proposed by the 
Republican representative from Maryland, Henry Winter Davis, and chairman of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Davis met with Romero in January 31,1864 to 
discuss the strategy for their introduction. While working on this strategy Montgomery 
Blair confided to Romero his perception of Seward’s policy towards Mexico. Romero 
reported that:
21 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Affairs, Jan. 18, 1863, #21, vol. Ill, p. 123; see also Schoonover, Lobby,
p. 28.
2 Donald, Sumner, pp. 101-2.
23 Schoonover, Mexican Lobby, pp. 31-8
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Blair mentioned that the United States government wanted to avoid involving the 
pride of the French nation in the Mexican conflict. .  .In addition, if the French 
government is left to fight internal discontent and the opposition of the Corps 
Legislatif, this government [U.S.] believes, it will soon find itself compelled to 
withdraw the expedition. If the United States intervenes in the matter, however, 
French national pride will be offended, and under these circumstances the 
emperor would find sufficient grounds not only to prolong his Mexican 
intervention indefinitely, but even to make war on the United States.24 
In the same conversation, Blair then told Romero confidentially that the U.S. was 
supplying intelligence to Napoleon Ill’s critics in the Corps legislatif, and that “a large 
part of the data that Thiers [Louis-Adolphe Thiers, a member of the “Five” liberals who 
consistently criticized Napoleon III] used so effectively in his speech against the 
expedition. . .  came from this government.” Romero wanted the French out of Mexico, 
the sooner the better and by any means possible. Seward had lunched with Romero 
before the latter’s meeting with Blair, and alluded to the intelligence initiatives in France. 
Romero concluded:
Combining this confidential information [from Blair] with impressions Seward 
conveyed on the day he lunched with me regarding the intelligence links between 
this government and the opposition in the Corps Legislatif.. .this government’s 
policy in Mexican affairs appears more favorable under the new light.25 
Romero was coming to an understanding that Seward indeed wanted the French 
out o f Mexico, but had his own methods for achieving that end. Rather than engage the 
French in a head-on military confrontation in Mexico, Seward was using intelligence to 
undermine Napoleon Ill’s support at home, while implying that the use of U.S. force 
would not be out of the question in the future. It was from this point that Romero began
24 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, Feb. 17,1862, #29, vol. IV, pp. 52-3; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 34.
25 Ibid., p. 34.
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to develop a grudging appreciation for the logic if not the efficacy of Seward’s approach. 
This would turn into respect once the crisis had been resolved.
Romero’s first duty was to Mexico, however, and he remained committed to 
encouraging congressmen to press on with their public opposition to the French. In 
March, Davis said he was still postponing any public debate on a resolution until he was 
clearer on what exactly French intentions were. He told Romero that intelligence in his 
possession suggested that the French wanted out of their Mexican enterprise. Romero 
said he had heard the same thing but had come to the opposite conclusion based on 
reports in Napoleon Ill’s official newspaper, Le Moniteur, and speeches by Eugene 
Rouher, Napoleon I ll’s Minister of State. Romero provided relevant copies of Le 
Moniteur to Davis and Kasson in order to motivate them to continue the fight. Davis 
concluded that once it was certain that Maximilian had accepted the offer to become 
emperor, the House would vote on the resolutions.26
On March 16, Romero reported that no sooner were Kasson’s resolutions 
introduced into the House Foreign Relations Committee than its members were called to 
the State Department, where Seward tried to dissuade them from proceeding. He tried to 
impress on the committee members the importance of not directly confronting the 
French, or, at least, not yet. His entreaties were to no avail once the newspapers 
announced that Maximilian was about to sign the Miramar Convention. On April 4, 
1864, the House unanimously passed the following:
The Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to leave the nations of 
the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the 
deplorable events now transpiring in the republic of Mexico, and that they 
therefore think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United
26 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, March 16, 1864, vol. IV, pp. 112-13; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 37.
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States to acknowledge any monarchical Government erected on the ruins of any 
republican Government in America under the auspices of any European Power.27 
Seward’s policy now faced a real test. He had been stringing the French along, 
making his points forcefully but politely in diplomatic exchanges. Yet the resolution 
from the House, passed unanimously, indicated a level of Francophobia that was 
inconsistent with Seward’s correspondence. French Charge d’Affaires in Washington, 
Marc-Antoine Geoffroy, wasted no time in asking for an explanation. The essence of 
Seward’s explanation to Geoffroy was contained in his message to Dayton. He stated at 
the outset that the resolution “truly interprets the unanimous sentiment of the People of 
the United States, in regard to Mexico.”28
Seward then proceeded to give the French a civics lesson that was probably ill 
advised, even if constitutionally correct. He wrote that the foreign policy concerns 
addressed in the House resolution were, in fact, “a practical and purely Executive 
question, and the decision of it constitutionally belongs not to the House of 
Representatives, nor even to Congress, but to the President of the United States.” After 
some polite words to the effect that the President had received the resolution with all the 
respect due to Congress, Seward instructed Dayton that the President:
does not at present contemplate any departure from the policy which this 
Government has hitherto pursued in regard to the war which exists between 
France and Mexico. It is hardly necessary to say, that the proceeding of the 
House of Representatives was adopted upon suggestions arising within itself, and 
not upon any communication of the Executive Department, and that the French 
Government would be reasonably apprised of any change of policy upon this 
subject which the President might at any future time think it proper to adopt.
27 Congressional Globe, 38"' Congress, l sl Session, Washington, D.C., 1864, p 1408-9.
28 Seward to Dayton, April 7 ,1864, #525, DR, Instructions, France, M 77, R57, pp. 43-4.
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Seward the lawyer was, of course, right. Article II, Sec. 1 of the Constitution places the 
responsibility for foreign affairs squarely in the hands of the President. Nevertheless, 
Congress has never felt a compelling need to be publicly reminded of that fact. In this 
case, Henry Winter Davis took particular issue with the fact that the public reminder 
came via a French newspaper. The French emperor was not averse to using cunning 
himself, and Seward may not have counted on Napoleon III publishing an edited version 
of his instructions to Dayton in Le Moniteur:
Le Gouvemement de I ’Empereur a recu de gouvemement des Etats-Unis des 
explications satisfaisantes siir le sens et la portee de la resolution prise par 
I ’assemblee des representans a Washington, au sujet des affaires de Mexico. On 
sait, d ’ailleurs, que le Senat avait deja ajoume indefiniement Vexamen de cette 
resolution, a laquelle dans tous les cas, le pouvoir executif n ’aurait point 
d ’accorde sa sanction. [The Emperor’s Government has received from the 
United States satisfactory explanation [emphasis added] as to the sense and 
bearing of the resolution come to by the House of Representatives at Washington 
relative to Mexico. It is known, besides, that the Senate has indefinitely 
postponed the examination of that question to which, in any case the executive 
power would not have given its sanction.]29
Congressman Davis was furious when news of the story reached Washington and 
called for copies of the Seward-Dayton correspondence. He and his colleagues were 
enraged by the fact that Seward appeared to be placating the French emperor at 
Congress’s expense. Resolutions condemning Seward were proffered in the House, and 
Romero lobbied for Senate concurrence. But Sumner held firm, expressing his sympathy 
for Mexico, but asserting “we ought not take any step that would compromise, or make
29 Congressional Globe, 38'1' Congress, l 51 Session, p. 2427. Henry Winter Davis probably did not quote 
the original French in Congress, but both the English and French versions appear in the Globe.
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more difficult, relations between the United States and France.”30 Seward wrote 
confidentially to Bigelow about the House vote:
The war of the French against Mexico is of course a source of continued irritation. 
The House of Representatives responds promptly to a popular impulse which is as 
strong as it is universal. Nevertheless, it will be seen in this case, as it was in the 
affair of the Trent, that the Nation [sic] can act with all the circumspection and 
deliberation which a regard to its condition of distraction and war and social 
revolution requires.31
Seward maintained that his cautious policy would prevail in spite of the political furor 
mounting around him.
That furor now shifted to the national presidential nominating conventions. In 
May 1864 in Cleveland, a meeting of dissident Radical Republicans extended the 
presidential nomination to John C. Fremont. In August 1861, Lincoln had cashiered 
Fremont, who had been the first presidential nominee of the new Republican Party in 
1856, for exceeding his orders.32 A politically well connected, albeit controversial, 
general during the war, Fremont, on his own initiative, had attempted to emancipate 
slaves in Missouri at one point.33 He had his fingers on the public pulse and called for an 
aggressive application of the Monroe Doctrine to the French in Mexico. The moderate 
Republicans, now temporarily called the National Union party in deference to a few key 
Democrats who joined them, met to re-nominate Lincoln in June. Article Eight of their 
platform called for the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine as “national policy,” 
something that Seward had been unwilling to do in his public utterances concerning all 
countries.
30 Quoted in Schoonover, Mexican Lobby, p. 40.
31 Seward to Bigelow, Confidential May 5,1864, in Retrospections, II, p. 182.
32 James McPherson, Battle Cry o f  Freedom: The Civil War Era, NY: Oxford U. Press, 1988, pp. 353-4.
33 In August, 1861, partially to make up for embarrassing losses on the battlefield, Fremont, ostensibly on 
his authority as a Union general, declared martial law in Missouri, announced the death penalty for 
Confederates caught behind Union lines, and freed the slaves o f  Confederate supporters in Missouri, 
McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 352. Lincoln was forced to overturn the order.
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That the national policy known as the “Monroe Doctrine” has become a 
recognized principle, and, that the establishment of an anti-republican 
Government on this continent by any foreign power cannot be tolerated.34 
Seward was sensitive to the growing drumbeat calling for action in Mexico, or at 
least to politicians beating the Monroe Doctrine drum for what he perceived as short-term 
electoral advantage. He kept his counsel mostly to himself in hopes that Lincoln would 
be nominated without problems and the election resolved in their favor. Seward did trust 
John Bigelow in Paris, and he wrote him privately and unofficially in June about the 
dangers of letting foreign policy become partisan:
Party politicians think that the Mexican question affords them a fulcrum, and they 
seem willing to work their lever reckless of dangers to the Country [sic]. . .  Can 
anybody doubt that it results from making foreign questions the basis of partisan 
action? So far we have escaped only this complication in our great trial; I hope 
we shall continue to steer clear of it.35
Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in July 1863 had improved 
Lincoln’s chances. Still, he was not convinced in the summer of 1864 that re-election 
was probable, much less guaranteed. General Sherman’s taking of Atlanta in September 
1864, just before the election, was a sorely needed boost. Conversely, General George B. 
McClellan, the Democratic candidate, was portrayed essentially as a “Copperhead,” one 
who would have sought peace when victory was so near. Lincoln won 212 of 233 
electoral votes, losing only Delaware, Kentucky and New Jersey.36
Such an overwhelming indication of public support should have effectively ended 
Lincoln’s and Seward’s troubles with Congress. But Henry Winter Davis, still smarting
34Quoted in Edmund McPherson, Political History o f  the United States o f  America during the Great 
Rebellion, Washington, D.C., 1864, p. 413.
35 Seward to Bigelow, Private and Unofficial, June 6,1864, in Retrospections, vol. II, p. 191.
36 Unreconstructed southern states disallowed from voting brought the total number o f  electoral votes in the 
1864 election down to 233 from the 303 in that o f 1860.
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over Seward’s explanation to Napoleon III concerning his last congressional resolution 
on Mexico, leveled one last salvo at the Executive branch:
Resolved, That Congress has a constitutional right to an authoritative voice in 
declaring and prescribing the foreign policy of the United States. . .  and it is the 
constitutional duty of the President to respect that policy not less in diplomatic 
negotiations than in the use of the national force when authorized by law; and the 
propriety of any declaration of foreign policy by Congress is sufficiently proved 
by the vote which pronounces it; and such proposition while pending and 
undetermined is not a fit topic of diplomatic explanation to any power.37 
Davis was essentially proposing the unconstitutional idea that Congress had an 
equal hand in the formulation of foreign policy. The resolution should have been 
defeated out of hand on that basis, but was tabled instead by a rather close vote, sixty- 
nine to sixty-three. In a bit o f grandstanding, Davis offered to resign his chairmanship of 
the House Committee on Foreign Relations because the House had proved itself so 
“unworthy” of having a chairman. His colleagues convinced him to withdraw his offer.38
Lincoln’s supporters balked at having the President mentioned by name in the 
resolution, so Davis resubmitted it in two parts. In the first he changed “the 
constitutional duty of the President” to “the constitutional duty of the executive 
department” which passed easily. The second part, that essentially proscribed the State 
Department from discussing congressional resolutions on foreign affairs “with any 
foreign power,” passed by a much narrower margin, sixty-eight to fifty-eight.
The profound implications that such a resolution seemed to hold for the conduct 
of foreign affairs were never really articulated, for several reasons. One was that the 
Senate refused to concur. Sumner wanted to help Mexico and roundly disliked Seward, 
but not enough to change the Constitution. Secondly, Henry Winter Davis was voted out
37 Dec. 15,1864, Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 2nd Sess., Part I, p. 48.
38 Marvin Goldwert, “Matias Romero and Congressional Opposition to Seward’s Policy Towards the 
French Intervention in Mexico,” Americas, vol. 22, July 1965, p. 34 and seriatim,
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by his Maryland district and would be dead within a year. Seward would have no 
problems with Gen. Nathaniel Banks of Massachusetts, Davis’s replacement as Chairman 
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Finally, California’s Senator McDougall fell 
to political opposition back home, and the bottle in Washington. By March 1864, a 
newspaper reported that McDougall:
has only been in the Senate a few times this Winter [sic], then drunk, booted like a 
dragoon and spurred like a Spanish vaquero. He falls from his horse on 
Pennsylvania Avenue. In a word, he is the first drunkard in Washington.39 
By the outset of 1865, then, Seward’s most outspoken congressional critics were out of 
the picture. Through a combination of electoral success, battlefield victories, luck, and 
tenacity, Seward had weathered the political storm.
Despite occasional faux pas, Seward’s work as Secretary of State showed both 
high intelligence and great geopolitical vision. In his official correspondence, he showed 
a grasp of complexity and historical precedent, coupled with real life experience, that far 
exceeded that of his main adversaries, particularly Napoleon III. With a few notable 
exceptions, he was legalistic and deliberate in his approach to the diplomatic problems 
before him. The picture that domestic adversaries, such as Welles, painted of him as a 
meddlesome gadfly, consumed with his own ego, is totally at odds with this, a 
contradiction hard to explain.
Seward had flaws, but overlooking things of importance generally was not one of 
them. More troubling were the instances when Seward allowed confidential State 
Department correspondence to be published, which, he must have known, would 
aggravate his critics in the Senate. Equating abolitionists with slave owners on paper, 
even if in a confidential communication, was inexcusable for one with his political 
experience. Telling the French that, even if Congress complained, the President and the
39 Russell Buchanan, “James A. McDougall -  A Forgotten Senator,” California Historical Society 
Quarterly, XV, No. 3, (1936), pp. 199-212.
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Secretary of State would decide foreign policy was unnecessarily incendiary under the 
circumstances, even if constitutionally correct. It was naive on Seward’s part to think 
that Napoleon III would not publish that explanation, edited in a manner to put himself in 
the best light.
Yet those few mistakes pale in comparison to what Seward was able to 
accomplish during the war years. Foremost among his diplomatic goals, his efforts 
greatly contributed to keeping England and France out of the war. He was now about to 
turn his full attention to getting the French out of Mexico without bloodshed. In a matter 
of months the Confederates would surrender and the Union would be saved. The 
executive branch had maintained its authority despite repeated attempts at encroachment 
by the legislative. Seward had personally withstood attacks from both within and without 
the government. Some of his principal adversaries had either self-destructed, as in the 
case of McDougall, or had been voted out, like Henry Winter Davis. Chase had flinched 
when called on to confront Seward in front of the president and his fellow cabinet 
members.
Sumner also disliked personal confrontation and opposed Seward behind-the- 
scenes. However, when it came time for him to make his case forcefully against Seward 
to the President in front of his fellow Senators and the assembled cabinet (without 
Seward), he also demurred. After the Senate adjourned in July 1864, Sumner biographer 
David Donald characterized the Massachusetts Senator as “tired and dispirited. Worn out 
by seven months of almost daily attendance in the Senate, unable to shake off his cold, 
depressed by the heats o f Washington, he had an overwhelming sense of defeat.”40 In 
what must have been a delicious irony for the Secretary of State, Sumner had actually 
advanced Seward’s policy by repeatedly tabling belligerent resolutions in the Senate 
relating to Mexico. Entering 1865, the Lincoln administration had been guaranteed 
another four years by the voters, and had been vindicated both domestically and
40 Donald, Charles Sumner, p. 185.
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internationally. The moderate Republican position had prevailed and the personal 
political fortunes of Lincoln and Seward never looked brighter. Ironically, the military 
that had been largely responsible for their electoral victory might now be responsible for 
the failure of Seward’s judicious Mexican policy.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SEWARD OUTFOXES GRANT AND ROMERO
In 1865 there was only one group capable of upsetting William Henry Seward’s 
cautious policy towards Mexico -  the U.S. military. At the outset of the Civil War, 
Seward’s principal diplomatic goal was to keep England and France from aiding the 
Confederacy by according it diplomatic recognition. After the war was over, his 
principal goal was to keep either a totally American force, or one comprising mostly 
American volunteers, from entering Mexico and forcibly evicting the French. The 
distinction would be important in the negotiations between Mexico and the U.S. over the 
prospective force, as Mexico wanted U.S. leadership and materiel, but did not want an 
occupying army. On a practical level, Mexico’s policy would mean that U.S. soldiers 
would have to be demobilized, then sign up immediately as volunteers ostensibly under 
overall Mexican control. It was an elaborate charade that Seward made sure never came 
to pass.
Seward had accomplished his first goal, but the second would prove daunting in 
light of Seward’s prior experience with the War Department. There, his otherwise 
pervasive influence in government had declined because of a number of errors in 
judgment. He would have to apply his legendary skill for handling strong personalities 
and rapidly changing situations if he were to keep the Mexican invasion from taking 
place.
The political vacuum created after the assassination of Abraham Lincoln and the 
attack on Seward in April 1865 made Seward’s contribution even more valuable than it 
had been when Lincoln was alive. Few looked to relatively unknown Democrat Andrew 
Johnson for leadership. Indeed, Johnson generally made matters worse early in his term 
as his harsh anti-Confederacy rhetoric rarely coincided with his actions. Tired of 
presidential temporizing, Radical Republicans in Congress demanded that their agenda be
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implemented posthaste. Given the sharp political divisions of the day, victorious Union 
generals like Ulysses Grant, William Sherman and Philip Sheridan, all now perceived as 
heroes in the north, could have exploited this vacuum relatively easily to their own ends. 
As will be seen, Grant was already making forays into foreign policy by the summer of 
1865. Seward had been grievously injured in April, but his recuperation was proceeding 
to the point where he could assume some of his old duties at the State Department by 
mid-summer. The urgent political matters cited above were what awaited him on his 
return.
Seward also had external pressures to consider. Mexican Minister to Washington 
Matias Romero had befriended Grant prior to Lincoln’s assassination and quickly 
perceived Grant’s political ascendancy. Romero worked tirelessly to enlist Grant in the 
invasion scheme that he was coordinating under orders from Juarez. Although he had 
fought bravely during the Mexican-American War between 1846-48, Grant had not 
approved of that war, and he retained a great deal of sympathy for the average Mexican. 
Grant biographer Brooks Simpson writes that Grant “would judge the Mexican-American 
War to be ‘one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation.’”1 
According to Simpson, Grant was skeptical of annexation and disapproved of Polk’s 
precipitating a fight with the Mexicans merely to claim that the U.S. was only acting in 
self-defense. Another Grant biographer, William Hesseltine, writes that Grant continued 
to keep close track of Mexican affairs and that roughly fifteen years after the Mexican- 
American War, he told his staff that “as soon as Lee was defeated they would have to 
fight the imperialists [Maximilian and the French].”2
According to Romero’s dispatches in the spring and summer of 1865, Grant was 
very favorably disposed to the invasion and had already taken some steps to implement it. 
Conversely, Seward’s efforts to counter Grant and Romero occupied much of his time
1 Brooks D. Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph over Adversity 1822-1865, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 
2000, p. 30.
2 William B. Hesseltine, Ulysses S. Grant: Politician, NY: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1935, pp, 52-3.
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once he returned to work from the summer of 1865 to March of 1867 when French troops 
finally left. Napoleon had made a public pronouncement of projected French troop 
withdrawal on January 22,1866, in a speech in front of the French legislature. In that 
speech, Napoleon III unilaterally declared victory for France in Mexico and said that 
Maximilian could now stand alone -  a bold-faced lie.3 Ten months later the French had 
still not departed, and the cries for American military involvement were increasing.
The new President, Andrew Johnson, was favorably disposed towards republican 
Mexico but had not as yet made up his mind about sending American troops there. 
Romero had met with Johnson after the assassination and found him prepared publicly to 
invoke the Monroe Doctrine as the rationale for the U.S. removing the French from 
Mexico, something Seward had assiduously avoided. Historian Thomas Schoonover 
notes that “Johnson wanted arms made available to the Mexican Liberals and directed 
General Grant to act on his own authority to aid them.”4 Rather than using regular 
troops, Johnson favored a private force composed of Americans and Mexicans, led by an 
American general. Johnson’s preference dovetailed with the plans of Mexican Minister 
Romero, and they had the advantage that the American officers would be paid by Mexico 
should the plan come to fruition.
This approach to ousting the French was precisely what Seward wanted to avoid. 
Johnson was a neophyte in foreign affairs, and he relied heavily on Seward. On the other 
hand, Johnson wanted to be re-elected in his own right in 1868 and was seeking a 
vindication for his policies in the 1866 mid-term elections. Bringing Romero along on 
the “Swing-Around-the-Circle,” saber rattling about Mexico, and cries for the defense of 
the Monroe Doctrine, were several strategies Johnson was willing to try in order to 
improve his chances for election.5 The problem for Seward was to prevent Romero from
3 Hannah and Hannah, Napoleon III and Mexico, p. 271; Cunningham, Mexico and the Foreign Policy o f  
Napoleon III, p. 185.
4 Thomas D. Schoonover, ed., Mexican Lobby: Matias Romero in Washington, 1861-1867, Lexington, KY: 
University o f Kentucky Press, 1986, p. 50.
5 Hans Trefousse, Andrew Johnson, A Biography, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., p. 270.
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having undue influence on President Johnson on the one hand, and to keep the foreign 
affairs aspect of Mexican policy from falling into the hands of the military, on the other. 
Romero had managed to see Johnson a number of times since the assassination while 
Seward was out of the picture, and he felt convinced that Johnson would advocate a more 
belligerent policy towards the French in Mexico, one squarely based on the Monroe 
Doctrine. Romero was pleased to report that it appeared that Seward’s cautious 
diplomacy would be repudiated:
The president’s manner, more than his words . . .  convince me that he will not 
approve Seward’s policy. Seward will then either have to change his conduct, 
submitting to Johnson’s ideas, which will doubtless be a complete defense of the 
Monroe Doctrine, or he will leave the cabinet.6
Romero reported going directly from this meeting with Johnson to another with 
Grant, where Grant seconded the president’s endorsement of the Monroe Doctrine and 
suggested sending a message to France that the U.S. was prepared to enforce that doctrine 
militarily. Grant also informed Romero at this meeting that he had chosen General John 
M. Schofield to lead the invasion force, should one be authorized. Schofield had attended 
West Point with General Philip Sheridan and had worked closely with General William 
Sherman in the southern campaign at the close o f the war. He fought with Sherman in 
Atlanta, and stopped Confederate general and former West Point classmate John B. Hood 
at the Battle of Franklin. At the age of thirty-four, he was promoted to brigadier general 
for his role in these campaigns and put in Charge of the Department of North Carolina, 
where he was serving when the war ended.7
Seward knew that with a prominent general like Schofield at its head, supported 
by friends like Grant and Sheridan in Washington, the invasion plan was quickly 
becoming a reality. Radicals in Congress would have also looked kindly on the invasion.
6 Romero to M inister o f  Foreign Relations, July 8,1865, #328, vol. V, pp. 455-7; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 77.
7 John M. Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army, NY; The Century Co., 1897, Ch. XIX.
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When Seward got word of Romero’s involvement, particularly his frequent face-to-face 
meetings with the President during Seward’s convalescence, he was furious. He had 
already composed a circular message to the diplomatic corps in Washington in 1865 
reminding them that all substantive diplomatic activity had to be carried on through the 
State Department. The message came to be known as the “Romero Circular,” and the 
Mexican Minister was certain that it was directed specifically at him.8 A superb 
bureaucratic infighter, Seward knew that regaining the upper hand on Mexican matters 
was essential, now that his own recuperation allowed him to re-enter the fray. Getting 
the president’s ear, and limiting Romero’s access were central to that strategy.
For all his genius and hard work, Seward was prone to occasional mistakes, some 
more inopportune than others. The bureaucratic infighting now called for might have 
been relatively easy for the chessmaster Seward if government departments other than the 
military had been involved. When it came to the military, however, Seward’s skills 
seemed to falter. A man of slight stature, he had not himself been a soldier or an officer, 
holding only a ceremonial commission from the New York militia in his former role as 
governor.9 Hence he could not exact respect from military men on the basis of his 
physical presence or his exploits in battle.
Secondly, from the beginning of the Lincoln Administration, Seward committed 
some serious mistakes when it came to military affairs. Such mistakes were 
understandable given the magnitude of the problems he faced and the relentless pressure 
for quick decisions required under the circumstances. His political skills and experience 
should have made his input invaluable to the decision-making process concerning the 
war. After all, politics played a major role in Union military affairs and Seward was used 
to success when he applied his acute intelligence to complicated strategic problems. The
8 State Dept. Circular, July 26,1865; Romero to Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, July 30, 1865, cited in 
Thomas D. Schoonover, Dollars Over Dominion, p. 179-80.
9 Seward’s uniform, revealing his stature, is in glass case at the Seward Home/Museum in Auburn, NY.
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political-military situation facing the Union after the debacle at the first battle o f Bull 
Run seemed to call for just that ability. Instead, Seward limited his effectiveness with the 
military by some poor choices.
To see how Seward got into an awkward situation with the military, it will be 
necessary to backtrack somewhat chronologically to see how some of the decisions he 
made early in the Civil War affected the implementation of his policy towards France 
later. Seward was also a lifelong politician, and his errors in these decisions were more 
often political than diplomatic, more often matters of personnel than policy. One was his 
unquestioning support for his old friend Thurlow Weed, even when Weed was implicated 
in profiteering. His faulty strategic advice concerning the re-supply of Forts Pickens and 
Sumter was a second. His worst mistake, however, was his support for Simon Cameron, 
Lincoln’s first Secretary of War.
Simon Cameron had been appointed to the cabinet as a quid pro quo for his 
support of Lincoln at the Chicago Republican nominating convention in 1860. That alone 
was not shocking, as Lincoln had balanced his cabinet with political considerations in 
mind. Seward had a low opinion of Cameron’s abilities but stood behind him because he 
knew Cameron would not be a strong adversary in the cabinet. For his part, Cameron was 
willing to put up with Seward’s interference because he perceived the financial 
opportunities open to him as Secretary of War. The Union was faced with the prospect of 
building an army practically from scratch. The amount of money that would change 
hands in such an endeavor was monumental. Cameron had been in politics for thirty 
years and could easily see his opportunities.10 In his hallmark-convoluted style, Welles 
observed:
The understanding that existed between Mr. Seward and Cameron at the
organization of the Cabinet and not a very high appreciation of the abilities of Mr.
10 Salmon P. Chase, Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War Diaries o f  Salmon P. Chase, ed. by David 
Donald, NY: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954, pp. 11-13.
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Cameron led Mr. Seward to believe he might make himself familiar with the War 
Department and assume as occasion required some of the duties of the Secretary 
of War, an assumption that was not entirely satisfactory to that officer."
Cameron proved to be a crook from the start. Congress eventually held an inquiry 
into practices in the War Department under Cameron and his subordinates that ran to 
three thousand pages when published in 1862.12 Cameron had increased the number of 
his fellow Pennsylvanians in the War Department from five to twenty-seven, “all selected 
for political motives.” Many of those Pennsylvania appointments were purchasing agents 
in a position to issue what proved to be very lucrative contracts. To Seward’s 
consternation, Cameron had also concluded several deals with Weed; a possible 
explanation of Seward’s initial tolerance of Cameron despite growing rumors of the 
latter’s avarice.
Two examples will suffice to illuminate the problem. Weed and three others 
borrowed money to buy the steamer Cataline for $18,000, then chartered it to the Union 
navy for $10,000 a month for three months, with a guarantee of $50,000 should it sink. 
Among the things the Cataline carried were “straw hats, linen pantaloons, pickles and 
other articles not found in any army ration list,” all approved by a Weed appointee. Weed 
had also reportedly assessed a five per cent commission on “powder sold to the War 
Department.” 13 Such allegations were particularly damning in light of the horrible 
casualties being sustained.
Incompetence and corruption would sink Cameron within two years of his 
appointment, but Seward needed his support in the interim for several reasons. Principal 
among these was that Seward had concurred in what came to be perceived as an 
egregious decision on the part of Cameron and the General-in-Chief of the Army,
11 A. Howard Meneely, “Three Manuscripts o f Gideon Welles,” American Historical Review, XXXI, No. 3, 
Jan. 1926, p. 486.
12 Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1946, pp. 220-223.
13 Ib id , p. 221.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
109
Winfield Scott, concerning Forts Sumter and Pickens. Scott had been one of the heroes 
of the Mexican-American War, but at the outset of the Civil War he was seventy-five, 
very ill, and exceedingly overweight. Historian Burton Hendrick described him as “so 
senile and weakened by dropsy that he could not walk and had to be carried by orderlies 
from his carriage to his office.”14 Even in his debilitated condition, he complained that 
Seward knew more about what was going on in the war than he did, and vastly more than 
Secretary o f War Cameron.
It must be remembered that Seward was convinced in early 1861 that there would 
be no war, that South Carolina’s actions were only a passing aberration. Since the 
Nullification controversy, South Carolina had adopted radical positions, and Seward was 
convinced that the rest of the south, particularly the upper south, would not be swayed by 
South Carolinian intransigence.15 Hence, when it became clear early in 1861 that the 
Confederates would not allow the re-supply or reinforcement of Fort Sumter in 
Charleston harbor, Seward and others in the Cabinet wondered if reinforcing the garrison 
merited starting a civil war. General Scott thought not, and even suggested that Fort 
Pickens should also be allowed to fall into Confederate hands. Part of Scott’s argument 
could be attributed to the fact that the re-supply of Sumter, which stood on an island in 
Charleston bay, presented thorny military problems.
However, that was not the case with Fort Pickens, opposite Pensacola, Florida.
Yet Scott, a Virginian, with the consent of Seward and Cameron, advocated abandoning 
them both to “instantly soothe and give confidence to the eight remaining slave-holding 
States, and render their cordial adherence to this Union perpetual.”16 Seward saw the 
surrender of the forts as a goodwill gesture that would “reassure the upper South and
14 Ibid., p. 225.
15 The Nullification controversy arose over South Carolina’s challenge to federal authority in 1832-33. 
South Carolina maintained that it did not have to abide by the federal law known in South Carolina as the 
“Tariff o f Abominations.” The controversy was a major step in the escalating crisis between the North and 
South; see William Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: the Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816- 
1836, NY: Harper & Row, 1966.
16 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry o f  Freedom: The Civil War Era, NY: Oxford U. Press, 1988, p. 269.
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strengthen unionists in the Confederate states.”17 According to historian James 
McPherson, Seward “was playing a deep and devious game” in which he was trying to 
situate himself as the “premier” of the new administration.18
Before Lincoln’s inauguration, and without consulting the new President, Seward 
leaked to the press that Sumter would be abandoned. Seward was not alone in the cabinet 
taking this position, as all but Treasury Secretary Chase and Postmaster-General Blair 
initially thought Fort Sumter too costly to hold. Press opposition to the abandonment 
mounted in the north, and Seward’s leak to the press backfired.19 Navy Secretary Welles 
and Attorney-General Bates now joined Secretaries Chase and Blair in advocating the re­
supply of Sumter, while Seward and Interior Secretary Caleb Smith continued to oppose 
the measure. Sensing a “no-win” situation, the wily Cameron absented himself from the 
vote. Hendrick hypothesizes that Cameron purposely missed voting on the issue because, 
as the cabinet member most directly affected, he did not want to appear afraid of armed 
conflict. On the other hand, he wanted and needed Seward’s continued support in the 
cabinet and did not want to vote against him on such an important issue. He did not even 
submit his written thoughts on the matter when directly ordered to do so by the President.
Lincoln ultimately decided on the re-supply effort that led to the Confederate 
firing on Sumter between April 12 and 14,1861, the immediate cause of the U.S. Civil 
War. Lincoln had come to the decision that negotiating with the secessionists would not 
be possible. Thus, the advice that Seward, Scott, and Cameron had provided was 
essentially useless. Worse, in this instance, was the fact that Seward had also leaked that 
advice to the Union’s enemies. On this issue Cameron was Seward’s only ally, and 
Seward reciprocated Cameron’s support. Scott became expendable once news of his role 
in the Sumter and Pickens decision was made public. Poor Union military performance
17 Ibid., p. 268.
18 Ibid., p. 270.
19 Ibid., p. 268.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
I l l
and the aging general’s degenerating health made inevitable Scott’s resignation in 
November 1861.
Seward’s initial foray into military affairs had gone very poorly. Knowing that 
Cameron had fallen from Lincoln’s favor, Seward now sought to align himself with 
someone who might help him achieve a modicum of success in military affairs. He 
needed an officer who could both win on the battlefield and provide him with up-to-date 
intelligence. Thus he allied himself with the general who appeared to have those 
capabilities, George B. McClellan, who would replace Scott after being put in Charge of 
Union forces in the east. The quid pro quo for Seward’s support in the cabinet was that 
McClellan would keep Seward abreast of military developments.
What Seward and McClellan had in common at this juncture was a desire to re­
unify the country without subjecting the South to excessive brutality. In the long run, 
victory and a “soft” war were to prove mutually exclusive. Lincoln was ultimately forced 
to rely on generals like Ulysses Grant, William Sherman, and Philip Sheridan, who were 
willing to punish not only Confederate soldiers, but also the general population of the 
Confederacy, in order to achieve victory. Hence the marriage of convenience between 
Seward and McClellan foundered on the fact that McClellan proved so tentative in actual 
battle and so disdainful of President Lincoln. Thus, by 1862, Cameron was of little 
further use to Seward, Scott was gone, and McClellan was proving an embarrassment, 
especially after the Battle of Antietam in September 1862. Seward’s association with 
those military officials connected to Union setbacks and the alleged profiteering of Weed 
were also eroding his public prestige and effectiveness within the government.
Cameron was enough of a politician to know that the public outcry about Union 
battlefield failures and growing reports of corruption would soon cost him his job, 
especially once Scott retired. Unlike the general, he intended to leave neither quickly nor 
quietly. He sensed the rift that was growing in the Cabinet over Union policy on 
emancipation. Treasury Secretary Chase wanted immediate emancipation, consistent with
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policy long advocated by his Radical associates in Congress. Cameron saw that it might 
be politic to ally himself with such a position, even though he had not been an abolitionist 
in the past, much less a proponent of immediate emancipation. Cameron distributed the 
annual report of the War Department to postmasters throughout the country late in 1861. 
Without consulting the president, Cameron called for a slave army:
If  it shall be found that the men who have been held by the rebels as slaves are 
capable of bearing arms and performing efficient military service, it is the right, 
and may become the duty of the government to arm and equip them, and employ 
their services against the rebels under proper military regulation, discipline and 
command.20
This was, of course, the exact opposite of the policy that Lincoln and Seward 
were advocating at the time. Lincoln always believed that the fate of the Union would be 
decided in the border states of Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland and Delaware. From the 
President’s perspective, nothing would drive these states into the Confederacy faster than 
talk of a “slave army.” Lincoln ordered the offending passages expunged before the 
official report was submitted to Congress. Unfortunately, many of the reports already 
circulated to postmasters could not be recalled, and Cameron’s proposal, looking every 
bit like an official document emanating from the Executive branch, gained wide 
distribution and caused the President significant aggravation.21
It was now clear that Cameron would have to go, and Seward, embarrassed by his 
former protege, was happy to speed the process. Welles pointed out that the 
Pennsylvanian Cameron had his own coterie of friends and advisers who were not 
anxious for him to appear as Seward’s lackey:
Neither to him nor them was it altogether pleasant that he should be considered as 
a mere secondary personage, or convenience to the Secretary o f State, yet this was
20 Quoted in Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet, p. 230; McPherson, Battle Cry, pp. 357-8.
21 Salmon P. Chase, Inside Lincoln's Cabinet: The Civil War Diaries o f  Salmon P. Chase, edited by David 
Donald, NY: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954, pp. 47,60-2; Welles, Diary, vol. I, p. 57.
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at the beginning the received opinion, and both Mr. Seward and his supporters 
were willing to encourage and strengthen that opinion.22 
Seward used one of the oldest ploys in the political book to resolve this awkward 
situation. In mid-January 1862, Seward arranged for Cameron to be named U.S. Minister 
to Russia to get him as far away as possible from political mischief and the potential for 
further corruption. This saved face for Cameron with his politically important 
Pennsylvanians. Cameron had hoped that his new-found Radical friends would have 
enough clout to save his job, but widely distributing presidential policy without first 
consulting the president was too much even for them. Welles wrote:
There was great sensitiveness in the public mind on the subject [arming former 
slaves]. Fremont had been disciplined in regard to it. The conclusion to which 
the government would arrive was not doubted; but that one of the heads of 
department should make it a prominent part of his report, and, without consulting 
the President to whom it was addressed and on whom was the responsibility of the 
measure and to whom it properly belonged to determine die policy of the 
Administration and communicate it to Congress, was admitted to be indecorous 
and improper.23
When hard-working and acerbic Edwin Stanton took over from Cameron, Seward 
quickly began to limit his role in military affairs. By now, he was faced with several 
diplomatic crises that demanded his full attention, especially the ongoing fear that France 
and Great Britain would formally recognize the Confederacy. However, his experience 
with Cameron, Scott and McClellan had shown that the military was a realm in which his 
legendary political acumen did not seem to work. Confidence in his old ally Weed was 
shaken, and his hope that the Union would be restored without devastation and great loss 
of life now seemed unfounded, He turned to his diplomatic duties with a new sense of
22 Ibid., p. 486.
23 Welles, Narrative, p. 487.
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resolve, hoping that a major Union military victory would stem the tide of public 
dissatisfaction with the Lincoln Administration’s performance in its first two years.
Seward and Lincoln would need victories on the battlefield to bolster their . 
political fortunes, jeopardized until mid-summer 1863 by poor Union performance, and a 
lack of clear diplomatic victories. The Trent affair of 1861-1862 had not resulted in war, 
but many Union supporters resented the release of the two Confederate diplomats, Mason 
and Slidell, from Union custody. Seward was having success keeping Britain and France 
from recognizing the Confederacy, but such an initiative was a slow, day-to-day process 
that did not gamer headlines. Over time, Grant and his subordinates came to realize that 
Lincoln and Seward needed them as much, if  not more, than they needed the President 
and Secretary of State. That may explain why Grant felt free to take the latitude in 1865, 
in initially consenting to a U.S. supported military mission to free republican Mexico 
from the French.
Seward continued his diplomatic initiatives with the French throughout 1863 and 
1864. As noted, California’s McDougall had engaged the debate in the Senate, and calls 
for more aggressive action against the French in Mexico abounded not only in Congress, 
but in newspapers and in a public club devoted to the maintenance of the Monroe 
Doctrine.24 By the summer of 1865, words alone would not be good enough for many. 
The French had to go either willingly or by force, and the plan to put General Schofield 
in Charge of a volunteer army to invade Mexico was rapidly coalescing. Even though 
Schofield was the man whom President Johnson and General Grant had designated to 
liberate Mexico from the French, this was not exclusively a U.S. decision. The Juarez 
government would be paying for at least part of the expedition and had to authorize any 
transgression of its borders.
24 Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, 1933 edition, pp. 442-455. Perkins specificaiiy cites the Defenders o f the 
Monroe Doctrine Club established in New Orleans in 1864. Perkins thinks that this club might have been 
part o f  a Mexican propaganda effort, pp. 448-49.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
115
Mexican Minister Romero had been advocating such an armed invasion for 
some time, but his first preference to lead the invasion was Grant himself, then Sherman 
or Sheridan. General Schofield was not among his original choices at all. Given growing 
indication of Johnson’s weaknesses, Grant was starting to see his political possibilities by 
this point. Sherman was not interested in going to Mexico, and Sheridan was deemed of 
more use commanding the troops along the Rio Grande, where Grant had assigned him.25
According to Romero, Grant was angry that France had tried to take advantage of 
the Civil War to insert itself into Mexico to crush republican aspirations. Romero 
reported that at a gathering on May 8,1865 Grant said that he anticipated seeing the new 
French Minister to Washington, the Marquis de Montholon. He intended to use sarcasm 
at the meeting, telling the Marquis that “the United States would pursue the same policy 
of neutrality and nonintervention in regard to Mexico which France had adopted toward 
the United States Civil War.” Grant implied that sixty-thousand U.S. troops would be 
ready to invade Mexico as soon as “. . .  they were mustered out, and that this [U.S.] 
government would not oppose the action.”26 By this time Grant had chosen Schofield to 
lead the expedition, and Schofield wrote of his selection:
the necessity was at once recognized of organizing a new army for the express 
purpose of acting against the French army in Mexico.. . It was proposed that this 
new army should be enlisted and organized under the republican government of 
Mexico, the only government recognized by the United States in that country.
This course would avoid the necessity of any political action of the government of 
the United States in the premises. . .  Grant. .  .was requested to select an officer to 
organize and command the proposed army.27
25 Philip H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs ofP.H . Sheridan, General United States Army, 2 vols., NY: 
Charles L. Webster & Co., 1888, II, pp. 206-228, especially p. 209.
26 Romero to Minister o f Foreign Relations, May 8,1865, #202, pp. 59-60; see also Schoonover, Lobby, p. 
59.
27 John M. Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army, New York: The Century Co., 1897, p. 379.
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The question poses itself, of course, as to why an “independent” army, led by 
American general officers, but also staffed with Mexican officers and a combination of 
Mexican and U.S. troops, was necessary. Moreover, republican Mexico, always in 
desperate financial straits during this period, was willing to pay rather generously for 
such a force. The answer is that clearly the Juarez regime did not want this to appear to 
be a totally U.S. force that would rekindle the animosities of the Mexican-American War. 
A “coalition” force would be more palatable to the Mexicans being liberated from the 
French than one composed exclusively of foreigners.
Schofield was probably not aware of all of these intricacies, and did not know that 
he was about to become a pawn in an intricate game between Johnson, Grant, Romero 
and Seward. Seward desperately wanted to derail this invasion plan, but he met anyway 
with all the above, plus Secretary of War Stanton, to hear the plan presented. Schofield 
reported that “not much was said between me and the President or either of the 
secretaries at that time about the means to be employed; but it appeared to be understood 
by all that force would probably be necessary, and for some time no other means were 
considered.”28 This was Schofield’s understanding, but not that of Seward, who had been 
considering “other means” for four years. He needed more time for his diplomacy to 
work and had to find a way to stop what was becoming a fast-moving train of armed 
intervention. Secretary of War Stanton granted Schofield a leave of absence to start 
organizing the invasion. In his memoirs, published in 1888, General Sheridan, who had 
been sent by Grant right after the conclusion o f the Civil War to the Rio Grande to 
intimidate the French in 1865, attributed much of the success of Seward’s strategy to oust 
the French to his army:
I doubt very much whether such results could have been achieved without the 
presence of an American army on the Rio Grande, which, be it remembered, was
28 Ibid., p. 379-80.
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sent there because, in General Grant’s words, the French invasion of Mexico was 
so closely related to the rebellion as to be essentially part of it.29 
By the end of July 1865, Schofield was negotiating his personal financial stake in 
the undertaking with Romero. The Mexican Minister was a little taken aback by the 
general’s demands. Schofield had been offered $100,000 to head the operation with ten 
percent of that payable in advance. Schofield wanted the whole $100,000 up front, 
explaining that he was taking a big risk, had large family responsibilities, and was not 
personally wealthy. Romero said that the Mexican government was still very strapped 
for cash, and that he understood that the large payments would be made at the end of the 
war, but most likely in real estate instead of cash. Moreover, if Schofield received his 
bonus up front, other U.S. officers who were volunteering for the mission might demand 
the same treatment. Schofield’s insistence on payment of so much cash in advance gave 
Romero pause, and he reported to his government:
Advancing the commanding general all of his bonus suggests that he might not 
retain a great interest in the enterprise’s success, particularly since he had made 
this point a condition, sine qua non [without which, nothing, i.e. a deal-breaker]. 
But on the brighter side, Romero continued:
If the enterprise has great success, as seems highly probable, contributing not only 
toward terminating our war with France but also to Mexico’s development and 
future prosperity, this sum is truly a bagatelle [trifle].30 
In his own description of events, Schofield was rather laconic. In his memoir, he stated 
that the “Mexican authorities proposed to furnish the means by which this army should be 
paid and the expense of military operations defrayed, and to that end a loan was to be 
negotiated in the United States.”31 There is clearly a discrepancy, of no little import, as
29 Sheridan, Memoirs, II p. 228.
30Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, July 30, 1865, #367, vol. V, pp. 513-19; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 87.
31 Schofield, Forty-Six Years, p.380
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to the source o f funding for the operation. For his part, Romero reported to his 
government on his conversation with Schofield about payment that the republican 
government of Mexico “had promised very liberal bonuses to officers and soldiers who 
came to aid us in the war against the French, but with the intention of paying them at the 
end of the war and then principally in real estate.”32 Given his strategy, Seward would 
have had no interest whatsoever in backing a loan of U.S. funds to facilitate an invasion 
he did not want. The Senate had consistently denied Mexico funds without land or 
minerals as collateral. Hence, Romero’s version of the payment protocol seems more 
credible. It does, however, seem to conflict with guiding principle of the Juarez regime 
of not alienating any more land. Clearly the land given as payment would be personal, 
and the exact amounts were never determined. Nonetheless, the method of payment 
proposed by Romero came quite close to trading Mexican land for foreign might.
Grant’s orders to Sheridan on the Rio Grande concerning Schofield were also 
revealing. He told Sheridan that he was unable to explain Schofield’s mission because 
“much that will have to be learned to fix his determination, whether to go or not, has yet 
to found out in Washington.” Grant went on in his orders to exceed his brief as 
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army and usurp the Secretary of State’s prerogatives as 
well. He said that President Johnson “agrees in the duty we owe to ourselves to maintain 
the Monroe doctrine, both as a principle and as a security for our future peace.” Grant 
continued in the foreign policy vein by stating:
It is a fixed determination on the part of the people of the United States, and I 
think myself safe in saying on the part of the President also, that an empire shall 
not be established on this continent by the aid of foreign bayonets. A war on the 
part of the United States is to be avoided, if possible; but it will be better to go to 
war now, when but little aid given to the Mexicans will settle the question, than to
32 Romero, July 30,1865, Correspondencia, Vol 5, pp. 513-19, quoted in Schoonover, Mexican Lobby, p. 
85.
33 Schofield, Forty-Six Years, p. 381.
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have in prospect a greater war, sure to come if delayed until the empire is 
established.34
Grant was essentially contemplating getting the U.S. involved in a war in Mexico 
on his own initiative. He told Sheridan that army surplus could be made available to 
republican Mexicans fighting the French, and that, for a nominal fee, soldiers could retain 
their weapons when mustering out. Without orders from Johnson to the contrary, Grant, 
on his own authority, was allowing Sheridan to let Schofield have whatever he might 
need for the invasion force. Congress had approved none of this, and the entire plan flew 
in the face of the policy Seward had carefully constructed over four years. President 
Johnson had not explicitly approved the plan, and Grant’s rationale was that “I think 
myself safe in saying” that his ideas coincided with the President’s and the “fixed 
determination” of most Americans. Grant chose not to explain how he arrived at his 
perception of that “fixed determination.”
Seward had to move quickly, even though he was continuing his recuperation 
from the assassination attempt at the shore in Cape May, New Jersey. He invited 
Schofield there and appealed to his vanity by offering the war-weary soldier the 
opportunity to be a diplomat in Paris. Without actually delineating what Schofield’s 
diplomatic status would be there, he told Schofield that he would be charged with 
convincing Napoleon HI to withdraw rather than fight. Schofield wrote of the meeting: 
The time had evidently arrived when Napoleon must be informed in language 
which could not be misunderstood what was the real sentiment of the government 
and people of the United States on the Mexican question. It was difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to express that sentiment in official diplomatic language that an 
emperor could afford to receive from a friendly power. It was therefore desirable 
that the disagreeable information be conveyed to Napoleon in a way which would 
command full credence, and which he yet need not regard as offensive. Mr.
34 Quoted in Ibid., p. 381
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Seward’s explanations.. .were summed up in the words: “I want you to get your 
legs under Napoleon’s mahogany, and tell him he must get out of Mexico.”35 
Seward repeated to Schofield what he had frequently expressed to his Ministers in 
Paris, i.e. that the U.S. would never tolerate in the Western Hemisphere a government 
established by the force of a European power. Persistence in such an endeavor only 
jeopardized the long and basically cordial bilateral relationship between the U.S. and 
France. The forcible eviction of French troops in Mexico would only lead to animosity 
between the two countries, possibly war. After this encounter, Schofield admitted that 
Seward’s presentation, “seemed to put upon me the responsibility of deciding the 
momentous question of future friendship or enmity between my own country and our 
ancient ally and friend.”36
Honored and flattered by the gravity of the mission Seward proposed, Schofield 
accepted in early August 1865. He cited his “natural love of peace,” and the “dictates of 
patriotism as contrasted with mere military ambition” as reasons for his choice. A 
cynical observer might have noted that financial arrangements for the Mexican military 
mission had bogged down, and that Romero was having second thoughts about advancing 
$100,000 to the general who was his fourth choice. By August 23, Seward had the 
official diplomatic papers in Schofield’s hands, all approved by Secretary of War 
Stanton. Then, in one of the cagiest moves of his entire tenure, Seward had Schofield 
wait almost three months to leave for his assignment. Schofield reported that the 
ostensible reason was that “correspondence then going on with the French government 
rendered it advisable that my visit be delayed” until answers were received.37 The delays 
in transmitting and receiving diplomatic correspondence played right into Seward’s hands 
in this case.
35 Ibid., p. 384-5
36 Ibid. p. 383.
37 Ibid., p. 384.
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The question, of course, poses itself as to whether or not a replacement could have 
been found for Schofield. Clearly there were many unemployed and underemployed 
former Union generals on hand. However, once contracted by Romero, given leave for 
this specific purpose by Secretary of War Stanton, and approved by both Grant and 
Juarez, it would have been awkward to replace Schofield. Moreover, Romero and Juarez 
had no way of knowing the length of Schofield’s diplomatic mission, much less that he 
would be offered one in the first place.
The argument here is that Schofield, per se, was not important. What was 
important, as is indicated by the diplomatic correspondence cited below, was that the 
U.S. not act precipitously. Unlike Grant, Seward did not see the French Intervention in 
Mexico as part of the Civil War, needing immediate resolution in order to wrap up that 
war’s loose ends. It was a separate diplomatic matter that called for a diplomatic 
solution. Although it cannot be known for sure, barring a direct order from the President 
to the contrary, Seward probably would have sought a way to derail almost any plan for 
military invasion of Mexico in 1865. Moreover, had Romero been privy to Seward’s 
correspondence with U.S. Minister to France, John Bigelow, he would have known that 
French resolve concerning Mexico was beginning to crack. Had he been armed with this 
information, Romero could have then averted his government that the veiy risky and 
expensive invasion scheme that was being contemplated in Washington and along the Rio 
Grande, might not be necessary at all.
While Grant and Romero were planning, and Schofield was packing, the 
negotiations between the U.S. and France were taking place, as they had all along, 
through traditional diplomatic channels, between Seward, Bigelow, and the French 
Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys. In a series of long, substantive dispatches throughout 
the fall of 1865, Bigelow reported on the deteriorating French position both at home and 
abroad, and offered his own solutions. In a long message written on August 21, 1865, 
Bigelow encouraged Seward to stick with his non-interventionist policy, regardless of
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cries of Congressmen and journalists to the contrary, “the people rely a great deal more 
upon you and upon the President to regulate their foreign policy than they do upon their 
representatives in Congress or upon the editors o f newspapers.”38
Bigelow had six reasons for not intervening militarily in Mexico. Initially, he did 
not believe that Americans would actually fight to defend the Monroe Doctrine, and that 
fighting for it would only needlessly alienate most European governments. He had little 
confidence in a “Latin race,” i.e. the Mexicans, being able to keep a republican form of 
government running for long. There were economic aspects to his objections as well. 
Bigelow maintained that a war in Mexico would damage U.S. credit in Europe at a time 
when the U.S. needed loans, and delay needed currency reforms that might lead to tariff 
reduction. His final reason was that the U.S. needed to display:
superior sagacity and discretion of a real representative democracy. In a war 
involving our national existence, like the one just closed, we might resist the 
world in arms successfully; but in a war to redress the wrongs of Mexico or to 
propagate republicanism by the sword, we should, in my opinion, be likely to fail. 
On the French side, Drouyn de Lhuys was negotiating for diplomatic recognition 
of Maximilian as the quid pro quo for French withdrawal. Bigelow broached the subject 
on October 19, by asking the French foreign minister whether a “formal recognition” of 
Maximilian’s government “would enable the Archduke to dispense with a foreign army?” 
Drouyn replied that “[U.S.] recognition” would greatly facilitate and hasten the 
retirement of France from Mexico.” Bigelow reported that some financial remuneration 
might speed up French withdrawal, particularly “some security for their debts.” With 
some prospect of recouping the fortunes Napoleon III had already expended, Drouyn de 
Lhuys thought “there would be no difficulty about their retiring promptly.”39 Bigelow 
knew that he had gone out on a diplomatic limb. He now had an indication from a high
38 Bigelow to Seward, 8/21/1865 cited in, Retrospectives, p. 152.
39 Bigelow to Seward, 10/19/1865 in Ibid. pp. 200-201.
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authority that the French were on the verge of getting out of Mexico, and were merely 
casting around for ways to cut their losses.
Bigelow queried Seward as to whether or not the recognition of Maximilian 
would be too high a price to pay for the imminent realization of Seward’s policy. 
Expressing his doubts about his initiative, he wrote to Seward:
Perhaps I have committed an indiscretion in allowing myself, by discussing it 
[diplomatic recognition of Maximilian] to give that much encouragement to the 
idea that our recognition of Maximilian was possible upon any terms; if so, please 
say so as bluntly as you please, or, if it suits you better, say nothing. I am under 
no obligation to renew the subject and neglected no proper precautions against 
leaving the impression that I spoke of any inspiration from home.40 
In twentieth century parlance, Bigelow had floated a “trial balloon.” Coupled 
with other intelligence and his own analysis, Bigelow’s reports were useful in letting 
Seward know that, from a source very close to the emperor, it was no longer a matter of 
“i f ’ but merely of “when” insofar as the withdrawal of French troops from Mexico was 
concerned. Seward could see diplomatic victory on the horizon, and he was not about to 
sell out Juarez for the sake of impatience. He would not betray the Mexican republican 
patriot, and told Bigelow so in early November:
The United States have hitherto practiced the utmost frankness on that subject 
[recognition of Maximilian]. . .  They [the U.S.] still regard the effort to establish 
permanently a foreign and imperial government in Mexico as disallowable and 
impracticable.41
The interpretive problem posed by this latter quote is that Seward appeared to be doing 
what he felt was best for republican Mexico under Juarez. Juarez himself and his 
emissary to Washington Romero were actively seeking the armed conflict that Seward
40 Ibid,, p. 203.
41 Seward to Bigelow, 11/6/1865, DR, Instructions, France, M77, R57.
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was trying to avoid. It can be argued that the Mexican government always viewed the 
Schofield enterprise as an essentially “Mexican” initiative. This explains Romero’s 
willingness to offer such high compensation to an American general and his immediate 
staff. Mexico would take advantage of whatever expertise and materiel the U.S. officers 
could commandeer, but it would not be an invading American army a la Mexican- 
American war. It would be a liberation army in which Mexicans would do most o f the 
fighting, led by both U.S. and Mexican officers. In all probability, the working out of 
such fine distinctions would have been nightmarish had the force ever actually gone into 
battle.
At about the same time as this communication, Schofield was cleared by Seward 
to leave for Europe. Schofield may have looked on his personal role in the upcoming 
negotiations with Napoleon III as portentous, but Seward’s real thoughts about the 
general’s diplomatic importance is contained in the following to Bigelow:
General Schofield proceeds to Paris. He is, I believe, fully informed of the 
feelings and sentiments, not only of this Government, but of the American people. 
I commend him to your confidence and authorize you to communicate with him 
whenever occasion shall require.42
It took Schofield two more weeks to get a ship out of New York, and he did not 
arrive in Paris by way of London until December 2,1865. After his long wait to 
discharge his diplomatic trust, Schofield found that Napoleon III was not in Paris, but at 
his country estate in Compiegne. When U.S. Admiral Charles Goldsborough, at port in 
southern France, heard of the General’s presence in France, he wrote to Minister Bigelow 
seeking information. Bigelow’s reply echoed Seward’s note:
General Schofield is charged with no communication for this or for any other 
European Government. His eminence as a soldier and the intimate relations of
42 “Confidential” letter from Seward to Bigelow, 11/4/1865 cited in Bigelow, Retrospections, vol. Ill, p. 
218.
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confidence which are known to subsist between him and the President give a 
natural and just importance to his presence in Europe at the present time.43 
Meanwhile, there was a good deal of substantive correspondence going on 
between the State Department and the French Foreign Ministry precisely relating to 
matters in Schofield’s brief. Unfortunately for the general, he was privy to none of it. In 
the course of the Bigelow-Seward-Drouyn de Lhuys conversation, Seward became 
convinced that no overt threats to the French would be required and that no invasion 
would be necessary to get the French to leave. He was certain that Napoleon III would 
not engage in a war with the U.S. to save Maximilian.
There is no indication in Seward’s official correspondence to Bigelow in Paris 
that he knew of reports being sent to Napoleon III in the fall of 1865 by the French 
military commander in Mexico, Achille Bazaine. Bazaine described the deteriorating 
situation there, and Maximilian’s inability to deal with it. The Emperor wrote to Bazaine 
that Maximilian had to “bring some order to the finances and to the main transport 
routes.” He went on to say that it would be easier for France to abandon a government 
that had “done nothing to support itself than to support it in spite o f  itself.”44
In his uniform, Schofield would make an intimidating presence in Paris, but only 
one designed to underscore decisions already taken on both sides of the Atlantic. By the 
time Schofield set foot in France in December, Seward could already discern the outlines 
of his diplomatic victory. Schofield made his presence known in his first public 
statement in December at an “American Thanksgiving” dinner in Paris at which he was 
but one of several speakers. In his remarks he praised the “demobilization” effort that 
had followed the Civil War. He proposed a toast that “will be heartily responded to by 
every true American -  the old friendship between France and United States: may it be 
strengthened and perpetuated!”45
43 Ibid., p. 267.
44 Quoted in Cunningham, Mexico and the Foreign Policy o f  Napoleon III, p. 184.
45 Schofield, Forty-Six Years, p. 387.
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Could these be the words of the general who six months earlier had been chosen 
to forcibly evict the French from Mexico, the general handpicked by Grant and approved 
by Romero? Not only had his absence delayed any invasion for six months to a year, but 
now he was also in Paris praising the French and celebrating ancient ties of friendship.
He was emphasizing the importance of the rapid mustering out process taking place in the 
Union army, making no mention of those who would have to be “mustered in” if Mexico 
was to be invaded. This was precisely the result Seward had wanted.
As a result of his direct experience in Paris, and perhaps without realizing it 
himself, Schofield had come to many of the same conclusions that Seward had held for 
some time. Schofield called the situation in Napoleon Ill’s government “extremely 
critical.” What had kept Napoleon going was his devotion to French “honor” and the 
realization that Napoleon could not have submitted to military defeat in Mexico “without 
the loss of his throne.” In a sentence that could have been written by Seward himself, 
Schofield concluded, “forcible intervention by the American people in the Mexican 
question, or the public threat of such action, arousing the national pride of France, must 
have led to a long and bloody war, resulting doubtless, in final success in America and 
probably in a revolution in France.”46 What follows in the text of his speech makes it 
perfectly clear that Schofield meant the “final success of America, i.e. American forces” 
and that he fully expected that France would have lost any armed struggle. This is not 
unreasonable in light of the fact that just six months earlier, he would have been the one 
taking credit for France’s defeat. Yet Schofield’s transformation from a devotee of Grant 
and Romero to an advocate of Seward’s non-interventionism is nonetheless remarkable.
In his memoir, Schofield asked rhetorically:
Why make enemies of our ancient friends? Our sister republic of Mexico must 
be relieved from foreign domination, at whatever cost; but strife and lasting
46 Ibid., p. 387.
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enmity between the United States and France would be a fearful price to pay for 
even so great a good as the freedom of Mexico.47
The irony in all of this, of course, is the fact that Schofield, who was supposed to 
“get his feet under Napoleon’s mahogany,” never did. After pondering Bazaine’s reports 
and the messages transmitted to him from Seward by way of Minister Bigelow, Napoleon 
III unilaterally decided to announce in January 1866 that the French expedition in Mexico 
had succeeded. The legal basis for Napoleon ID’s decision was the Treaty of Miramar 
(1864) that had officially set into motion the Maximilian enterprise and delineated mutual 
financial responsibilities. Maximilian would not have been in a position to live up to the 
Treaty’s onerous financial terms even at the time of its signing in 1864. To think he 
could have done so after two years of constant warfare was ludicrous. Napoleon III 
simply seized on this convenient pretext to lie to his parliament and the French people 
about the outcome of his initiative in Mexico.
Had Schofield’s presence in Paris in the month leading up to Napoleon I ll’s 
decision made any difference? It is, of course, impossible to say. Schofield had met with 
Napoleon Ill’s son and had made the rounds of various Parisian salons, where he spouted 
the “party line” given him by Seward at their summer meeting in Cape May. At this 
stage, however, Maximilian’s coffin already had a number of nails firmly embedded. 
Schofield may have been just one more. Schofield was, in fact, present for the January 
22,1866 speech to the legislature, in which Napoleon III announced French withdrawal. 
The ostensible reason for Schofield’s presence in Paris had been achieved without the 
general ever having to confront Napoleon III directly.
After reporting to Washington on Napoleon’s speech, Schofield took off on a long 
vacation to southern France, Italy, Switzerland and England. By virtue of Seward’s 
scheme, Schofield had avoided battlefield danger in the daunting landscape of northern 
Mexico. His reputation remained untainted by troubles that might have awaited him
47 Ibid. p. 388.
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there. He was nominated to succeed Stanton as Secretary of War in June 1868 and 
became Superintendent of West Point from 1876 until 1881. Not only had Seward gotten 
him out of the way at a most critical time, thus derailing Grant and Romero’s invasion 
plans, but it also appears he helped Schofield’s career in the bargain. Were the 
diplomatic assignment in Paris, the opportunity to work and visit in Europe after a brutal 
war in the U.S., and the risk-free nature of these assignments, enough to compensate 
Schofield for the $100,000 he never earned in Mexico? Schofield may have reminded 
himself that the very reason that the French were in Mexico, at least superficially, was 
because Mexico did not pay its debts. Schofield may have viewed the plumb assignment 
in Paris (which probably paid him close to the going rate of $1000 a month for a U.S. 
Minister), as better recompense than the $10,000 Romero was offering in advance, with 
the remaining $90,000 due upon successfully ousting the French and Maximilian. That 
would have doubly been the case if the $90,000 took the form of Mexican land, and not 
American dollars.
Understandably, Romero was not so pleased. As soon as heard about Schofield’s 
assignment to France, he detected the fine hand of his main adversary in the State 
Department. Writing on August 4,1865, Romero reported to his government that 
“Seward desires to undo the arrangement [U.S. led invasion] by flattering Schofield with 
a mission to France.” He continued, citing Schofield’s naivete, “unfortunately, Schofield 
does not recognize Seward’s real purpose in the present case.”48
Romero continued to plot with Grant for the remainder of the year, but eventually 
realized his gambit was essentially over. If the French were willing to leave voluntarily, 
Grant saw no reason to squander political capital or risk soldiers in a needless 
undertaking. Grant had nothing to gain and much to lose by continuing to promote an 
armed intervention. In Paris, Schofield sounded more like Seward in Washington than a
48 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, August 4 ,1865, #377, vol. 5, pp 530-31; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 90.
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general ready to lead a charge. Moreover, the American troops massed under Sheridan 
along the Rio Grande could not be kept there indefinitely. A number of border incidents 
had already threatened the tenuous peace between these soldiers and Maximilian’s 
supporters.49 If Napoleon III did not want a war, starting one, perhaps inadvertently, 
would serve no purpose. Seward’s policy of what Bigelow called “simple forbearance” 
appeared to be carrying the day.50
But the devil would be in the details. Announcing withdrawal in Paris was one 
thing; actually getting French troops out of Mexico would be another. Moreover, some 
political cover had to be arranged that would serve French honor. Leaving Mexico 
because Maximilian could not pay his bills was not consistent with the image of French 
“gloire” that Napoleon III had been trying to broadcast throughout the world. There 
would be endless recriminations in France about who was to blame for the fiasco. 
Military reputations and careers would be shattered. How could Mexican peasants rout 
the French army, the descendents of Napoleon I ’s Grande Armeel Would the army’s 
effectiveness against the menacing Prussians be eroded? How could Benito Juarez, a 
Zapotec Indian, have frustrated the hopes of renewing “Latin culture” in the New World? 
Did this now mean that the Monroe Doctrine had been vindicated, even though Seward 
had never used the term in his official correspondence? Would all the European powers 
henceforth have to defer to the United States in the Western Hemisphere? These were 
but a few of the questions and problems resulting from Napoleon Ill’s decision. But the 
most pressing problem that soon faced both the U.S. and the European powers would turn 
on the fate of Maximilian himself.
49 Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 214-17.
so Bigelow, Retropsectives, vol. Ill, p. 155.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SEWARD AND THE EXECUTION OF MAXIMILIAN
In late 1866 Seward needed reliable information from the ground in Mexico yet 
had little. That was primarily due to the fact that U.S. Minister to Mexico Thomas 
Corwin had been away from his post for close to three years. The immediate problem for 
Corwin, and the long-term reporting problems for Seward, began when the French 
occupied Mexico City in the summer of 1863. Thomas Schoonover writes that Corwin’s 
loyalties shifted from Juarez’s Liberals to Maximilian shortly thereafter, possibly for 
financial reasons.' Corwin had decided not to follow Juarez into exile, opting to stay in 
Mexico City before returning to the U.S. on extended leave of absence, departing prior to 
Maximilian and Carlota’s arrival in Mexico in June 1864. His son, William H. Corwin, 
undertook his father’s administrative duties and also did some political reporting. In the 
interim, two replacements for Corwin, General John Logan and Lewis D. Campbell had 
been nominated by President Johnson and approved by the Senate. However, neither 
established residency in Mexico, so for roughly three years the U.S. had no Minister 
there.
This lack of ministerial representation raised questions, and Romero started 
pressuring friendly congressmen to introduce resolutions in the House pertaining to 
Seward’s handling of Mexican affairs. In short, if republican Mexico was so important, 
why could a U.S. diplomat not be found who would go to wherever Juarez happened to 
be? Mexican Minister Matias Romero drafted a resolution to be presented by his Radical 
friend Godlove Orth of Indiana that concerned matters of diplomatic recognition. One 
purpose of the resolution was to question whether Corwin had been colluding with the 
French prior to his departure. Both Orth and Romero considered it insensitive to 
introduce the resolution once Corwin died suddenly in mid-December, 1865, concluding
1 Thomas Schoonover, Dollars Over Dominion, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1978, p. 175.
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“no reason exists now to reveal his labor in favor of Maximilian, nor would it appear 
noble to do so.”2
In contrast to his lack of information regarding Mexico, Seward could base his 
actions towards the European powers on good reporting from his diplomats there. 
Ministers Charles Francis Adams in London and John Bigelow in Paris were outstanding 
in the quality and timeliness of their reports. Minister Resident to Brussels Henry 
Sanford was very good at providing a wider range of European perspectives. Given the 
time lags attendant to all diplomatic correspondence before the transatlantic cable came 
into use in 1866, it was hard for any Secretary o f State or Foreign Minister to know what 
was transpiring in anything close to real time.
In the case of the Juarez government, it was practically impossible. Historian 
Frank Knapp noted that the problems experienced by Seward were at least as severe for 
the Juarez government. In his biography of Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, Juarez’s 
successor as president and member of the Juarez cabinet throughout this period, he notes 
that correspondence traveled to the U.S. from Chihuahua to Franklin, Texas, to Santa Fe, 
New Mexico, Kansas City, Missouri and finally to Washington, D.C. Official letters took 
from one to two months to make the trip, if they arrived at all.3 Seward did have reports 
from the ten or so consuls accredited to Mexico, but they concerned themselves primarily 
with commercial matters.4 Seward needed someone on the ground with overall 
responsibility for political reporting.
General John Logan, the first nominee to replace Corwin, received his 
commission as Minister to Mexico a few weeks before Corwin’s death and was chosen 
specifically to underline U.S. military potential in the region. Logan was a fighter, not a 
compromiser, who advocated going to war with France over Mexico. In his interview
2 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, Dec. 19,1865, #671, vol. V, p. 907; see also Thomas 
Schoonover, M exican Lobby, Lexington, KY: University Press o f  Kentucky, 1986, p. 113.
3 Frank Knapp, The Life o f  Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, 1823-1889, Austin, U. o f  Texas Press, 1951, pp. 90- 
98.
4 M. Lane in Veracruz and Marcus Otterbourg in Mexico City, for example.
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before the Cabinet he reportedly stated that he would accept the assignment with the 
proviso that the U.S. government “would assure him of a change in policy whereby the 
United States would aid the Juarist forces in expelling Maximilian and in restoring the 
republic.”5 He had been a Congressman from Illinois and was confident of 
Congressional support for his nomination. Yet his friends cautioned him that he might 
never be able to function in his ministerial capacity, because of the peripatetic nature of 
the Juarez government. Commenting on a dinner conversation with Logan on December 
14,1865 Romero reported to his government that the general would turn down the job: 
Logan clearly does not wish to see the Mexican question reduced to the efforts or 
caprice of a single man. If the government was not disposed to face and treat the 
issue as it merits, he [Logan] added, the minister who attempted to follow his own 
judgment would appear ridiculous. . .  Logan has spoken with Seward, but the 
secretary of state’s views have not satisfied him.6
To serve as U.S. Minister to the republican government of Benito Juarez was not 
going to be easy for anyone, even a U.S. army general. Juarez had no fixed capital, and 
arriving at his reported residence, Chihuahua, entailed an arduous overland trip through 
the northern desert. The physical discomfort alone attendant to the assignment was 
daunting. Logan had to be aware that his nomination was a Johnson Administration 
answer to growing Congressional criticism that too little diplomatic attention had been 
paid to Mexico since the conclusion of the Civil War. As an army general, he must have 
known of the Schofield mission to Paris, and how Seward was capable of using military 
officers for diplomatic show rather than substance. He may have been expressing to 
Romero over dinner the fact that he did not want to travel thousands of miles only to 
advance the political agenda of Johnson and Seward. Whatever the case, General Logan
5 Martin H. Hall, “The Campbell-Sherman Diplomatic Mission to Mexico,” Bulletin o f  the Historical and 
Philosophical Society o f  Ohio, XIII, October, 1955, p. 255.
6 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, Dec. 14,1865, #652, vol. V, pp. 891-2; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 112.
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opted out.7 A new emissary to Mexico was found in the person of Lewis D. Campbell, 
another Whig from Ohio, who would not be confirmed by the Senate until May 1866.
However, before Seward could focus on the Campbell assignment, he had several 
other more pressing matters requiring his attention. The first was to bolster the political 
fortunes of his superior, President Johnson, and the moderates in the Republican Party.
By the summer o f 1866 Radical Republicans were gaining ascendancy in national politics 
and Johnson was progressively seen as a compromiser at best, a Copperhead at worst.8 
To counter this impression, Johnson concocted the idea of a “whistlestop” tour whereby 
he could present his case directly to the electorate. To add luster to the occasion, he 
invited a number o f luminaries along, and charged Seward with orchestrating the entire 
enterprise.9 “The Swing Around the Circle,” as it became known, was described by 
Seward biographer Glyndon Van Deusen as “a campaign tour designed to promote the 
election of Congressmen who would support [President] Johnson and his policies.”10 
The “Swing” had several other purposes. In order to show his sympathy for 
Mexico, Minister Romero was among the invitees, and was trotted out dutifully whenever 
it was deemed politic to pledge U.S. support for Juarez and enmity for the French and 
Maximilian. In his hometown of Auburn, New York, Seward presented Romero to the 
assembled crowd as follows:
This gentleman is Senor Romero, minister of the United States of Mexico. For 
Mexico’s benefit and to prevent Mexico’s destruction, the president of the United
7 Dean Mahin, One War at a Time: The International Dimensions o f  the American Civil War, Washington, 
DC: Brassey’s, 2000, p. 274.
8 Copperheads were northern Democrats who opposed the Civil War, Hans Trefousse, The Radical 
Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard fo r  Racial Justice, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969, pp. 311-12; see also D.
P. Crook, The North, the South, and the Powers 1861-1865, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1974, pp. 280,283.
9 Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, p. 461; Welles, Diary, vol. II, 589. President Johnson and Seward 
were accompanied by Gen. Grant, Admiral Farragut, and Mexican Minister Romero, among many other 
prominent public figures, including Welles and members o f  his family. The “Swing” started in late August 
1866 in Philadelphia, stopping in New York, Albany, Niagara, Chicago, St. Louis and Louisville returning 
to Washington by way o f  Pittsburgh, Harrisburg and Baltimore.
10 Ibid., p. 461.
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States had given notification that the foreign intervention will have to cease by 
this coming November [1866]."
The “Swing” started to unravel for Johnson in Cleveland, where instead of 
remaining on the high road, he started down the low road of responding in kind to 
hecklers. Rumors of hard drinking among the official party surfaced, aimed particularly 
at Johnson, Seward and Grant. Radical Republicans in Chicago saw that Johnson was 
accorded no official reception, even though the dedication of a statue to Stephen Douglas 
in Chicago was the ostensible reason for the trip.12 More depressing for Johnson was the 
fact that Grant and Romero generated the greatest enthusiasm among the crowds as the 
“Swing” progressed. Feeling that the president was manipulating them for partisan 
political purposes, members of the official party, among them Grant and Romero, found 
reasons to leave before the “Swing’s” conclusion.
According to Welles, Seward almost died “of an attack of cholera” returning to 
Washington from the “Swing” and was moved to a special railway car between 
Pittsburgh and Harrisburg. Welles reported that Seward’s attending physician, Dr. 
Norris, “was apprehensive he might not survive the night.”13 Seward apparently thought 
that he was dying as well, and said to President Johnson:
My mind is clear, and I wish to say at this time that your course is right, that I 
have felt it my duty to sustain you in it, and if my life is spared, I will continue to 
do so. Pursue it for the sake of the country; it is correct.14
11 Romero to M inister o f  Foreign Relations, Sept. 2,1866, #594, vol. 8, pp. 235-7; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 137.
12 Howard K. Beale insists that there is no evidence for Johnson’s alleged chronic insobriety. He says that 
Johnson was probably drunk when he gave his infamous speech to the Senate on the occasion o f Lincoln’s 
second inauguration, but he was recovering from typhoid fever. Beale maintains that a glass o f  whiskey 
given to Johnson by a friend in the Senate just before the speech had an inordinate effect on his weakened 
system. Howard K. Beale, “Johnson and His Policy,” in Eric McKitrick, Andrew Johnson: A Profile, pp.
. 79-80, especially n, p. 80.
13 W elles, Diary, p. 594.
14 Welles, Diary, p. 595.
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Seward’s beloved daughter Fanny was called for in the expectation that he would not 
make it to Washington. The sixty-five year old Seward turned out to be much more 
resilient than the twenty-two year old Fanny, who died of tuberculosis later that October. 
He was devastated by her death, but his ability to continue to deal with weighty 
diplomatic matters amidst crises in his personal life was astonishing.
The “Swing” had proven to be a fiasco. Biographer Hans Trefousse, while 
generally sympathetic to Johnson, notes simply that the electoral style that had worked 
well for Johnson in Tennessee was disastrous under the circumstances of the “Swing.” 
Johnson gave impassioned “stump” speeches, laced with Biblical references. When 
heckled, he took on his hecklers. Instead of appearing courageous, he appeared petulant 
and not the least bit presidential. The rumors of hard drinking among certain members of 
the party were resurrected, notably those relating to Grant, Romero left early, pleading 
sickness, and Seward almost died from cholera. Politically, the “Swing” had just the 
opposite effect of what Johnson intended.15 In September 1865, Seward did not have 
time to dwell on the “Swing,” for Napoleon III seemed to reneging on his promise to 
begin withdrawing French troops in November.
The initial three-phase plan had been communicated to Seward by the French 
Minister to Washington, the Marquis de Montholon, in April 1866, and was the basis for 
Seward’s belief that the French would be out of Mexico soon and that no U.S. military 
action would be necessary. Seward expected that there would be considerable jockeying 
about terms and the role of Maximilian, but was nonetheless convinced that once begun 
in November, French withdrawal would soon become a fa it accompli. Bigelow had been 
reporting since 1863 on the strain that supporting French actions in Mexico was putting 
on the national treasury.16 It was this belief that sustained Seward’s efforts to buy time in 
the summer of 1866 to deflect Grant and Romero’s call for armed intervention.
15 Hans Trefousse, Andrew Johnson: A Biography, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989, pp. 262-67.
16 Bigelow to Seward, October 9,1863, in John Bigelow, Retrospections o f  an Active Life, vol. II, NY: The 
Baker and Taylor Co., 1909, pp, 80-1.
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Thus Seward’s dismay and anger are understandable when he received a dispatch 
from Bigelow in November saying the Napoleon III had experienced a change o f heart.17 
The mid-term elections had not gone well for the Republicans, and Democrats and 
Radical Republicans demanding decisive action in Mexico were in the ascendancy. 
Seward had been accused of weakness and vacillation in his dealings with Napoleon III 
over Mexico, and Napoleon’s altering the withdrawal agreement would increase that 
criticism.
Bigelow reported that the new French Foreign Minister, the Marquis de Moustier, 
who had replaced Drouyn de Lhuys, had confirmed a newspaper report that Napoleon III 
wanted to have all French troops leave in March 1867, instead of in three groups over a 
year beginning in November 1866. Napoleon III claimed that maybe Washington had not 
been informed by a bureaucratic oversight. Bigelow immediately sensed the political 
fallout in the U.S. such a unilateral decision would have. He knew that those clamoring 
for an invasion of Mexico to oust the French would seize on this proof of Napoleon Ill’s 
duplicity to make their case.
Bigelow arranged for a meeting with Napoleon III to ascertain firsthand the 
accuracy of Moustier’s report.18 The French Emperor said it was true, but that there was 
no political motivation behind his decision, and that it had been “influenced entirely by 
military considerations.” Napoleon III went on to say that the “successes of the dissidents 
[Juaristas], supported as they were by large re-enforcements [sic] from the United States, 
seemed to render any reduction of his force there perilous to those remaining behind.” 
Bigelow said that Napoleon III emphasized that his message to his military commander 
Bazaine had not been sent in code, and in so doing, assumed the U.S. was aware of his 
thinking. He also said that his personal representative, General Henri Castelnau, told 
Maximilian that “France could not give him another cent of money or another man.”
17 Bigelow to Seward, November 8,1866, in Ibid., p. 599.
18 Ibid., p. 599.
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Bigelow said that Castelnau transmitted to Maximilian the Emperor’s advice that he 
abdicate. When asked if any of this information had been transmitted to the U.S., 
Napoleon III replied that:
He did not know; that M. de Moustier ought to have done so; that, as these events 
occurred during the interim of a change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was 
possible that it had been neglected, though his telegram to Marshall Bazaine was 
purposely sent in a way to show that there was nothing in his plans to disguise.19 
Bigelow then pointed out to the Emperor the “grave inconveniences” that could stem 
from “any unexplained departure from stipulations already given in his Majesty’s name 
to the world.” Bigelow then went on to justify such an unvarnished presentation to 
Napoleon III on the grounds that the French and Maximilian had had some recent 
successes in Mexico, and the “turbulent” state of our politics at home might “awaken 
suspicions in the United States which might seriously prejudice the relations of the two 
countries.”20
Seward brought the matters raised in Bigelow’s message to a special cabinet 
meeting on November 2 2 ,1866.21 Gideon Welles wrote:
Seward was in fidgets. A dispatch from John Bigelow, our Minister, says the 
embarkation of the French troops is postponed till spring. This step was taken 
some weeks since, but we had not been consulted or notified. In the mean time 
Seward, anticipating the departure of the French troops, has sent out his Minister 
[Campbell] with Lieutenant-General Sherman for a State Department triumph in
19 Bigelow to Seward, Nov. 8, 1866, quoted in Bigelow, Retrospections, vol. 3, p. 599.
20 By the end o f  August 1866, French commander Achille Bazaine had removed most French troops from 
the north, and focused on defending the southern two-thirds o f Mexico. His forces, under General Prieto, 
had a victory against the Juaristas at Juchitan, but did not follow up. It was the only minor victory in a fall 
otherwise marked by retrenchments and outright defeats, Jack Dabbs, The French Army in Mexico 1861- 
1867, The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963, p. 181.
21 The fact that Seward was able to present Bigelow’s message to the cabinet in two weeks was probably 
due the fact that cable service was now in effect from Halifax to Washington, D.C. It cannot be proven, but 
in all likelihood the message was sent by steamer from France to Halifax, then transmitted to Washington 
by cable.
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re-establishing the Mexican Republic. . .  The President and Seward, I saw, were 
ready to take decisive measures. Seward was full of palaver, -  had many things 
to say that were nothing. . .  Seward read a thunder-and-lightning dispatch, a sort 
of ultimatum, full of menace and monitions in every respect, as a telegram.22 
The telegram did not get sent in its original form. Most of the Cabinet felt that the 
telegram was too strongly worded in its first draft, and suggested that it be rewritten.
The Cabinet met again the following day to continue discussion of the issue. 
President Johnson had invited General Grant because Seward’s telegram would explicitly 
make reference to General Sheridan’s troops on the border. Interior Secretary Orville 
Browning, absent from the previous day’s cabinet meeting, said that the telegram was an 
“ultimatum.” According to Welles, the others laughed because the new message was 
considerably toned down from the original.
The approved version was sent in code via transatlantic cable and, according to 
Bigelow, “was the first and the longest as well as the most momentous, perhaps, that has 
yet ever crossed the Atlantic by telegraph, and . .  .as it came in cipher.. .the most 
expensive dispatch for its number of words that to this day has ever reached Europe from 
the State Department.”24 The text took over a day to arrive and reportedly cost the U.S. 
$13,000, and cost Bigelow “corresponding anxiety.”25 Seward approved of Bigelow’s 
approach and cited the “embarrassment” produced by Napoleon Ill’s decision, 
exacerbated “immeasurably” by the fact that the decision was taken “without conference 
with, and even without notice to, the United States.”26 He denied that the U.S. had 
provided the “re-enforcements” to which Napoleon III referred, and said that the U.S.
22 Welles, Diary, vol.. II, p. 622.
23 Ibid., p. 624.
24 Bigelow, Retrospections, vol. 3, p. 611.
25 To get some perspective on the cost, a U.S. Minister serving in a U.S. legation overseas received $12,000 
per year. The State Department lists the highest pay for a current Foreign Service Officer at $ 124,534, 
www.state.gov/m/dghr/pav/8047pf.htm. Using the rough equivalent o f a factor o f ten, the cable would 
have cost c. $130,000 in U.S. currency in 2003. Bigelow cites the cost and his own “corresponding 
anxiety” in Ibid., p. 611.
26 Seward to Bigelow via telegram, 11/23/1866 in Bigelow, Retrospections, vol. 3, pp. 609-11
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would have been unaware of any French telegram sent to French commander Bazaine, 
even if it had not been encoded. Essentially Napoleon III had intimated that the U.S. 
would have known about the change through intelligence intercepts of his telegrams to 
Bazaine. Somewhat sanctimoniously, Seward countered, “We consult only official 
communications to ascertain the purposes and resolutions of France, as we make our own 
purposes and resolutions known only in the same manner where she is concerned.” He 
went on:
But the Emperor’s decision to modify the existing arrangement without any 
understanding with the United States, so as to leave the whole French army in 
Mexico for the present instead of withdrawing one detachment in November 
current [1866], as promised, is now found in every way inconvenient and 
exceptionable. We cannot acquiesce.
Seward then listed the reasons. Napoleon HI said that all the French troops would 
be withdrawn “next spring,” and for Seward that was “indefinite and vague.” Secondly, 
Seward maintained that Congress and the American people would not understand the 
reason for the delay. He alluded to, but did not explain directly to Napoleon, the high 
political cost the Johnson Administration would have to pay if France reneged on its 
timetable for withdrawal. Seward’s third point was that such a delay would disrupt the 
mission to Mexico of Minister Campbell and General Sherman, about to be undertaken 
“to confer with President Juarez on subjects which are deeply interesting to the United 
States and of vital importance to Mexico.” The “ultimatum” part, to which Browning 
objected, consisted of the following instructions to Bigelow:
You w ill. . .  state to the Emperor’s government that the President sincerely hopes 
and expects that the evacuation of Mexico will be carried into effect with such 
conformity to the existing agreement as the inopportune complication which calls 
for this despatch shall allow. Mr. Campbell will be advised of that complication.
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Instructions will be issued to the United States military forces of observation 
[Sheridan’s forces] to await in every case special directions from the President. 
Consistent with his approach all along, Seward finished by asserting that the U.S. “desire 
nothing more earnestly than to preserve peace and friendship with France.” However, 
after underlining the importance of Franco-American friendship, Seward concluded that 
not informing the U.S. of the change in plans was not an oversight:
Nor does the President allow himself to doubt that what has been determined in 
France, most inauspiciously, as we think, has been decided upon inadvertently, 
without full reflection upon the embarrassment it must produce here...
The amazing thing is that Bigelow chose not to deliver immediately the world’s 
most expensive telegram to the Foreign Ministry. Bigelow wrote that because o f the 
length of the message, the telegraph office was tied up for more than a day, and many 
foreign diplomats began asking him about what was contained in such a lengthy 
transmission. Bigelow decided “to leave the tenor of this transatlantic communication to 
the imagination rather than to the loose tongues of those whom it might concern.”27 
Bigelow, a favorite of Seward’s, seemed to be breaking the trust involved in his 
diplomatic assignment by not immediately transmitting the U.S. position to Napoleon III.
However Bigelow, along with Welles, thought there might be a domestic political 
motive for the harsh words. The next steamship to arrive in France from New York 
carried the text of the message in the New York Herald for the whole world to see. 
Bigelow assumed that the telegram “was written for Congress rather than for the 
Tuileries.”28 Clearly Seward had leaked the message to the Herald. The only reason to 
do that would be to gain domestic political advantage, and begin building a consensus in 
support of the administration before Napoleon III had time to read and respond to the 
message itself.
27 Ibid., p. 612.
28 Ibid., p. 612.
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Welles suspected political motives in Seward’s burst of activity relating to the 
telegram. Welles knew that the administration’s defeat in the recent elections had 
“greatly disappointed Seward, and as he has little faith in political principles, popular 
intelligence, or public virtue, he resorts to expedients, and if they fail, he becomes 
depressed.”29 Welles also thought that Seward was not telling the rest of the Cabinet 
everything. The fact that he had leaked the text of the telegram to the Herald might have 
been one of those things.
I am mistaken if there is not much shambling statesmanship in this Mexican 
demonstration. If  I am not in error, there have been some steps taken of which 
most of us are not advised. The condition of things does not suit me, though, as 
Seward says, France has trouble and cannot afford to go to war with us. I would 
not tempt or dare her unnecessarily.30
Even though Bigelow did not deliver the message officially, word of it traveled 
widely once the Herald’s account of it was translated. Bigelow maintained that his 
strategy paid off when the opposition questioned Napoleon ID’s Minister of State, 
Eugene Rouher, about the New York Herald’s report of the bellicose nature of Seward’s 
demands in the Corps legislatif. Rouher responded that Napoleon Ill’s government had 
“received no such dispatch from the United States Legation.”31 France had not been 
officially insulted because the official message had not been transmitted. However, the 
gist of the message carried in the Herald had nonetheless communicated that the U.S. 
was completely serious about wanting the French out of Mexico, and that Seward had 
just about run out of patience. It is impossible to say whether or not Seward knew in 
advance that Bigelow would not deliver the actual text, thus keeping the issue from 
becoming official. It cannot be denied that sending the longest and most expensive 
telegram to date was a theatrical diplomatic move.
29 Welles, Diary, vol. II, p. 626.
30 Ibid. p. 626.
31 Bigelow, Retropections, vol. 3, p. 612.
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The argument that Seward’s telegram may have just have been such an exercise in 
diplomatic bluster, designed to rattle the French, is bolstered by a telegram sent to Paris 
by Seward a few days after the long one under discussion.32 It had two parts, the first of 
which said that General Sheridan was reporting that American troops had reportedly 
crossed the Texas-Mexico border into Matamoros “on plea of preventing the pillage of 
Americans.” Seward said that he, Secretary of War Stanton and General Sheridan would
disapprove of the action and relieve the offending general of his command if the Charges
•)*>
proved to be true. Seward was disavowing use of U.S. military force, but the French
had to be nervous that it might have already been used. This report of U.S. action on the 
border, authorized or not, coupled with Seward’s earlier strong message, kept the 
pressure on Napoleon III to withdraw.
The second part of the message bordered on the disingenuous. Napoleon III had 
maintained in his November interview with Bigelow that he told Montholon, his Minister 
in Washington, about the change in plans. In this telegram a month later, Seward noted 
that Montholon “has now shown me a despatch of M. Moustier o f the 15,h of October 
last, and explained the reason for not giving me a copy of the same when received.”34 So 
Seward may have known about the change in French plans in October, but given the poor 
election results in November, he chose to display a warlike attitude towards France that 
would soften public and congressional criticism.
This view would be consistent with that of Welles, but Welles was frequently 
critical of Seward, particularly when it came to Mexico. It might explain why Bigelow 
would take it upon himself not to deliver the contents of Seward’s warlike telegram, 
thinking that the whole endeavor was undertaken primarily for political effect in the U.S. 
Bigelow knew that the same effect would be achieved through the newspaper account, 
and would not force France to take an official position. This episode is consistent with
32 Telegram, Seward to Bigelow, Nov., 30,1866, in Retrospections, vol. 3, pp. 615-16.
33 Sheridan, Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 221-23.
34 Telegram, Seward to Bigelow, Nov. 30,1866, cited in Bigelow, Retrospections, vol 3, p. 616.
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Seward’s two-pronged approach of not forcing France’s hand by directly insulting her 
honor, while at the same time ratcheting up the pressure with the implied threat of U.S. 
military action.
A message from Moustier in Paris to Montholon in Washington was re­
transmitted through Bigelow via cable on December 3,1866 so that Seward could see its 
contents translated into English. It said that the reason for the change in the French 
position was transmitted via Montholon to Seward on October 16, and that “the latter had 
appeared satisfied with the declarations that had been made by our representative.” 
According to Moustier, Seward had acknowledged the message, at least verbally. 
Moustier’s telegram continued in a conciliatory vein, noting that the reason for the 
change had been essentially that communicated to Bigelow by Napoleon III in 
November, namely the fear that a divided French force would be decimated by the 
Juaristas. Moustier told Seward that the decision had been based on “military 
considerations,” and that France fully intended to repatriate her troops in March.35 
France was not trying to prolong her presence in Mexico. Quite the contrary, it wanted to 
get everyone out as quickly as possible under the safest conditions, even if that meant 
abandoning Maximilian. Shortly thereafter, this is exactly what France did. Assuming 
that that neither Moustier, the French Foreign Minister, or Montholon, France’s Minister 
in Washington, were lying, then this telegraphic exchange reinforces the idea that Seward 
may have known about changes in the French plan and conveniently chose to forget them 
when it was politic to do so.
This episode reminds one of historian David Donald’s characterization of Seward 
as acting a little mad, as had been the case on several occasions early in the Lincoln 
Administration. Had he consciously raised the diplomatic pressure on France by
33 French Minister o f  Foreign Affairs Moustier to French Minister in Washington, the Marquis de 
Montholon, October 16,1866 quoted in Bigelow to Seward, December 3 ,1866 in Retrospections, vol. Ill,
Dp. 617-18.
See note #11 ,  Chapter 3, p. 95.
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issuing a long telegram that was never officially delivered, but obviously leaked to the 
press? Was spending all that money for a communication of which the whole diplomatic 
corps in France was aware, but which remained secret for days, basically an exercise in 
theatricality to get his point across? Was the mention in an ensuing telegram that a U.S. 
general may have invaded Mexico designed to show Napoleon III just how close 
confrontation between French and U.S. forces might be? These activities in November 
1866, which included the embarkation of the new Minister to Mexico, Lewis D. 
Campbell, accompanied by General William Sherman, were key elements in making sure 
that France kept its word about leaving Mexico. Within four months, the French would 
be gone, within seven, Maximilian. Seward was about to see his carefully thought out 
strategy in Mexico culminate in success.
Seward said he would explain the reason why Montholon never showed him a 
copy of the message detailing the proposed change in the French timetable for 
withdrawal. In subsequent cables, he never did, and the question remains whether or not 
Seward had known of French plans since October, but decided to make an issue of the 
change for political reasons in late November. In December 1866, Seward could not be 
sure the Napoleon III would honor his word. Hence, while the new transatlantic cable 
was busy with the hum of traffic between the U.S. and France, Minister Campbell and 
General Sherman were still trying to make headway on the ground in Mexico.
Although confirmed in May 1866, Campbell did not leave for Mexico until five 
months later. Part of the reason for this delay was that President Johnson wanted to 
underscore the potential use of the U.S. military to oust the French by having General 
Grant accompany Campbell when he presented his credentials to Juarez. Grant in 
Mexico would send an unmistakable message to Napoleon III, and by extension to
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Maximilian, Austria, and Belgium that the time for the polite exchange of diplomatic 
messages was coming to an end.37
A year earlier, Seward had used General Schofield to gently rattle the U.S. saber 
in Paris. Had Minister-to-Mexico designate General John Logan agreed to go to Mexico 
in December 1865, that would have rattled the saber a little more. Now Napoleon III 
would not be able to escape the noise when a top U.S. general accompanied Minister 
Lewis D. Campbell to his new assignment. Romero viewed Campbell’s nomination as 
“equivalent to a new ratification on the Senate’s part of the president’s policy of 
continuing to recognize the national government of Mexico and further proof of 
adherence to the Monroe Doctrine.”38
The diplomatic effect of a U.S. general accompanying the American Minister 
would be reinforced by Sheridan’s “army of observation” on the Rio Grande. In that 
capacity, Sheridan had official sanction to wink and nod at a number of initiatives 
undertaken to help the republicans, mostly allowing them access to war materiel. His 
troops were rested and ready to go and the French had to be aware that they would be 
little better than cannon fodder should such a force link up with those already fighting for 
Juarez. In September of 1866, Sheridan visited U.S. troops in San Antonio and made a 
public show of asking about supplies should those troops find it necessary to move 
southward. He then went to Fort Duncan, just opposite the Mexican town of Piedras 
Negras on the Rio Grande, where he opened communications with Juarez, just over the 
border. Sheridan reported that he did all this for maximum public effect on Maximilian 
and the French troops. He explained that “the greatest significance was ascribed to my 
actions, it being reported most positively and with many specific details that I was only
37 Austria still had a few troops guarding Maximilian in his capacity as an Austrian prince. Belgium had 
also sent a contingent to support their princess Charlotte. As his relations with the French deteriorated, 
Maximilian and Charlotte occasionally entertained the fantasy that those two European powers would 
somehow replace the French, an idea that had no chance o f becoming a reality. For approximate number at 
time o f  their departure from Mexico, see note #57, this chapter.
38 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, May 6,1866, #346, vol. 7, pp. 487-8; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 129-30.
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awaiting the arrival of the troops, then under marching orders in San Antonio, to cross the 
Rio Grande in behalf of the Liberal cause. Sheridan concluded that these “reports” and 
“demonstrations” frightened the “Imperialists” to the extent that they “withdrew the 
French and Austrian soldiers from Matamoras [sic], and practically abandoned the whole 
of northern Mexico as far down as Monterey [sic].39 Disease had also taken its toll on the 
French troops, and maintaining supply lines in northeastern Mexico had proven 
particularly difficult.40
The cabinet was therefore rather surprised when Grant rather angrily refused to 
go. According to Gideon Welles, when the instructions to Grant were read to him during 
a cabinet meeting in October 1866, Grant said that “he did not think it expedient for him 
to go out of the country. . .  The President was surprised and a little disconcerted.” 41 
President Johnson’s reaction was understandable insofar as a military officer was 
refusing an order from his Commander-in-Chief. Welles went on to say that Grant 
suspected that Johnson had ulterior political motives for getting him out o f the country. 
Johnson and Seward could not have overlooked the fact that Grant was much better 
received during the “Swing” than had been the President. With Grant gone, Johnson 
would have the possibility of replacing him as top Army commander with General 
William Sherman. Of course Johnson had the constitutional right to do that anyway, but 
he was already encountering a lot of opposition in Congress, where Grant was well liked. 
Firing Grant would complicate Johnson’s political life in a way that sending him on a 
diplomatic mission would not.
Grant displayed his own growing sense of how the Washington political game 
was played by asking Sherman to go to Mexico in his stead. Writing to his brother, 
Senator John Sherman, General Sherman said that he had to undertake the Mexican 
assignment “. . .  to escape a worse duty, and to save another person from a complication
39 Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, vol II., p. 215-16.
40 Dabbs, French Army, p. 180.
41 Ibid., vol. II, p. 621.
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that should be avoided.”42 The “other person” was Grant and the “worse duty” would 
have been Grant’s current job as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Sherman 
considered the Commander-in-Chief post “political” and declared “ I am determined to 
keep out o f political, or even quasi-political office, and shall resign before being so 
placed, though I cannot afford to resign.”43 It is little wonder that Sherman’s patience 
grew short as the Campbell-Sherman expedition evolved.
Welles had to provide a steamer once Campbell and Sherman were confirmed in 
their mission and the Susquehanna was put at their disposal. Welles, who mistrusted 
many, thought the mission “premature” because “the French have not left, and though 
from all accounts they are doing so, Louis Napoleon [Napoleon III] will not hesitate to 
break faith if it is for his interest.”44 In the same entry, Welles questioned Seward and 
Johnson’s motives, characterizing the mission as “a political contrivance, such as Seward 
is fond of concocting for effect. A Radical Congress is about assembling [sic] after a 
succession of party triumphs, and he is afraid of it. The embassy is to draw off 
attention.”45
As things turned out, Welles may have been right. Campbell and Sherman left for 
Mexico via Havana on November 10,1866 [see map p. iv]. Campbell felt that he needed 
more information on the Mexican situation, and he went to Havana where he met with a 
number of people. U.S. consuls to Veracruz and Mexico City were also en route from the 
U.S. to Mexico via Havana on different ships, and Campbell chose to wait and consult 
with them there. Campbell then chose to wait for those consuls to arrive at their posts in 
order for them to transmit their impressions of the situation back to him in Havana.
In the interim, Campbell met with a former Confederate General, John B. 
Magruder, who had a message for Seward from the French commander in Mexico,
42 The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General Sherman and Senator Sherman from  1837 to 
1891, ed. Rachel Sherman Thorndike, New York: Da Capo Press, 1969, p. 282
43 William Sherman to John Sherman, Nov. 11,1866 in Ibid., p. 282.
44 Welles, Diary, vol. II, p. 622.
45 Welles, Diary, vol. II., p. 622.
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General Bazaine, The message cited “the moral influence wielded by the government of 
the United States” as the reason for the destruction of Maximilian’s empire, and called 
for a joint U.S.-French force to maintain order. He suggested between ten and fifteen 
thousand U.S. forces in the north and a similar number of French troops in the south 
working together as a joint peace keeping force. Campbell forwarded this message to 
Seward on November 21, but no action was taken other than a reply acknowledging the 
overture.46
Campbell and Sherman finally reached the waters outside of Veracruz on 
November 29, almost three weeks after leaving New York. But Veracruz was in the 
hands of Maximilian’s supporters and U.S. consul Lane reported to Campbell that there 
was no indication of any immediate change. Campbell and Sherman sailed north to 
Tampico, where Juaristas controlled the city. They disembarked and met with the 
Juaristas who informed the American representatives that Juarez was not in relatively 
nearby San Luis Potosi, but still in far away Chihuahua. Upon receiving this news, 
Sherman wrote to his brother, John, that Juarez was “way up in Chihuahua for no 
possible purpose other than to be where the Devil himself cannot get at him. I have not 
the remotest idea of riding on mule back a thousand miles in Mexico to find its chief
„47
magistrate.
Campbell wrote to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs that he wished to 
present his credentials as quickly as possible. As a former Congressman, Campbell knew 
that Congress would only be in session for approximately another three months, 
adjourning on March 4,1867, until the following December. If congressional action were 
to be necessary to aid the republican regime, necessary steps would have to be taken 
soon.48 However, Sherman had already made his opposition clear about going to 
Chihuahua, and Campbell now followed his lead.
46 Campbell to Seward, November 21,1866, DR, Despatches, Mexico, M97, R 31, pp. 248-53.
47 William Sherman to John Sherman, Dec. 7,1866, in Sherman Letters, p. 284.
48 Martin Hall, “The Campbell-Sherman Diplomatic Mission to Mexico,” p. 264.
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The Susquehanna left Mexican waters and arrived in Brownsville, Texas on 
December 7, just across the Rio Grande from Matamoros, where Campbell and Sherman 
caught up with U.S. General Sheridan. All three then met with Juarista general Mariano 
Escobedo, who controlled Matamoros, and who informed them that Juarez would soon be 
in Monterrey, not close, but still not as far as Chihuahua. Campbell chose to stay in 
Texas and make preparations to go overland to Monterrey to complete his mission, while 
Sherman took the Susquehanna home. By mid-December Campbell found out that 
Juarez was still in Chihuahua and had no immediate plans to leave. Frustrated, Campbell 
left for New Orleans, where he wrote to Seward at the end of 1866 that seeking to make 
personal contact with the Juarez government should wait until “its residence shall have 
been definitely established, and its authorities show, practically, some power and a 
greater disposition to enforce justice and to respect our flag.”49 Seward replied by telling 
Campbell to wait in New Orleans for further instructions.
Meanwhile, Maximilian vacillated. After several sessions with his advisors in 
late November 1866, he finally decided to stay in Mexico and try to fight it out against 
the Juaristas. Seward had a good reason for ordering the Campbell-Sherman delegation 
not to come ashore at Veracruz unless Maximilian officially abdicated. He did not want 
the U.S. to be seen as dictating the outcome of the struggle between Maximilian’s forces 
and those of Juarez. His policy of neutrality towards France had worked up to this stage 
and there was no compelling reason to further sour relations with France. If Maximilian 
chose to try to stay in power, then matters would be decided on the battlefield, where 
Seward felt that Juarez would prevail, and the U.S. goal of maintaining republican 
Mexico would be achieved. Seward’s carefully cultivated guise of U.S. neutrality toward 
Franco-Mexican affairs would remain intact.
49 Campbell to Seward, December 31,1866, #7 or 8 (Campbell made initial mistakes in numbering his 
messages that were corrected subsequently), DR, Mexico, Despatches, pp. 291-95.
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Failure of the Campbell/Sherman mission did have negative elements. I f  Mexico 
descended into anarchy upon the departure of the French, Maximilian could be sacrificed 
in the process. Additionally, Seward still had no good first-hand intelligence from trusted 
sources. Welles, who admittedly took a jaundiced view of Seward’s initiatives, 
commented as follows on the mission:
Seward’s Mexican diplomacy continues a muddle, as it has been from the 
beginning. Still he continues to get off from his blunders, mistakes, and 
mismanagement without serious exposure or attack. . .  The steamer Susquehanna 
has reached New Orleans with General Sherman. Campbell was left a t . .  .Point 
Isabel [Texas]. . .  with his thumb in his mouth. The whole turns out a faux pas, a 
miserable, bungling piece of business.50 
Or was it? Seward was not prone to “bungling,” Welles’s opinions 
notwithstanding. There had been a great public outcry in the U.S. since the end of the 
Civil War calling for forceful action in Mexico. Seward had to do something, and the 
replacement of Thomas Corwin with General Logan in late 1865 would have quelled 
some of the administration’s Radical Republican critics in Congress. Once Logan 
demurred, criticism grew during the five months it took to confirm Campbell. The 
Campbell/Grant mission that became the Campbell/Sherman mission was conceived with 
several objectives in mind. One was to deflect congressional criticism about temporizing 
in Mexico by sending a “high-profile” delegation. A similar effect was achieved by the 
telegraphic exchanges between the U.S. and France in late 1866.
It is also likely that President Johnson wanted Grant out of Washington for 
domestic political reasons. From Seward’s perspective, he feared that Grant was the one 
person who could genuinely upset his plans for a peaceful solution to the problem of the 
French in Mexico. Having worked with Romero in naming General Schofield as leader 
of the Mexican invasion force, Grant had shown an early commitment to solving the
50 Welles, Diary, vol. II, pp. 648-49; Hannas, Napoleon III, p. 288.
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Mexican problem militarily. Johnson and Seward obviously believed that if Grant were 
on a ship at sea, or taking an arduous overland journey to Chihuahua, he might be less 
threatening to Seward’s plans of solving the matter without bloodshed. Johnson 
biographer Hans Trefousse, writes about the president’s effort to get Grant out o f 
Washington on a diplomatic mission, thereby opening up the possibility of replacing 
Grant with General William T. Sherman.51 Such a ploy had its flaws, of course, as 
Grant, while traveling, could have just as well committed Sheridan’s troops on the Rio 
Grande, had he chosen to do so. An incident justifying U.S. response could have easily 
been created, just as one had been to initiate the Mexican-American War in 1846.52 
Grant’s insistence on remaining in Washington averted that possibility.
Yet even when Grant refused, the idea of replacing the highest ranking U.S. 
officer with the second, Sherman, would still have a calculated effect on Maximilian and 
the French. The diplomatic impact, even if slightly diminished, was essentially the same: 
to hasten French withdrawal. By late December 1866, it appears that neither President 
Johnson nor Seward intended to actually use Sheridan’s troops. They just wanted the 
French to think that they might. How much of the initiative was Seward’s, and how 
much Johnson’s, is hard to tell. Seward had already spent close to five years working on 
the problem of the French in Mexico. It would be safe to say that Seward, not Johnson, 
was guiding Johnson Administration decisions regarding Mexico as 1867 was ushered in, 
particularly given Johnson’s looming political problems. Welles reported discussing the 
possibility of “impeachment” with Johnson as early as December 24,1866. Even though 
Welles said that the President gave the matter “no concern whatever,” the drumbeat for 
his removal had begun, and the effectiveness of his presidential leadership was entering a 
phase of precipitous decline.53
51 Trefousse, Johnson, p. 270.
52 Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History, NY: Vintage Books, 1966, p 87.
53 Welles, Diary, vol. II, p. 647.
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Seward may have also envisioned the Campbell/Sherman mission in the same 
light as General Schofield’s mission to Paris, i.e. an attempt to buy time.54 Before 
making any further moves, Seward needed to know if French were actually leaving, 
whether or not the Juarez forces definitively moved from defense to offense, and what 
Maximilian planned to do. He also required intelligence on the morale of the remaining 
French forces and that of Maximilian’s Mexican supporters who might be left to fight on. 
The answers to all of these questions came about in early 1867, more quickly than 
practically anyone expected.
The personal plight of Maximilian and his wife Carlota was not something to 
which Seward had devoted a lot of time, and it appeared to some, after Maximilian’s 
execution, that he did not handle their eventual demise particularly well.55 The grand 
geopolitical struggle between England, France, the Confederacy and the Union was what 
had concerned Seward. Abolishing slavery in the United States and working to make the 
benefits of the Civil War outweigh its enormous costs justified his involvement in 
national affairs. Keeping the country together politically after Lincoln’s assassination 
was a task worthy of Seward’s talents.
A spoiled Hapsburg prince and his over-indulged young wife simply did not 
constitute a concern of the same magnitude. Prime Minister Palmerston and Foreign 
Minister Russell in Great Britain, Napoleon III and Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys in 
France; these were worthy adversaries, capable of summoning Seward’s best. 
Maximilian, an indecisive French puppet unable to maintain even a semblance of 
political and fiscal order in Mexico without massive external subsidies, was not cut from 
the same cloth. Until perhaps March of 1867, Seward never considered Maximilian as 
anything more than a pawn in a cmcial geopolitical struggle. In fact, it was hard for 
Seward to know much about Maximilian at all from 1864 to 1867, given the spotty nature
54 Hanna & Hanna, Napoleon I II  and Mexico, p. 289.
55 Princess Charlotte Amelie o f  Belgium, called Carlota in Mexico.
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of U.S. intelligence in Mexico after Corwin’s departure. This perhaps explains why 
Seward’s handling of the U.S. response to Maximilian’s last days seems open to several 
interpretations. This final episode stood in contrast to the thoughtful, persistent and 
ultimately successful campaign he waged to get the French to leave Mexico.
Although Napoleon Ill’s January 22,1866, decision to withdraw French troops 
from Mexico proved to be a death sentence for Maximilian, it did not necessarily have to 
have been. Before his public announcement of the withdrawal, Napoleon III had 
informed Maximilian in a letter that financial reasons were the basis for his decision.56 
Once officially notified, it was then incumbent on Maximilian to decide whether or not 
he and his entourage would leave with the French. If departing, he would have to 
establish some sort of transitional government while arrangements for his departure were 
being made. He would have to make provisions for his supporters, particularly the 
Belgians and Austrians who had come to aid him out of a sense of dynastic duty.57 By 
signing the Treaty of Miramar, he had forsworn his rights as a Hapsburg prince, and 
would have to find some suitable position for himself and Carlota in Europe that would 
not be too humiliating for husband and wife aristocrats.
He had hundreds of decisions to make in a very short time, and succeeded in 
making almost none. In the back of his mind, Maximilian probably knew that staying 
might well result in his execution if the Juaristas prevailed, but he was loath to face that 
eventuality. His anti-republican decrees in October 1865 authorizing summary execution 
for “rebels,” followed by commander Bazaine’s order to take no prisoners, meant that 
Maximilian could expect little leniency from Juarez if he ever needed it.
56 Hannah, Napoleon III, p. 275.
57 According to Dabbs, 6,811 comprised the “Austro-Belgian legion and guard posts." He says there was 
another detachment o f  Austrians in Puebla primarily concerned with provisioning Maximilian’s forces, 
Dabbs, French Army, p. 204. Corroborating these numbers is Gustave N iox’s assertion that
7,000 Belgians left on March 12,1867,1,700 Austrians out o f  a total European force in Mexico o f 28,693. 
The remaining twenty thousand were French. Gustave Niox, Expedition D u Mexique 1861-1867, 
Appendix XI, p. 761.
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In spite of all this, Seward certainly did not want to see Maximilian executed.
The Austrian was only thirty-four in 1866, his wife twenty-six. That he would be 
humiliated when he returned to Europe as a “former” emperor who could not maintain his 
crown might be punishment enough. Public awareness that the mighty Hapsburgs had 
met their match at the hands of some Mexican peasants would be sufficiently onerous. A 
reduction in the royal pair’s extravagant manner of living would almost certainly ensue. 
The fact that events unfolded so quickly in early 1867 may explain the surprise o f many 
in Europe at the prospect of Maximilian’s execution. It was little more than a month 
between his capture on May 15th and his execution on June 19th. Again, the time lags 
attendant to the correspondence of the era intervened, for by the time the word of 
Maximilian’s capture reached Europe, it was already almost too late to intervene in his 
execution.
Seward never really dealt directly with Maximilian or Carlota, either personally or 
through formal diplomacy. He was used to dealing with older statesmen. His youngest 
interlocutor, Mexican Minister Romero, thirty-six years his junior, was very mature for 
his age, very analytical, self-controlled and, by 1867, rather experienced. Seward was 
therefore at somewhat of a loss when it came to pondering the fate of two nineteenth- 
century romantics who considered themselves rulers of Mexico. Their unpredictability, 
inconsistency, and vacillation alternated with their pugnacity and grandiloquence, making 
it hard for Seward to predict what they might do under pressure, once apprised of 
Napoleon Ill’s decision.
Fully cognizant of Napoleon Ill’s capacity for duplicity, Seward surmised that 
Carlota would be wise not to expect too much from the French emperor. Seward also 
knew that as far as Pope Pius IX was concerned, Maximilian had not upheld his end of 
the bargain in Mexico to firmly re-establish the Catholic Church with all of its extralegal 
rights. Carlota, always the more forceful personality, nevertheless decided to take matters 
into her own hands.
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In the summer of 1866, she embarked on a one-woman mission to the Vatican and 
Paris to demand the support she thought was owed to her and her husband. She was 
rebuffed in both places. In Paris, none of the dignitaries who would have normally 
greeted an empress upon her arrival showed up to greet her. They had supposedly gone 
to the wrong train station. Nonetheless, it was an ill omen. Napoleon III pled illness as 
the reason for not seeing her right away, but the French empress Eugenie did, along with 
the French ministers of war and foreign affairs, and the Austrian ambassador. They told 
her that the imperial decision had been taken and that nothing could or would be done to 
reverse it. Napoleon III himself re-iterated this when he was well enough to see her a few 
days later.58
She proceeded to the castle at Miramar in order to gather her thoughts and write 
her husband, then went to the Vatican to confront Pope Pius IX. The Pope had initially 
supported Maximilian because it was his understanding that Maximilian would restore 
Catholicism with all of its privileges in Mexico. Not only had Maximilian not done this, 
but he had also sustained certain religious freedoms advocated by the Liberals. In so 
doing, Maximilian had alienated Mexican Archbishop Antonio Labastida, and the Pope 
had sent papal nuncio Monsignor Meglia to Mexico to look into the problem.59
Hence the Pope was both aware of the situation in Mexico and not disposed to do 
too much for Maximilian when Carlota made her visit to Rome to plead their case. It was 
during her appeal to the Pope that Carlota had her first major mental breakdown; 
ultimately she spent the next sixty years insane. Telling the Pope that she was afraid of 
being poisoned by Napoleon Ill’s agents, she pleaded with the Pius IX to stay overnight 
in the Vatican. The Pope protested, saying that no woman had ever done so, but her
58 Jasper Ridley, Maximilian and Juarez, p. 248-9; Percy Martin, Maximilian in Mexico, Chapters XIX and 
XX, pp. 234-256.
59 Jasper Ridley, Maximilian and Juarez, NY: Ticknor and Fields, 1992, p. 179.
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condition was so alarming that the Pope relented. From that point forward, she never 
totally recovered her sanity, nor saw her husband again.60
Meanwhile in France, almost a year exactly from the date of his announcement of 
French withdrawal to the Corps legislatif, Napoleon III ordered his new representative in 
Mexico, General Francois Castelnau, to evacuate all French troops by March 1867, 
regardless of what Maximilian chose to do. Bazaine was already withdrawing from the 
north of Mexico and the Juaristas were emboldened by General Sheridan’s troops on the 
Rio Grande. Having chosen to stay and fight, Maximilian now turned for salvation to the 
Mexican generals leading his own “imperial” forces, Miguel Miramon and Tomas Mejia. 
In mid-February 1867, he left with them and their troops for Queretaro, a city northeast 
of Mexico City. From Queretaro, he tried to open lines of communication with Juarez, 
but to no avail. The Juaristas1 now held the upper hand, and Maximilian’s forces were no 
match for them. The Juaristas began a siege of Queretaro that lasted until mid-May, 
when Maximilian was captured.
In April 1867 Seward seemed suddenly to realize that Maximilian’s life might 
hang in the balance. He wrote to Campbell, who by then was serving as U.S. Minister to 
Mexico out of the St. Charles Hotel in New Orleans, that, “the capture of the Prince 
Maximilian in Queretaro by the Republican armies of Mexico seems probable.” Given 
the Juaristas’ thirst for revenge, clemency could not reasonably be expected. Seward 
noted, however, that Maximilian’s execution “. .  .would be injurious to the national cause 
of Mexico and to the Republican system throughout the world.” Just why Seward 
thought that Maximilian’s execution would be “injurious” to the worldwide “Republican 
system” is not totally clear. Seward himself left no writings on the subject, so one can 
only speculate as to his motivations. Certainly, the historical precedent of U.S.
60 Her brothers, King Leopold II o f Belgium and the count o f  Flanders, brought her back to Belgium where 
she lived in palaces until her death in 1927. It is primarily her story that has caught the imagination of 
romantic novelists over the years, Ridley, Ibid., p. 249.
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sympathies waning for the French “Republican system,” once the atrocities of 
Robespierre’s “terror” became widely known in the late 1790s, may have been a factor.
Perhaps because the U.S. had shown clemency to the Confederates, Seward 
thought Juarez might follow a similar example.61 Seward may have also been engaging 
in a telegraphic flurry to show the rest of the world that he was trying to obtain clemency 
for Maximilian, knowing full well that such clemency was probably out of the question. 
In 1867, there was not much of a “republican system” in the world, and the execution of 
one misguided aristocrat was not going to alter whatever course republicanism was about 
to take henceforth. More convincing, perhaps, is the argument that Seward did not really 
consider Maximilian as evil and deserving of his fate. Maximilian had been stupid, and 
had received and acted on very poor advice. Humanitarian that he was, however, Seward 
probably did not view those transgressions as worthy of death. On June first, Seward 
telegraphed Campbell:
Proceed with as much despatch as possible to the residence o f President Juarez of 
Mexico and enter upon your mission. Earnestly urge clemency to Maximilian and 
other prisoners of war, if necessaiy.62
Campbell instead asked for a U.S. ship to escort him to Mexico, but one was not 
available. Seward ordered him to find other means of transport. Campbell shot back, 
citing the unpredictability of foreign carriers, that he felt the U.S. Ministers should arrive 
in U.S. ships. Finally he noted that quarantine regulations were in effect in Havana and 
Vera Cruz, prohibiting disembarkation there. Seward insisted that he leave immediately 
nevertheless, and Campbell said that, because he was under “severe bilious attack,” travel 
would be life threatening. He offered to resign, and Seward immediately accepted:
61 The only Confederate executed for war crimes was Henry Wirz, commandant o f  the infamous 
Confederate prisoner-of-war camp, Andersonville, McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 797,802.
62 Seward to Campbell, June 1,1867, Telegram #33, DR, Instructions, Mexico, M 77, R  113 p. 523.
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It is important that the Minister to Mexico should proceed at once. Your 
resignation will therefore be accepted with thanks for your service and regret for 
your retirement.63
Seward appointed Marcus Otterbourg, the U.S. consul in Mexico City, to replace 
Campbell, but it was too late for Otterbourg to make a difference.
Seward’s concerns for Maximilian’s life proved well founded. Maximilian was 
not summarily executed, but accorded a military trial that began on June thirteenth. He 
and generals Miramon and Mejia were found guilty by the afternoon of the fourteenth, 
and their execution was scheduled for the afternoon of the sixteenth. Juarez, who by now 
had moved from Chihuahua to San Luis Potosi, was not himself in Queretaro, the site of 
the trial. Requests were coming to him from many quarters to spare Maximilian’s life, 
and he ordered a stay of execution until the nineteenth in order to reflect. Juarez was 
extremely devoted to the concept of rule by law, and saw no reason to overturn the 
court’s decision. The legal sentence of death by firing squad was carried out on June 
nineteenth on a hill in Queretaro (Cerro de las Campanas).
Subsequent criticism of Seward was based on his perceived indifference to 
Maximilian’s fate. The U.S. was thought by most in Europe to be the only country that 
could have changed Juarez’s mind.64 In Seward’s defense is it fair to say that he really 
wanted to exert U.S. pressure for clemency, but the intransigence of Campbell at the 
critical moment made that impossible? The only written records are Seward’s 
instructions to Campbell and Otterbourg. They both indicate a sincere desire to see 
Maximilian’s life spared.
63 Seward to Campbell, June 15,1867, Telegram (original not specifically numbered, but would be #37 if 
sequential), DR, Instructions, Mexico, M 77, R 113, p. 524.
64 Ralph Roeder, Juarez biographer, writes that a number o f  prominent Europeans pleaded for clemency for 
Maximilian, notably Victor Hugo whom he quotes as saying “This will be your second victory, Juarez.
The first, in overcoming usurpation, is superb. The second, in forgiving the usurper, will be sublime.” 
Roeder, Juarez and his Mexico, p. 670.
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It must also be remembered that at this critical juncture, Seward had a number of 
pressing issues to contend with besides Mexico. He had chosen to support Andrew 
Johnson, and that was proving to be a fatal political decision. The “Swing” had shown 
the electorate the president’s weaker side, his stubbornness and his alleged propensity for 
alcohol. His tough talk about dealing harshly with former Confederates did not 
correspond to his actions, something that increasingly infuriated Radical Republicans in 
Congress.
In early 1867, the House Judiciary Committee was investigating Johnson for 
possible impeachment proceedings, just as the Mexican affair was reaching its critical 
juncture.65 However, although Seward publicly supported Johnson and did much to 
arrange for his legal defense, he was also quite close to Secretary of War Stanton, whom 
Johnson wanted to remove. In order to prevent this, Congress had passed (over 
Johnson’s veto) the Tenure in Office Act in March 1867, making it illegal for Johnson to 
remove Stanton without congressional approval. Considering the Tenure in Office Act 
unconstitutional, Johnson fired Stanton anyway, thereby precipitating the impeachment 
crisis that essentially unraveled the Johnson administration and cleared the path for 
Grant’s election in 1868. Seward had shown himself capable of juggling many 
diplomatic balls at once in the past, but these domestic political concerns must have 
preoccupied him considerably and diverted his attention from what was unfolding so fast 
in Mexico.
That excuse notwithstanding, Seward may have also perceived that it might be 
advantageous not to become overly involved in Maximilian’s denouement. He had 
achieved his primary diplomatic goal. The French had left and U.S.-Franco relations 
were still intact. There had been no large invasions of Mexican territory and only a few 
casualties from minor border scrapes. Having supported Juarez so long and at such a 
distance, there was no compelling reason to start the new era of diplomatic relations with
65 Trefousse, Andrew Johnson, Ch. 17.
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his victorious Liberals on the wrong foot. If Maximilian’s death was what Juarez and the 
Mexican military required, so be it. On one hand it was tragic that a young man had to 
die, but Seward, like other members of the U.S. government, had just been witness to the 
deaths of hundreds of thousands. Maximilian may have been indecisive, but indecision 
could also bear a heavy price, as General McClellan had proven to Lincoln and Seward 
so often during the Civil War. In the final analysis, Maximilian could have saved himself 
by leaving with Bazaine and the French troops. His vainglorious attempt to fight on 
without the French was tantamount to suicide.
It was also a lamentable outcome that Carlota, once again Princess Charlotte in 
Belgium, was crazy. She and her husband, however, had many indications before 1867 
of Napoleon Ill’s capacity for duplicity. She learned from Pope Pius IX a crushing 
lesson on the temporal power of the Catholic Church. If he needed to, Seward might 
have assuaged his conscience with the realization that Maximilian and Carlota were 
ultimately killed by naivete.
A more compelling explanation for Juarez’s decision against clemency is that 
foreigners simply could not influence him on this issue. Juarez Lad been fighting his 
whole life against the privileged classes, and knew that he would have received no mercy 
from them had the tables been turned.66 Juarez and his advisers had more than sufficient 
reason to turn a deaf ear to pleas for clemency. On May 15,1867, Juarez wrote to his 
son-in-law:
Los impacientes estan dados a Satanas, porque quisieran que en un instante 
quedara todo terminado, aunque los grandes criminates quedaran impunes, y  sin 
garantias la paz futura de la Nacion; pero el gobierno sin hacerles caso, sigue 
corriendo despacio con el firme proposito de hacer lo que mejor convenga al
66 Juarez had once been exiled by Santa Anna for what Santa Anna perceived as a personal slight from 
Juarez when he was governor o f  Oaxaca. The second time he was captured by Conservative forces, he 
managed to escape. In neither case was he the undisputed political and military leader o f the Liberals, as he 
became during the course o f  the Intervention.
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pais, sin que influyan en sus determinaciones la venganza personal, la compasion 
entendida ni amago alguno extranjero, sean cuales fueren los terminos con que se 
quiera disfrazar: hemos luchado por la independenciay autonomia de Mexico y  
es preciso que esto sea una realidad. [Those who are impatient can go to the 
devil, because they want everything resolved immediately, whereas major 
criminals remain unpunished, and with there [still being] no future guarantees for 
the peace of the nation. But the government [of republican Mexico], without 
paying attention to those who are impatient, continues to slowly push forward its 
firm conviction to do what is best for the country, without personal vengeance 
influencing its decisions, nor the supposed compassion, nor the threats of anyone 
from outside, regardless of how such overtures might be disguised: we have 
fought for the independence and autonomy of Mexico, and that is precisely what 
the reality will be.]67
It would be hard to find a better articulation of Mexico’s determination to make 
its own decisions. Juarez’s words display the strength of his convictions, and his pride in 
the Mexicans who had supported him. He realized that there might be external efforts to 
influence him, but he was prepared to disregard them no matter how they were 
“disguised.” As recounted in greater detail in the Conclusion, Juarez and Romero 
orchestrated a very warm reception for Seward in Mexico City in 1869, where the 
straightforward sentiment expressed in this letter would be tempered by the dictates of 
the occasion. However, in these comments, written to a trusted family member, one can 
see what Juarez truly thought.
Additionally, the Juarez government did not want a Maximilian, living in Europe, 
to be the rallying point for everyone with a grudge against Mexico, the locus and focus of 
hundreds of intrigues the likes of which had brought Maximilian to Mexico in the first
67 Benito Juarez to son-in-law Pedro Santacilia, May 15,1867 in in J.M. Puig Casauranc, Archivos 
Privados de D. Benito Juarez y  D. Pedro Santacilia, Mexico City: Publicaciones de la Secretaria de 
Educacion Publica, Biblioteca Nacional, 1928, p. 216.
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place. Juarez would need a loyal military to restore order in post-Maximilian Mexico. 
The army had made it perfectly clear that Maximilian was to receive no mercy. Juarez 
and his foreign minister, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, feared that Europeans might 
consider the reborn Mexican republic “soft” if its courts did not carry out its sentences.68 
With Maximilian executed and the French departed, Juarez and his government could 
renew their relations with the rest of the world starting with a clean slate.
That "clean slate” extended to the U.S. With the French gone, Seward’s policy 
appeared brilliant, but that did not hide the fact that during the struggle itself, the U.S. 
had done very little tangibly to aid the republican cause. Seward’s explanation for why 
the U.S. had not provided more guns and money now appeared vindicated by events. He 
appealed to Juarez’s adamant desire to maintain Mexican territorial integrity when 
speaking to Romero, who reported:
If a United States army went to Mexico, he [Seward] claimed, it would never 
return. It was indeed easy to throw the French out of Mexico. . .  but it would be 
impossible to throw the Yankees out. For each million dollars the United States 
government lent Mexico n o w . , .  later it would cost us a state, and for each arm in 
these circumstances, the eventual cost would be an acre of mineral land.69 
Seward knew that Juarez would understand this argument. Juarez had been 
convinced all along that his republicans would oust the French and Maximilian, if he 
stayed on. U.S. aid in this process was welcome, but the Juaristas were capable of any 
sacrifice to achieve their goal of expelling foreigners. Indeed, one of the reasons Juarez 
is so highly venerated in Mexico today is that he had such faith in the perseverance of the 
Mexican people a century and a half ago.
68 Frank Knapp, The Life o f  Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada 1823-1889: A Study ofInfluence and Obscurity, 
Austin: U. o f  Texas Press, 1951, pp.l 15-117. Knapp argues that Lerdo de Tejada was also completely 
against clemency for Maximilian.
69 Romero to Minister o f  Foreign Relations, April 6 ,1866, #266, vol. 7, pp. 382-5; see also Schoonover, 
Lobby, p. 122-23.
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Yet Juarez knew that, perseverance notwithstanding, ousting a Yankee army from 
Mexican soil would be virtually impossible. Unlike the case with the French, there 
would be no ocean to complicate supply problems, no European balance-of-power issues 
for distraction. It had been less than two decades since a U.S. army had alienated half of 
Mexico’s legal territory and untold potential wealth. Juarez feared American 
expansionism, and may have been aware that Seward had said in a speech in 1860 that 
the capital of the U.S. would be situated in Mexico in the not too distant future.70 For 
Mexico, getting the French out without getting the Americans in was an enormous 
accomplishment, for which Seward deserved much credit.
Yet from the perspective of its leadership, republican Mexico had not merely been 
a pawn in a geopolitical game. Romero succinctly expressed such a sentiment to Senator 
Sumner:
We believe. . .  that the United States’ moral influence had been one of several 
factors compelling Napoleon to withdraw his forces from Mexico. We did not 
consider it the only one . . .  or even the major one. If  the United States had 
remained indifferent to everything, we believed Napoleon perhaps could have 
postponed the withdrawal of his forces somewhat longer, but in the end they 
would have left. Although we were grateful to the United States public for their 
sympathy toward us, we do not believe we owe our success exclusively to that 
country,71
Francisco Zarco, a prominent Mexican journalist and member of Juarez’s cabinet, 
considered it inaccurate to give the U.S. credit for Maximilian’s downfall and the exit of 
the French. Writing to Juarez in September 1866, he stated, “We were saved by the 
resistance of our own people and by your tenacity, and we owe no thanks at all to the 
United States.”72 Both Zarco and Romero saw the persistence of Juarez and the military
7(1 Seward, Works, IV, 333; 111, 188; Van Deusen, Seward, p. 209.
71 Romero-Sumner conversation, April 28,1867, quoted in Schoonover, Lobby, p. 157.
72 Quoted in Hamnett, Juarez, p. 161.
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genius of his generals like Porfirio Diaz as the principal factor in the downfall o f  the 
French. The topography of Mexico itself was a factor; the desolate northern deserts to 
which Juarez escaped proved unconquerable to the French. With all of its arroyos 
(streams) and barrancas (ravines) on the coast, its deserts in the north, and jungles in the 
south, the landscape was perfectly designed for guerrilla activity and playing the waiting
73game.
There is little question that the Juarez government was disposed to execute 
Maximilian and his two most prominent generals, Miguel Miramon and Tomas Mejia as 
early as May 1867. In letters to his son-in-law Pedro Santacilia in late May 1867, Juarez 
said that, according to the Law of January 25,1862, he could have had them executed 
immediately, once they had been positively identified.74 He said that instead, his 
government chose to have a trial “in order that the charges [against] the defendants and 
[their] defense could be [openly] stated” (pero el gobierno ha querido que haya un juicio 
formal en que se hagan constar los cargos y  las defensas de los reos.) Juarez was aware 
of world opinion, and he considered the trial a way to prove that the government had not 
acted precipitously and out of bad faith (“Asi se alejara toda imputacion de precipitacion 
y  encono que la mala fe  quiera attribuirle”)15 Juarez, devoted to the rule of law his 
whole life, was not going to overturn the verdict of the military court that found all three 
guilty. This in no way meant that Juarez was bloodthirsty and seeking revenge. Only 
these three would be executed, for Juarez commuted the death sentence for other less 
prominent opponents depending on the seriousness of their crimes (“A los mas 
prisioneros los he indultado la pena capital en otra proporcionada a sus crimenes.)76 On 
June 17, two days before the execution order was to be carried out for Maximilian, Mejia,
73 Pancho Villa would do the same thing when chased by U.S. forces under General John Pershing in 1916, 
after his raid on Columbus, NM. See John S. D. Eisenhower, Intervention: The United States and the 
M exican Revolution, 1913-1917, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993. Chapters 17-19.
74 Juarez to Santacilia, May 22,1867, Arckivos Privados, pp.218-221.
75 Ibid., p. 218.
76 Ibid., June 10,1867, p. 220.
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and Miramon, Juarez wrote simply to Santacilia that clemency had been denied (Fue 
denegada a Maximiliano, Miramon y  Mejia la gracia de indulto. En la manana del dia
7719 del corriente deben ser ejecutados.)
The larger question of republican Mexico’s agency in the ouster of the French 
remains open for debate. Seward applied and maintained constant diplomatic pressure on 
the Europeans from the time of the European debt-collecting mission in late 1861. He 
told Napoleon IH repeatedly that a monarchy erected on a republic would not be tolerated 
in Mexico. However, he never explicitly threatened France with military force, and, 
indeed, would not have been in a position to do so until the Civil War ended. This 
explains Romero’s reference to the “moral influence” of the U.S. being one of “several 
factors” that led to success. Other factors in the ouster of the French that had nothing to 
do with the U.S. included Maximilian’s haplessness and Carlota’s meddling in state 
affairs. In the midst of their imperial pretensions, they never really understood the 
precariousness of their position. They had numerous indications that all was not well and 
that their support did not extend far beyond the walls of Chapultepec Palace but chose to 
ignore them all.
Assigning blame for the failure of Maximilian and the French is relatively easy. 
Determining just who deserves credit for republican Mexico’s victory is somewhat more 
difficult. The drain on the French treasury caused by the Intervention forces, along with 
French command and control issues in Mexico, eventually compromised French military 
effectiveness. The French parliament became increasingly outspoken against the 
enterprise, as did famous writers like Victor Hugo.78 Prussia menacing France’s northern 
border forced Napoleon III to consider whether or not he was adequately prepared to 
fight a war on two fronts.79 In the final analysis, however, Seward’s constant pressure,
77 Ibid., June 17,1867, p. 221.
78 A plaque containing H ugo’s words o f  encouragement to the Mexicans opposing the French at Puebla on 
May 5th, 1862 is prominently displayed at the museum in Puebla memorializing the Cinco de Mayo battle.
79 D.P. Crook, The North, the South, and the Powers 1861-1865, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1974, pp, 367-8.
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the lion’s share of the credit for leaving Mexico free of foreign military domination by 
the summer of 1867. This was Seward’s crowning diplomatic achievement.
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CONCLUSION 
COTTON A SHADE BETTER
William Henry Seward turned over the State Department to Hamilton Fish, 
another former U.S. Senator from New York, when Ulysses Grant assumed the 
presidency in March 1869. After roughly four decades, Seward was through with active 
involvement in national politics. Seward had sealed his political fate by alienating 
Radical Republicans early in the Lincoln Administration, by supporting President 
Andrew Johnson, and by advocating greater reconciliation towards the former 
Confederacy during Reconstruction. Insofar as the Radical Republicans were now 
ascendant in national politics, Seward had become extraneous.1
Seward turned sixty-eight two months after Grant’s inauguration and had but 
three years and seven months left to live. With the exception of a brief hiatus, he had 
been in public life since his first election to the New York State senate as an Antimason 
in 1830. The injuries he suffered in the coordinated attack the night of Lincoln's 
assassination had left him disfigured, and the paralysis that would eventually kill him in 
1872 was now moving up his right arm.3 He had every right to retire to his hometown of 
Auburn, New York and receive the acclamations of its citizens, and visits from prominent 
admirers.
Instead, Seward chose to travel the world. He was always interested in expanding 
both his mind and his horizons, and upon leaving office he had expressed an interest in 
learning more about Mexico firsthand. In the summer of 1869, Seward traveled cross­
country by rail and visited Alaska, the newest acquisition of the U.S., which was now
1T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, Madison: U. o f  Wisconsin Press, 1941, pp. 382-4; Hans 
Trefousse, The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard fo r  Racial Justice, N Y : Knopf, 1969, p. 152, pp. 
240-41, Chapters IX and X.
2 Glyndon Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, NY: Oxford U. Press, 1967, pp. 14-15.
3 Seward biographer John M. Taylor speculates that Seward may have been suffering from amytrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS), better known as Lou Gehrig’s Disease, Taylor, William Henry Seward, p. 295.
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U.S. territory largely through Seward’s efforts. Once back in California Seward decided 
to take up an offer that had been made earlier, according to his son and secretary 
Frederick:
Regarding him [Seward] as the chief defender of the Mexicans in their long 
struggle with the European Powers, the Mexican Government had cordially 
invited my father to visit their country, see the people whom he had befriended, 
and accept their hospitalities. Now that he was free from official cares and was 
travelling so near their frontiers the invitation was renewed.4 
The Sewards and their party spent from October 1869 until January 1870 in Mexico, 
traversing the country from Manzanillo on the Pacific coast to Veracruz on the Gulf [see 
map p. v].5 The details o f the journey itself, recorded by Frederick, were arduous enough 
in themselves; for such a journey to be undertaken by a relatively ill septuagenarian was 
astonishing. When the party finally reached Mexico City in mid-November, 1869 after 
roughly six weeks of overland travel, it was met by Romero, who was then Minister of 
Finance; Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and the American 
Charge, Mr. Nelson. In a telling display of respect for a private citizen, President Juarez, 
his wife, and daughter met the party, now escorted by cavalry, a few miles further on.6 
What ensued was a political love feast that lasted almost a month. The culminating event 
was a banquet at the National Palace for four hundred invitees in Seward’s honor. 
Frederick Seward noted Senor Altamirano’s toast to his father as representative of most:
4 Frederick W. Seward, Reminiscences o f  A War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, 1830-1915, NY: G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1916, p. 390 and seriatim; see also Albert Evans, Our Sister Republic: A Gala Trip through 
Tropical Mexico in 1869-70, Hartford, CT: Columbian, 1870; and The New York Times, Sunday, Jan. 16, 
1870, p. 8 reproduced in the New York Times Digital Archive.
5 As far as the author can tell, this represented the first visit to Mexico by any acting or former U.S. 
Secretary o f  State.
6 Seward was famous for his kindness to individuals. President Romero had sent his wife and family to 
New York while he was avoiding the French in northern Mexico. Romero and Juarez’s son-in-law Pedro 
Santacilia were directly in Charge o f  the presidential family while in the U.S., but Seward made sure 
behind the scenes that they were accorded every consideration. He even made provision for Dona 
Margarita Juarez to travel back to Mexico on the U.S. Wilderness once the hostilities were over. See Van 
Deusen, William Henry Seward, p. 492 and Bernstein, Matias Romero, p. 156.
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It is the apostle of human rights, the defender of the dignity of America, and one 
of the venerable patriarchs of liberty, whom we welcome in our midst, and in 
honour of whom we decorate with flowers our Mexican homes.. .It is not merely 
Seward, the great statesman of the age, Premier of the United States. I see, and 
only wish to see in him, the friend of humanity, the enemy of slavery, and the 
liberator of the bondsman. His heart, his thoughts, his whole life have been 
consumed in the task!7
In his reply Seward reviewed how perilous the situation had been for both Mexico 
and the Union in 1861. He pointed out that European powers had tried to take advantage 
of the internal difficulties besetting both countries. He ended with a rousing defense of 
Mexico and hemispheric republicanism:
In that hour of supreme trial, I thought I knew, better than the enemies of our 
cause, the resources, the energies, and the virtues of the imperilled [sic] nation. 
The United States became, for the first time, in sincerity and earnestness, the 
friend and ally of every other Republican State in America, and all the Republican 
States became, from that hour, the friends and allies of the United States.8 
Whatever had been the case before Seward’s visit, all rancor appeared to dissipate 
in this series of official banquets and balls in Mexico City in December of 1869. 
Representatives of the two countries spoke as allies who had worked together feverishly, 
if not always amicably, against a common foe. What reverberated in the toasts was an 
admiration for Union efforts to abolish slavery and to respect the rights of man. Lincoln 
was viewed as the great champion of that struggle, and Seward, who had been targeted 
with Lincoln, and whose scars from the encounter were now visible for all to see, sat 
before them with their own Juarez as a witnesses to the struggle. Rather than appearing 
merely as the desperately poor and disorganized neighbor to the south, Mexico was at last
7 F.W. Seward, Reminiscences, p. 413.
8 Ibid. p. 414.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
170
able to throw open the doors of its palaces and gardens, and show Seward firsthand what 
had been at stake. Seward reacted to this hospitality:
You will readily believe that I am impressed with the scenes of this new and most 
magnificent festival. The Government has but intimated its wish and the 
intelligence, the enterprise, the learning, the art, the beauty, the wit, the taste and 
the gayety [sic] of the Capital [Mexico City], immediately, as if by magic, 
surround me. What Capital in any country could present a more refined 
entertainment, I know of none.9
Seward’s goodwill mission in 1869-70 showed that Mexicans could be extremely 
magnanimous if shown the proper respect. They were willing to let bygones be bygones 
as long as both parties displayed good faith and treated each other as equals. Admittedly 
articulating such a position was somewhat easier once Seward was out of office. Seward 
was gracious, and was not about to insult his Mexican hosts. On the other hand, the 
Mexicans knew it was impossible for their country to remain isolated from what became 
known as the “Colossus of the North,” and Mexican suspicions about U.S. intentions 
probably remained unspoken during the festivities.10
This does not mean that Seward was merely opportunistic in his sanguine 
comments about Mexico. He reflected on the meaning of his Mexico trip sometime later 
in a “Speech on his Travels, March, 1870.”11 Written out in longhand, the draft does not 
indicate exactly when or where the speech was given. There are a number of edits in the 
text, and just what version may have been spoken is not clear. Nevertheless, the speech’s 
sixty-odd pages give an overview of Seward’s thinking about a number of global issues. 
Seward wrote, “the name of Mexico awakens intense emotions, though of various sorts, 
everywhere among the American people.” Having reviewed the writings of various
9 “Speech o f  William H. Seward at the National Ball, Dec. 18,1869, The Papers o f  William H. Seward, 
microfilm, reel #187, #6457, Rochester, NY: University o f  Rochester Rare Books and Special Collections,
10 Michael C. Meyer, “Mexican Views o f  the United States,” in W. Dirk Raat and William H. Beezley, eds., 
Twentieth-Century Mexico, Lincoln, NB: U. o f  Nebraska Press, 1986, pp. 286-300.
11 “Speech on his travels, March, 1870,” Ibid., #6461, pp. 33-50.
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American “publicists” on Mexico, Seward wondered why they seemed to reproach 
Mexicans for being “grave and even sad in their address and demeanor.” Seward pointed 
out that Mexico had undergone “a severe experience” and that, rather than reproaching 
Mexico for her history, that experience should commend the Mexicans “more than any 
other nation to the sympathies, support and favor of the United States.” He went on to a 
brief but accurate assessment of how Mexico’s economy was intertwined with its caste 
structure, and noted that once the Spaniards arrived, Mexico had been “practically denied 
the advantages of a foreign immigration.” Seward was noting the lack of mobility in 
colonial Mexico, where the Catholic Church dominated practically everything. In turn, 
Spaniards from Spain dominated the Church.
Seward went on to say that, in spite of all of these impediments to change, many 
Mexicans had been inspired by the American and French Revolutions, and wanted to 
make Mexico “a free, equal, federal Republic, in all respects like the United States.” In 
order to do this, Mexicans had to overcome the Spanish legacy of three “radical evils 
incompatible with the desired Republican system.” The first evil, slavery, “having taken 
feeble root,” was abolished in the 1820s, shortly after independence. The second evil, 
what Seward called the “monarchical principle,” was not eradicated until the failure of 
the French Intervention and the execution of Maximilian. The third evil, the 
“ecclesiastical principle,” or the monolithic social control exercised by the Catholic 
Church, which Seward said had always aligned itself with the “monarchical principle,” 
did not “expire until both met a common fate in the restoration of the Republican 
Constitution in 1867.”
Seward was right about slavery, although debt peonage existed, and, well into the 
twentieth century, may still exist in rural locations.12 The monarchical principle ended
12 This is a system whereby peasants borrow for their needs against their agricultural production. The value 
o f  their borrowing almost always exceeds the value o f  their production, hence they are always in debt. In 
the nineteenth century, they could not move until all their debts were paid. It was not slavery per se, but 
the system replicated many o f  slavery’s evils. Jaime Suchlicki, Mexico: From Montezuma to the Fall o f  the 
PR1, 2nd ed., Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2001, pp. 46-7.
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with Maximilian, but that did not prevent Mexico from adopting a political system for 
most of the twentieth century that consolidated political power in a single party.13 
Seward was wrong about the expiration of the power of the Catholic Church. It no longer 
had its monolithic quality, but its hold on the national psyche remained, and its influence 
is still a major factor in modem Mexico.14
In this “Speech,” Seward also speculated on the future role of the U.S. in a 
republican Mexico. Seward’s record in the U.S. Senate, along with his efforts to acquire 
territory like Alaska, merited his characterization as an expansionist, as Walter LaFeber, 
Thomas Schoonover, Ernest Paolino, and Joseph Whelan have pointed out in their works. 
Yet after his trip to Mexico, Seward appeared to have second thoughts about the extent of 
future American involvement in that country. He said that many o f those he encountered 
wanted the U.S. to absorb Mexico, as "it was necessary and desirable for its [Mexico’s] 
peace and prosperity.” He quickly added that for every such person there were a 
hundred, or five hundred, who were “proud of their native resources and devoted to the 
integrity and independence of Mexico.” The indigenous Mexicans whom he met were 
“unanimous” in feeling this way.
Seward was no Pollyanna, and these thoughts represented his mature reflection 
after his trip, not a toast to be given in Mexico during a ball in his honor. He noted that 
the Congress of Mexico was “not altogether wise” in its financial legislation and he 
anticipated a period o f economic stagnation due to the depredations of war and the 
disinclination of various European powers to come to Mexico’s aid. Referring to 
“industrial immigration,” by which he clearly meant investment, Seward said that it 
would not be easy to promise much “for the present,” but that, given the situation, the
13 The Partido Revolucionario Institutional, called PRI (pronounced PREE), ruled Mexico for roughly 
seventy years, from the 1930s to 2000.
14 Luis Gonzalez y Gonzalez, “The Christeros o f  San Jose,” pp. 168-174 and David C. Bailey “The Church 
since 1940,” pp. 236-42, in Raat and Beezley, Twentieth-Century Mexico.
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U.S. would “monopolize all advantages of that sort.” What Seward said he could 
promise was the:
forbearance, charity, sympathy and friendship on the part of my country. If left 
undisturbed by foreign nations, the existing population of Mexico seems to me 
adequate to work out for that wonderful country an enviable destiny. I was 
emphatic in the expression of a desire that the United States and Mexico might 
remain, as they now are, not enemies, but friends and allies.15 
This speech reflected Seward’s genuine affection for Mexico and its future. It 
also laid out, in rough form, the nature of Mexican-U.S. bilateral relations until the 
Mexican Revolution in 1910. During that period, the U.S. would relate to Mexico 
primarily through investment, the “dollars over dominion” of which Thomas Schoonover 
writes. That investment would help to stabilize the economy, build the infrastructure, and 
hopefully produce order and tranquillity in a society that desperately needed both. The 
mechanism of this process is detailed by historian David Pletcher’s Rails, Mines and 
Progress: Seven American Promoters in Mexico, 1867-1911, his study of U.S. 
investment in Mexico between the restoration of Juarez in i 867 and the Mexican 
Revolution in 1910. According to Pletcher, the “annual commerce of the United States 
with Mexico increased from about $7,000,000 to $117,000,000” during that period.16 He 
maintains that, by 1911, Mexico “was truly an economic satellite of the United States,” 
receiving perhaps as much as forty per cent of the total of U.S. overseas investment. The 
implications of such a mammoth transfer of wealth are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. What is clear is that the role of American investment in Mexico continues to 
be one of the most controversial topics affecting the two countries.
15 W.H. Seward, “Speech on Travels,” March, 1870, pp. 49-50.
!6 David Pletcher, Rails, Mines and Progress: Seven American Promoters in Mexico, 1867-1911, Ithaca: 
Cornell U. Press, 1958, p. 3. See also Smith, Talons o f  the Eagle, chapters 9 and 10, and Langley, Mexico 
and the United States, chapters 2 ,4 , and 5.
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Seward cannot be blamed for the way in which U.S. investments in railroads, 
mines, and oil may have exacerbated pre-existing tensions in Mexican society. In 1869, 
Seward was basing his hopes for Mexico on his experience in the United States, both as a 
governor and U.S. Senator. He had seen the growth in the standard of living that 
improvements to the infrastructure could bring about. Infrastructure improvements led to 
more economic activity that in turn led to more employment. The system had obvious 
flaws, and abuses of it became rampant in the U.S. in the late nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, Seward’s hopes for Mexico in 1870 were not as yet tinged with the cruel 
truth that economic order based on investment capitalism could lead to economic 
exploitation if not regulated. Nor could he have known that the wealth generated by new 
investments would be so inequitably distributed. He could not have envisioned that the 
stability of which he spoke as being a pre-condition for Mexican progress would have an 
entirely different meaning for Porfirio Diaz when he became president of Mexico.
Seward understood geopolitics and knew that Mexico’s Tehuantepec isthmus was 
a logical choice for a railroad or canal to link the Atlantic to the Pacific. He could see 
how critical possession or control of such an area would be both militarily and 
economically in the future. If the Caribbean were to become an “American lake,” then 
the control of both ends of that lake had to be in U.S. hands. His visit to Asia in 1870-71 
confirmed his belief that the future of the U.S. export economy might well be more 
oriented to the Pacific than to the Atlantic. The acquisition of Alaska fit perfectly into his 
view of the U.S. as a westward-looking power. Ernest Paolino writes:
Seward had conceived an idea of empire as serviceable in another day as it had 
been in his. The idea was simply that the United States should possess the 
commercial hegemony of the world. By virtue of its superior political, moral, and 
commercial institutions, Seward believed America was destined to dominate the 
trade routes and markets of the globe, and especially of Asia.17
17 Paolino, Foundations o f  the American Empire, p. 210.
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It is Seward’s legacy that he had such a vision, and that he accomplished so much 
towards its realization during his lifetime. Later, greed and political shortsightedness on 
both sides of the border would squander the warm relations that Seward had try to forge 
with Mexico. During the military phase of the Mexican revolution, from roughly 1910 to 
1920, the U.S. adopted a stance that was not only unsympathetic, but one that actually led
1 fi
to armed incursions into Mexico in two prominent instances. The Mexican revolution 
was trying to eradicate the influence of Pofirio Diaz that had permeated Mexican politics 
for roughly forty years since the presidencies of Juarez and his successor Sebastian Lerdo 
de Tejada. In so doing, it challenged the close commercial relations between the 
Porfiriata and foreign investors, particularly Americans.19
It had been Seward’s assumption that such a close relation would spawn the 
progressive effects on society that industrial growth had in the U.S. However, without 
anything equivalent to the Progressive Era to speak of in Mexico, the flaws of the 
capitalist system became both more entrenched and widespread up to the revolution in 
1910. Instead of improving the life of the average Mexican, capitalism improved the 
lives o f a few Mexicans who were already rich, and many foreigners. Historian Michael 
Meyer cites two aphorisms that summarize the problems of the Porfiriata. “Poor 
Mexico, so far from God and so near the United States,” was attributed to Diaz himself. 
The second, without attribution, referred to the economic policies of Diaz, whereby 
Mexico had become the “mother of foreigners and the stepmother of Mexicans.”20
18 U.S. Marines occupied Veracruz in 1914 after a perceived slight to the flag, and roughly six-thousand 
U.S. soldies searched for “Pancho” Villa in northern Mexico after he raided Columbus, NM in 1916; see 
Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution 1914-1915: The Convention o f  Aguascalientes, NY: W.W. 
Norton &  Co., 1960, pp. 72-4; Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram, NY: Ballantine Books, 
1994, pp. 47-53; John S. D. Eisenhower, Intervention: The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 
1913-1917, NY: W.W. Norton, 1993, chapters 9 and 10.
19 Thomas Schoonover, Dollars Over Dominion: The Triumph o f  Liberalism in Mexican-United States 
Relations, 1861-1867, Baton Rouge, LO: 1978, pp. 275-6.
20 Michael C. Meyer, “Mexican Views o f  the United States,” in W. Dirk Raat and William Beezley, eds., 
Twentieth Century Mexico, Lincoln: U. o f Nebraska Press, 1986, pp. 288,290.
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Another criticism that emerges from Seward’s handling of the French in Mexico 
is that he never took seriously Mexico as Mexico, either republican under Juarez or 
imperial under Maximilian.21 Seward’s actions and his writings after his visit to Mexico 
indicate that he genuinely cared about Mexico. In devising a strategy to oust the French 
that would address his first priority, the maintenance of the Union, Seward also 
considered how Mexico could be left intact and free of foreign political interference in 
the process. His methods may have appeared dilatory or duplicitous to some like Matias 
Romero or to those hawkish supporters of the Monroe Doctrine in congress like Senator 
McDougall, who thought that nothing short of war, would do. Yet for five years he did 
not waver in his commitment to see a free and democratic Mexico that was also free from 
U.S. military presence. It is indicative of his commitment to that country that he 
undertook to make Mexico his first extended stay outside of the U.S. after his retirement. 
The growth in his respect and understanding for Mexico is reflected in his speeches there 
and his subsequent writings.
Of course, Liberal Mexicans themselves deserve the credit for their tenacity in 
opposing Maximilian and his French supporters. They needed their struggle against the 
French to end, and thus begin the arduous process of rebuilding a country devastated by 
war. Extending the conflict by U.S. entry into a war against the French would have only 
postponed the rebuilding process. For his part, Seward had to be certain that the Civil 
War did not continue under a different guise in Mexico. Historian Robert E. May has 
argued that there had long been a “southern dream” of a slave-based economy that would 
be centered in the Caribbean. Although Mexico had abolished slavery early in the 
century, Maximilian had opened the door to southerners wanting to re-locate to Mexico. 
They could not have “slaves” per se, but the rules governing the white settlers’ “persons 
of color” were tantamount to slavery.22 Seward had to make absolutely certain that such
31 Vasquez & Meyer, Mexico fren te a los Estados Unidos, pp. 70-75.
23 Robert E. May, The Southern Dream o f  a Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861, Gainesville: U. o f Florida 
Press, 2002, pp. 255-57, summarizes Maximilian’s land decree o f  Sept. 5,1865. Confederate immigrants
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a contingency did not come to pass. Once the Liberal government of Juarez was firmly 
reestablished and the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution passed, abolition 
was the law of the land in both the U.S. and Mexico. Legally, at least, the institution that 
had occasioned so much suffering could no longer be a source of potential friction 
between the two neighbors.
Like Mexico, the U.S. also had much healing and rebuilding to do. Seward knew 
that sending U.S. forces into Mexico only twenty years after the Mexican-American War 
would have unpredictable consequences. If history were an indicator and the Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo a roadmap, the U.S. would end up occupying and possibly acquiring 
the territory where its soldiers fought. Even if soldiers were ordered home, their cultural 
influence could prove disruptive, as had happened in Texas. The U.S. did not want to be 
accused of replicating the French experience: setting up a government against Mexico’s 
wishes by dint of force. This Seward steadfastly refused to do. He had started out faithful 
to republican principles in Mexico, and remained so throughout his tenure at the 
Department of State.
Various factors had, of course, complicated Seward’s diplomacy. The Juarez 
government was actively pursuing U.S. military aid in order to oust Maximilian and the 
French. Not helping Juarez militarily may have been prescient in the long run, as neither 
Mexico nor the U.S. desired American troops to be in Mexico for an indeterminate time. 
However, in 1865-1866, republican Mexicans did not see it that way. As previously 
noted, Mexican Minister Romero spent much of his time in 1865-1866 with General 
Grant and various Radical Republican members of Congress, trying to fashion a “rescue” 
attempt for Mexican republicanism that would have been an American invasion under a 
different name. Seward’s estimation to Romero about what such an invasion would cost
could bring former slaves. “Persons o f color” would be peons, like Mexican workers, for not less than five 
and not more than ten years. Runaways were to be returned to their owners. Matthew F. Maury, a 
Confederate who advised Maximilian on immigration, “hinted o f  the reestablishment o f slavery in Mexico 
in some o f  his letters.”
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has already been cited: a Mexican state for every million dollars loaned, an acre o f 
Mexican territory for every U.S. soldier engaged. Republican Mexico easily won the 
final confrontation with Maximilian, but in the words of Ralph Roeder, “it was due in no 
small measure to his [Seward’s] management, acting as umpire and timekeeper, that the 
field was cleared for the final event. .  .”23
Seward knew as well as Juarez and Romero that republican Mexico had more to 
fear from its potential American liberators than its current French oppressors. Indeed, 
subsequent Mexican criticism of Juarez and Romero focused specifically on the “devil’s 
bargain” that Juarez and Romero were prepared to make with the U.S. military to oust the 
French.24 The diehards fighting the French and Maximilian wanted all foreigners out of 
Mexico. They had suffered foreign exploitation since 1519, and despite payments made 
by the U.S. to preserve appearances, they had seen roughly half of Mexico rendered to 
the U.S. in 1848 and 1853.25
As already noted, keeping the U.S. military out of Mexico was not synonymous 
with excluding U.S. influence from Mexico. Seward had been an expansionist his whole 
life, and acquiring territory that could be useful to the U.S. characterized his stewardship 
at the State Department. Even when his popularity had hit a low in 1867 because of his 
unwavering support o f President Johnson, he managed to convince Congress to pay for 
the acquisition of Alaska, a purchase that today might be viewed as an addition as 
important as the Louisiana Purchase. He actively pursued and almost succeeded in 
acquiring the Virgin Islands and Samana Bay in Santo Domingo. An earthquake and a 
hurricane caused the Senate to rethink the wisdom of acquiring the Virgin Islands from 
Denmark for $7.5 million, but Seward’s perspicacity was re-affirmed when the 
government spent more than three times that much ($25 million) to acquire them in 1917.
23 Ralph Roeder, Juarez and His Mexico'. A Biographical History, vol. II, NY: Viking Press, 1974, p. 662.
24 Celerino Salmeron, Las Grandes Traiciones de Juarez: Vistas a traves de sus Tratados con Inglaterra, 
Francia, Espana y  Estados Unidos, 10"' ed., Mexico City, 1986; Martin Quirarte, Historiografia Sobre El 
Imperio de Maximiliano, Mexico City, UNAM, 1970.
25 Treaty o f  Guadalupe-Hidalgo and Gadsden Purchase.
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All Seward wanted in Santo Domingo was Samana Bay because of its excellent harbor. 
He almost got this for one million dollars in cash and one million dollars worth o f arms, 
but political turbulence there upset the negotiations.26
These acquisitions, or attempted acquisitions, differed from Mexico in that they 
related to projecting or protecting expanding U.S. sea power or communications 
capability. Alaska was a sparsely populated colonial outpost of the Russian Empire. The 
Russian Empire needed money, and Seward saw the value of Alaska’s timber and fish 
long before petroleum became a factor. However, it was mainly Alaska’s usefulness as a 
site for coaling stations and repair facilities that interested him. Alaska could also be 
useful in extending cable lines for international telegraphy. The Virgin Islands and Santo 
Domingo could play an important geopolitical role in protecting the link between the 
Atlantic and Pacific once a canal linking the two was constructed. As Ernest Paolino 
points out, all o f these acquisitions could potentially have a military use, but their real 
utility was in allowing the U.S. merchant fleet to expand American commerce.27
Mexico, on the other hand, posed problems for an expansionist far more complex 
than those posed by scattered islands and bays. Mexico was an evolved, populated 
country with a complex history. Part of that history was an unmistakable xenophobia, 
and the words that unleashed the peasant uprising in 1810 leading to Mexican 
independence from Spain that have come down to us from Miguel Hidalgo had an 
ominous ring for any future occupiers:
. .  .Will you free yourselves? Will you recover the lands stolen three hundred 
years ago from your forefathers by the hated Spaniards? Will you not defend 
your religion and your rights as true patriots? Long live our Lady of Guadalupe! 
Death to bad government! Death to the gachupines [Spaniards, bom in Spain]!28
26 Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, pp. 529 and 549; Taylor, William Henry Seward, pp. 274-5.
27 Emest Paolino, The Foundations o f  the American Empire: William H enry Seward and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1973, pp. x, 118-20,122, 128.
28 Meyer, Course o f  Mexican History, p. 276.
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It was military conquest and exploitation that most Mexicans hated, and Seward 
was wise to have avoided the re-appearance of such in the guise of a rescue mission. He 
sensed that involving U.S. troops in Mexico would lead to a long guerilla war of attrition 
and permanent hatred of the U.S. After the carnage of the Civil War, Seward found such 
a possibility unacceptable.
Faithfulness is another characteristic that emerges from an overview of Seward’s 
activities in many arenas. He had been faithful to President Lincoln, which had been 
relatively easy, and to President Johnson, which had been much harder. In the case of 
Mexico, he never abandoned his hope that republicanism would prevail despite 
staggering odds. He refused to recognize Maximilian after most European powers had 
already done so. Although the question is open to lively debate, it can be argued that 
Seward gave as much aid to the Juarez government as he could under the circumstances. 
Although that aid may have been mostly “moral” in the eyes of Romero, or symbolic, 
Seward did what he could with the means at his disposal. Once the Civil War was over, 
Seward moved quickly to ratchet up real diplomatic pressure, and implied military 
pressure, to achieve the rapid exit of the French. He remained true to his analytical 
conclusion that monarchies were finished in the New World, and his heartfelt devotion to 
republican principles. It is no wonder that his gravestone in Auburn reads “He Was 
Faithful.”29
President Lincoln reciprocated Seward’s loyalty. Once Lincoln made it clear that 
Seward was not going to function as Prime Minister per his April Fool’s Memorandum in 
1861, Seward never again attempted to usurp his chiefs authority. Lincoln, in turn, 
entrusted his Secretary of State with great power, allowing him to take the lead on the 
administration’s foreign policy. Lincoln would review some of Seward’s dispatches, but 
the president was far too occupied with domestic matters to devote much attention to 
foreign affairs, about which he admittedly knew little. Lincoln returned Seward’s loyalty
29 John Taylor, William Henry Seward, p. 296.
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by backing him up during the cabinet crisis of 1862, when Radicals in the Congress and 
some fellow Cabinet members wanted Seward out. The contention of Jay Monaghan and 
Dean Mahin that Lincoln was the architect of Union foreign policy does not seem to 
stand up to the evidence that most of the initiatives were Seward’s. That was even more 
the case once Johnson replaced Lincoln, particularly in matters relating to Mexico.
Seward’s loyalty to President Johnson was more problematical, and his later 
comment to Drouyn de Lhuys about “bearing the responsibilities of all his chiefs errors” 
may refer more to his time in the Johnson administration than in that of Lincoln.30 
Seward had agreed with Lincoln that punishing the Confederacy would only prolong 
national healing. He concurred with the sentiments expressed in Lincoln’s Second 
Inaugural, and thought that Johnson did too. Johnson, however, proved far too 
conciliatory to those from the former Confederacy who had no intention of changing, and 
far too antagonistic to those Radical Republicans who insisted that they should. Seward’s 
domestic political capital was expended in the ensuing tug-of-war between the executive 
and legislative branches. The “Swing” proved to be Seward’s political swan song, and in 
staying loyal to Johnson and in helping with his impeachment defense, Seward ceased to 
be a factor in Republican politics. Grant and the Radicals were in the ascendancy 
roughly from the time the House Judiciary Committee started looking into impeachable 
presidential offenses in January 1867. Seward still had diplomatic triumphs, notably 
engineering the acquisition of Alaska and the bloodless removal of the French from 
Mexico. His final triumphs were his voyages to Mexico and his trip around the world.
His last one began in August 1870. His son George and his wife, who were en 
route to Shanghai where George was to be the new U.S. consul, accompanied Seward.
An old political friend, Hanson Risley, was also along, chaperoning his two daughters, 
Olive and Harriett.31 Rumors circulated in Washington about Seward’s infatuation with
30 See note #21 on Drouyn de Lhuys interview later in this Conclusion
31 Hanson Risley was a faithful Seward-Weed political supporter who was rewarded for his loyalty with 
jobs in New York and the Treasury Dept, in Washington. Olive was the older, having been bom around
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Olive. Gideon Welles, ever eager to comment on his colleague’s perceived foibles, said 
he disbelieved the rumors, but could not resist writing:
There is much gossip in relation to a projected marriage between Secretary 
Seward and a Miss [Olive] Risley. He is in his sixty-eighth year and she in her 
twenty-eighth. I give the rumor no credit. Yet his conduct is calculated to make 
gossip. For the last six weeks he has passed my house daily to visit her, is taking 
her out to ride, etc., etc. Says he is an old friend of the family.32 
The girls’ father left the party in San Francisco. In Shanghai the others members 
of the party left, George stayed at his consular post, and Seward was left to traverse the 
rest of the world in the company of Harriet and Olive. To stop the gossips, Seward 
adopted Olive, and made out his will in November 1870, dividing his wealth between his 
sons and his adopted daughter.33
After spending three months in India, the small entourage visited Egypt, the Holy 
Land, Vienna, Venice, Rome, Naples, Florence and Geneva before arriving in Paris in 
August. When he finally got back to Auburn, Seward calculated that the trip had lasted 
fourteen months and covered forty-four thousand miles.34 In Paris, Seward met with 
former French Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys. In this encounter, Seward elaborated 
on his perception of the French Intervention and his strategy to end it. Even though, by 
the time he reached Paris, his upper body was practically paralyzed, he nevertheless 
retained his spirit of adventure and optimism, and, above all, his keen intellect. The only 
witness to the interview with Drouyn de Lhuys was one “Mr. O’Sullivan.. .  a resident 
there [Paris] who had been connected with the American diplomatic service,” whose 
recollection of the meeting Frederick Seward copied into his Reminiscences,35 After
1840, Harriet around 1846. Olive was about the same age as Seward’s daughter, who had passed away in 
1866.
32 Welles, Diary, III, p. 449.
33 Van Deusen, Seward, p. 558-9.
34 Ibid., Seward, p. 561.
35 F.W. Seward, Reminiscences, pp. 420-428.
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exchanging pleasantries and catching up on former acquaintances, Drouyn de Lhuys 
asked Seward for his opinion o f Napoleon III, whom Seward had met once as Louis 
Napoleon when he was in exile in the U.S., and once as emperor in Compiegne in 1859. 
Seward expressed his disappointment:
I could not believe it possible that a European statesman who had visited the 
United States would fail to see that the combination of the States [Union] was 
impregnable, and that the American continent should never again be the theatre of 
European aggression or invasion.36 
O’Sullivan pointed out that Antoine Thouvenel had been the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs when all of the initial decisions about the Intervention had been taken, and that 
Drouyn de Lhuys was forced to carry out policies with which he disagreed. Drouyn de 
Lhuys concurred, and Seward reportedly replied:
I can well understand this now, though I did not then. From the time of Joseph in 
the Court of Pharaoh, until now, it has been the hard task of a prime minister to 
give up all the merits of his own opinions to his chief, and to bear himself the 
responsibilities of all the chiefs errors.
Charles Lavalette replaced Drouyn de Lhuys just before the evacuation of French 
troops in 1867, and therefore Drouyn asked Seward for an update on U.S. thinking during 
the evacuation. Seward said that in the fall of 1866, the new French Minister to 
Washington, Montholon, brought him a communication from Napoleon III requesting 
that instead of withdrawing French troops in three parts, starting in November 1866 and 
ending in November 1867, he wanted to withdraw them all at once in March 1867. 
Seward said that although he basically trusted Napoleon ffl’s promise of withdrawal, 
domestic political exigencies in the U.S. would not allow him to accept any delay in the 
agreed upon timetable. Fearing the wrath of the U.S. Congress that was about to meet, 
and the machinations of Grant and Romero, Seward said of Napoleon Ill’s communique:
36 Seward, quoted by O ’Sullivan in F.W. Seward, Reminiscences, p. 424.
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It was sure to be unsatisfactory to them [Congress] and the public . . .  General 
Grant, with the Mexican Legation urging him on one side, and a powerful party in 
Congress on the other [Radical Republicans], was inclined to send an army into 
Mexico to expel the French. I knew this was unnecessary. I knew it was easier to 
send an American army into Mexico than it was to get it out again.37 
Seward then went on to explain his understanding of the Monroe Doctrine, saying that it 
was the responsibility of the U.S. to save republics in the Western Hemisphere from 
takeover by monarchies. Seward then emphasized that the Monroe Doctrine did not 
allow the U.S. to “absorb them by fraud or force.”
Indeed, after the French Intervention, the Monroe Doctrine was only challenged 
once again, when the U.S. was drawn into a border dispute between Great Britain and 
Venezuela in 1895. President Grover Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Richard 
Olney, invoked the Monroe Doctrine to warn Great Britain that its involvement in 
Venezuela was becoming unacceptable. Olney explained that “any permanent political 
union between a European and an American state [was] unnatural and inexpedient.”38 
Olney went on to write the memorable phrase that moved the Monroe Doctrine from 
being essentially a defensive doctrine to an offensive one: “Today the United States is 
practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it 
confines its interposition.”39
The Olney quote makes clear that Seward’s limited interpretation of the Monroe 
Doctrine was not heeded by subsequent U.S. leaders, especially Presidents Grover 
Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson. The idea of moving from merely 
protecting American republics from forced European re-colonization, to preemptively 
intervening in their affairs, was furthered by President Theodore Roosevelt’s “Corollary”
37 Ibid., p. 427.
38 Quoted in Thomas Paterson et. al, American Foreign Relations, Vol. I: A History to 1920, 5'1' ed„
Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 2000, p. 202.
39 Ibid., p. 202.
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to the Monroe Doctrine. Fearing in 1904 that Germany might forcibly take over the 
Dominican Republic to repay debts, Roosevelt addressed the U.S. Senate in 1905: 
Chronic wrongdoing. . .  may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require 
intervention by some civilized nation and in the Western Hemisphere the 
adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United 
States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to 
the exercise of an international police power.40 
In essence, Roosevelt said that the United States could now do what it had been 
prohibiting European countries from doing.
This concept of intervening politically and militarily in Latin American affairs 
reached its zenith in the spring of 1916. President Woodrow Wilson abhorred the 
Mexican Revolution, and particularly General Victoriano Huerta who had taken over in 
1913, after the assassination of Mexican President Francisco Madero. Wilson considered 
the Mexican Revolution as much of moral affront as a political one. In that regard, he 
once told a British interviewer, “ I am going to teach the South American Republics to 
elect good men!”41
In March 1916, citing a bandit raid on Columbus, New Mexico by Francisco 
“Pancho” Villa, Woodrow Wilson dispatched a U.S. “Punitive Expedition” into Mexico 
to capture Villa. The expedition never found Villa and left Mexico in February 1917.
The bitter feelings against the U.S. engendered by this intervention were precisely the 
sort that Seward was trying to avoid in the 1860s42 Seward had been interested in 
protecting Mexico from European monarchical intervention. He was not interested in 
replacing European political-military influence in Mexico with that of the U.S.
40 President Theodore Roosevelt quoted in Eric Foner and John Garraty, The Reader's Companion to 
American History, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1991; Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History o f  the 
United States, 4" ed., NY: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1955, pp. 527-29.
41 Woodrow Wilson quoted in John Eisenhower, Intervention! The United States and the Mexican 
Revolution, 1913-1917, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993, p. 32.
42 Josefina Z. Vazquez and Lorenzo Meyer, The United States and Mexico, Chicago: U. o f  Chicago Press, 
1985, p. 2.
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Describing his reception in Mexico, Seward said to Drouyn de Lhuys, “It was a pleasant 
experience in Mexico, to receive the thanks of the President [Juarez] and his ministers for 
my agency in procuring the withdrawal of the French army without sending the United 
States force to expel it.”43
To say that Seward’s contribution to evicting the French amounted to merely 
traditional diplomacy, accompanied by saber rattling at opportune moments, is to lose 
sight of the many obstacles he encountered along the way. He had kept England and 
France from formally recognizing the Confederacy. His official diplomats and spies in 
Europe had outmaneuvered their Confederate counterparts, and revealed information 
concerning shipbuilding that Seward had been able to use to his diplomatic advantage.
He had also outfoxed General Grant and Matias Romero, particularly in his shunting of 
General John Schofield to Paris. Along the way, Seward made a conscious effort not to 
paint France into a comer, nor had he overtly insulted French “honor.” It was the belief of 
Seward and several others in the Cabinet, notably Montgomery Blair, that Napoleon III 
would have been compelled to fight the U.S. had France been insulted or its soldiers 
directly attacked by U.S. troops.
Domestically, Seward had stayed in office, no small feat in itself. He managed to 
survive the criticism of his colleagues in the Cabinet, and his former Radical Republican 
friends in the Senate. It has often been said that “luck is the most important commodity 
in politics,” and Lincoln and Seward had enough of it to be re-elected in 1864, even 
though Lincoln thought their chances were slim earlier in the year.
One quality that permitted Seward to overcome adversity was his sense of humor. 
For example, although he always spoke of Lincoln with reverence, and did not like to 
dwell on the events of April 14,1865, he did not shy from some self-deprecating humor. 
While visiting India in the course of his around-the-world trip, he was shown two
43 Ibid., p. 428.
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telegrams. Noting that India was rapidly becoming an alternative source of cotton at the 
end of the Civil War and that its shares were traded in London, the first telegram read: 
“London, April 15th, Lincoln Shot, Seward murdered.”
The second:
“London, April 16th, Lincoln dead. Seward not dead. Cotton a shade better.”44 
That Seward shared such an anecdote with his former French diplomatic adversary is 
indicative of how he managed not to take himself too seriously. Indeed, it was Seward’s 
sense of humor, and appreciation of a good joke or story, that made him close to Lincoln. 
Van Deusen recounts a good example of the Lincoln-Seward repartee. Lincoln 
reportedly swore rarely, but Seward rather freely. Once while in a carriage together in 
Washington, the muledriver was cursing his recalcitrant animals. As reported by 
newspaperman Noah Brooks, who was along for the ride, Lincoln queried the muledriver: 
“Excuse me, my friend, are you an Episcopalian?”
“No, Mr. President,” replied the man. “I am a Methodist.”
“Well,” said Lincoln, “I thought you must be an Episcopalian, because you swear just 
like Governor Seward, who is a church warden.”45
But of all his qualities, it was Seward’s intelligence that seemed to have carried
him through. Practically, he was able to find ways to outmaneuver most of his
\
adversaries, notably Romero and Grant. On a loftier plane, he had a view of the United 
States in the world that exceeded that of most of his peers. That view grew from his 
formal education at Union College, his extensive experience in government, his travels, 
his numerous contacts and his prodigious reading. From this mix Seward distilled a view 
of American pre-eminence in the world based on its democratic principles and its 
dynamic economy. In Seward’s view, the U.S. had boundless potential if only the 
scourge of slavery could be abolished, and the Union re-established on amicable terms at
44 Ibid. p. 428.
45 Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, pp. 335-6.
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the end of the Civil War. He would have preferred to avoid bloodshed amongst 
Americans, but faced with the inevitability of war, he harnessed all his energies to 
President Lincoln’s to assure that slaveholders would not prevail.
He knew that it was critical that the Union win the Civil War for any number of 
reasons. In the case of Mexico, he knew if Confederate influence was allowed to 
establish itself, there was the possibility that the horrors of slavery would continue as 
slaveholders found ways to continue that practice there. The government of Napoleon III 
preferred the Confederacy to the Union, and Maximilian’s government would have 
promoted French policy had it ever really gotten established. Unfortunately for France, 
the crucial year the French lost in taking Puebla between1862 and 1863 meant that the 
Union was that much closer to victory when Napoleon III was finally in a position to 
implement his plans for Mexico. In that sense, the Cinco de Mayo had great significance 
not only for republican Mexico, but also for the Union.
As for Seward’s greater legacy, his role in determining the direction of U.S. 
foreign policy for the remainder of the nineteenth century, and indeed until today, is still 
apparent. Frederic Bancroft, writing in 1900, a decade after Seward’s death, praised 
Seward’s diplomacy:
Notwithstanding his limitations, Seward stands in the front rank of political 
leaders, both on account of the talents he displayed and the services he rendered 
to his country. And he holds the first place among all our Secretaries of State. 
Sumner had more thorough knowledge of international law; Adams was by birth 
and education equipped for diplomacy; Chase had a genius for managing national 
finances in critical times. Stanton was the broad and tireless organizer of the 
physical forces that saved the nation. Seward had dash, a knowledge of political 
conditions, and a versatility such as none of these men possessed, while his 
perfect tact and vigor of intellect, his enthusiasm and inspiring hope, made him
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almost the perfect supplement to Lincoln. The Secretary grew in diplomacy as 
the President grew in statesmanship.46
As noted in the Introduction, historian Walter LaFeber wrote that Seward 
“deserves to be remembered as the greatest Secretary of State in American history after 
his beloved Adams.”47 Ernest Paolino echoes LaFeber’s assessment, and sees Seward as 
the initial architect of global economic hegemony. He writes that the “true significance 
of William H. Seward..  .lies not so much in his specific achievements, brilliant as they 
undoubtedly were, as in the fact that he anticipated the direction of American foreign 
policy for the next generation and beyond, and with the limited materials and 
opportunities at his disposal, prepared the way.”48
This research has hopefully demonstrated how Seward used the skills cited by 
these observers to achieve in Mexico a peaceful solution to what could have been a 
bloody and prolonged confrontation with the French and Maximilian’s Mexican 
supporters. His persistent diplomacy, backed by a credible military threat, forced the 
French to see that their Mexican adventure could not succeed. Unfortunately for 
Maximilian and Carlota, they were not as quick to see the writing on the wall. Benito 
Juarez and his successors as President of the Mexican Republic, Sebastian Lerdo de 
Tejada and Porfirio Diaz, were left with a country devastated by war, but not one 
occupied or controlled by foreign troops. Due in no small part to Seward’s efforts, 
Mexico was now free to forge its own political destiny. Historian Dexter Perkins called 
Seward’s diplomatic campaign regarding Mexico “one of the most brilliant in the annals 
of our foreign policy.”49
46 Frederic Bancroft, The Life o f  William H. Seward, 2 vols., NY: Harper &  Brothers Publishers, 1900, p. 
528.
47 LaFeber, The New Empire, p. 25.
48 Paolino, Foundations, p. 212.
49 Dexter Perkins, A History o f  the Monroe Doctrine (A New Revision o f  the book originally published  
under the title: HANDS OFF: A History o f  the Monroe Doctrine), Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963, p. 
132.
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For almost three-quarters of the twentieth century, that destiny contained an 
element of anti-Americanism, woven into the fabric of the political party, PRI, which 
controlled Mexico for over seventy years. Now, at the outset of the twenty-first, old 
animosities between Mexico and the U.S. may be undergoing a period of re-evaluation.
A new, more business-friendly party, PAN, led by President Vicente Fox, is now in 
power.50 Millions of U.S. citizens are of Mexican descent and hundreds o f thousands of 
U.S. citizens retire or spend a great deal of time in Mexico.51 New financial 
arrangements are broaching the barriers that have separated the two countries for many 
years, and borders may no longer be the course of a river or lines on maps, but areas 
hundreds o f miles wide.52 Should such a trend toward peaceful prosperity continue, 
based on the mutual respect for each country’s respective economy and culture, then the 
hopes for U.S.-Mexican bilateral relations, which Seward expressed during his visit there 
in 1870, will have finally come to pass.
50 PAN  (Partido de Action  National). Fox beat PRI candidate Francisco Labastida with 43.4 to 36.8 o f  the 
popular vote. Partido Revolucionario Democratico (PRD) candidate, left-wing Cuahtemoc Cardenas, son 
o f  former Mexican president Lazaro Cardenas, received less than 18%, Suchlicki, Mexico, 2nd ed„ p. 199.
51 Latinos (all Spanish speakers, not just Mexicans) are now 13% o f  the U.S. population, having grown 
from 14.6 million in 1980, to 22.4 million in 1990, and 37 million in the 2000 census, Betsy Streisand, 
“Latino Power,” U.S. News & World Report, March 17,2003, pp.34-36.
52 Lester Langley, MexAmerica: Two Countries, One Future, NY: Crown Publishers, 1988, Chapter 16.
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APPENDIX I
SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT’S CONSIDERATION,
APRIL 1,1861
First. We are at the end of a month’s administration, and yet without a policy, either 
domestic or foreign.
Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable. The presence 
of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention 
to other and more grave matters.
Third. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for both domestic and 
foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on the Administration, but danger upon the 
country.
Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But how? I suggest that 
we make the local appointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior 
and occasional action.
Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular, and perhaps not 
sufficiently explained. My system is built upon this idea as a  ruling one, namely, that we 
must
CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON 
SLAVERY OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION.
In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to one of 
Patriotism or Union.
The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery or a 
party question, is so regarded. Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the 
free States, and even by the Union men in the South.
I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the issue. I deem it 
fortunate that the last Administration created the necessity.
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For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and reenforce [sic] all the forts in the 
Gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put 
the island of Key West under martial law.
This will raise distinctly the question of Union or Disunion. I would maintain 
every fort and possession in the South.
FOR FOREIGN NATIONS
I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once.
I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into 
Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of 
independence on this continent against European intervention.
And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France,
Would convene Congress and declare war against them.
But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.
For this purpose, it must be somebody’s business to pursue and direct it 
incessantly.
Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or
Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must 
end, and all agree and abide.
It is not in my special province.
But I neither see to evade nor assume responsibility.
[Quoted in its entirety with formatting and nineteenth century spelling from John G. 
Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A History, 10 vols., NY: The Century Co., 
1890, III, pp. 445-47.
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APPENDIX II
Executive Mansion, April 1,1861
HON. W.H. SEWARD,
MY DEAR SIR: Since parting with you I have been considering your paper dated 
this day, and entitled “Some thoughts for the President’s consideration.” The first 
proposition in it is, “First, We are at the end of a month’s administration, and yet without 
a policy, either domestic or foreign.”
At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said, “The power confided to 
me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the 
Government, and to collect the duties and imposts.” This had your distinct approval at 
the time; and, taken in connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott, 
directing him to employ every means in his power to strengthen and hold the forts, 
comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single exception that it does 
not propose to abandon Fort Sumter.
Again, I do not perceive how the reenforcement of Fort Sumter would be done on 
a slavery or party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national and 
patriotic one.
The new received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo certainly brings a new item 
within the range of our foreign policy; but up to that time we have been preparing 
circulars and instructions to ministers and the like, all in perfect harmony, without even a 
suggestion that we had no foreign policy.
Upon your closing propositions, that “whatever policy we adopt, there must be an 
energetic prosecution of it,
“For this purpose it must be somebody’s business to pursue and direct it 
incessantly,
“Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it,
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or
“Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must 
end, and all agree and abide,” I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a 
general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed 
without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon 




[Quoted verbatim from Hay & Nicolay, III, pp. 448-49, with original format and spelling]
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APPENDIX III
CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, SPAIN AND FRANCE, 
RELATIVE TO COMBINED OPERATIONS AGAINST MEXICO. SIGNED AT 
LONDON, OCTOBER 31,1861. RATIFICATIONS EXCHANGED AT LONDON,
NOVEMBER 15,1861.1 
[His Majesty the Emperor of the French, Her Majesty the Queen of Spain, and 
Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, being compelled by the arbitrary and 
vexatious conduct of the authorities of the Republic of Mexico to demand from those 
authorities more effective protection for the persons and properties of their subjects, as 
well as the fulfillment of the obligations contracted towards them by the Republic of 
Mexico, have agreed to conclude a Convention with a view to combining their common 
action, and, for this purpose, have named as their Plenipotentiaries, to wit: -
His Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Excellency the Count of Flahaut de la 
Billarderie, Senator, Lieutenant-General, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the 
Legion of Honour, His Ambassador Extraordinary to Her Majesty the Queen of Great 
Britain and Ireland;
Her Majesty, the Queen of Spain, His Excellency Don Xavier de Isturiz y 
Montero, Knight of the Illustrious Order of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Royal 
Order of Charles III, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honour, Senator 
of the Kngdom, Her Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister at the court of Her 
Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland;
Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable John 
Earl Russell, Viscount Amberley of Amberley and Artsalla, a Peer of the United 
Kingdom, a Member of Her Britannic Majesty’s Privy Council, Her Majesty’s Principal 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;
'Cited in Michele Cunningham, Mexico and the Foreign Policy o f  Napoleon III, NY: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 
214-16.
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Who, after having exchanged credentials, have agreed upon the following 
Articles: --
ARTICLE I: His Majesty the Emperor of the French, Her Majesty the Queen of 
Spain, and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, engage to make 
immediately after the signature of the present Convention, the necessary arrangements for 
dispatching to the coasts of Mexico combined naval and military forces, whose strength 
shall be determined by a further exchange of communications between their 
Governments, but of which the total shall be sufficient to seize and occupy the several 
fortresses and military positions on the Mexican coast.
The Commanders of the allied forces shall be, moreover, authorised [sic] to 
execute other operations which may be considered, at the time, most suitable to effect the 
aim specified in the preamble of the present Convention, and specifically to ensure the 
security of foreign residents.
All the measures contemplated in this Article shall be taken in the name and on 
the account o f the High Contracting Parties without reference to the particular nationality 
of the forces employed to execute them.
ARTICLE II: The High Contracting Parties engage not to seek for themselves, in 
the employment of the coercive measures contemplated by the present Convention, any 
acquisition o f territory nor any special advantage, and, not to exercise in the internal 
affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to 
choose and to freely constitute the form of its Government.
ARTICLE III: A Commission composed of three Commissioners, one to be 
named by each of the Contracting Powers, shall be established with full authority to 
determine all questions that may arise as to the application and distribution of the sums of 
money which shall be recovered from Mexico, having regard to the respective rights of 
the Contracting Parties.
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ARTICLE IV: The High Contracting Parties desiring, moreover, that the 
measures which they intend to adopt should not bear an exclusive character, and being 
aware that the Government of the United States on its part has, like them, claims to 
enforce upon the Mexican Republic, agree that immediately after the signature o f the 
present Convention a copy thereof shall be communicated to the Government of the 
United States; that that Government shall be invited to accede to it, and that in 
anticipation of that accession, their respective Ministers in Washington shall be at once 
furnished with full powers for the purpose of concluding and signing, collectively or 
separately, with the plenipotentiary designated by the President of the United States, a 
Convention identical to that which they sign this day, except for the suppression o f the 
present Article. But as by delaying the execution of Articles I and II of the present 
Convention, the High Contracting Parties would risk failing in the object which they 
desire to attain, they have agreed not to defer, with the view of obtaining the accession of 
the Government of the United States, the commencement of the above-mentioned 
operations beyond the time at which their combined forces can be assembled in the 
vicinity of Vera Cruz.
ARTICLE V: The present Convention shall be ratified and the ratifications 
thereof shall be exchanged at London within fifteen days.
In witness thereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed it, and have fixed 
thereto the seal of their arms.
Concluded at London, in triplicate, the thirty-first day of the month of October, in 
the year of grace one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one.]
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APPENDIX IV
CONVENTION CONCLUDED AT MIRAMAR 10 APRIL 1864 BETWEEN 
FRANCE AND MEXICO1 
[The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of the French and that of His 
Majesty the Emperor of Mexico, prompted by the same desire, to ensure the 
reestablishment of order in Mexico and to consolidate the new empire, have resolved to 
regulate by means of a convention the terms relating to the sojourn of French troops in 
that country, and have named as their plenipotentiaries for this purpose, to wit:
His Majesty the Emperor of the French, M. Charles-Francois-Edouard Herbet, 
plenipotentiary minister first class, Senior member of the Council of State, under­
secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, grand officer of the Imperial Order of the 
Legion of Honour, etc.,
And His Majesty the Emperor of Mexico, M. Joaquin Velasquez de Leon, his 
Minister of State without portfolio, grand officer of the Distinguished Order of Our Lady 
of Guadalupe, etc.
Who, after having exchanged their credentials which have been found in good and 
due order, have agreed upon the following Articles: ~
ARTICLE 1: The French troops who are at present in Mexico will be reduced as 
soon as possible to a corps o f25,000 men, including the Foreign Legion.
This corps, in order to safeguard the interests which have prompted the 
intervention, will remain in Mexico temporarily, under conditions regulated by the 
following articles.
ARTICLE 2: The French troops will leave Mexico progressively, as the Emperor 
of Mexico is able to organise [sic] the necessary troops to replace them.
ARTICLE 3: The Foreign Legion in France’s service, comprising 8,000 men, 
nevertheless will remain in Mexico for six years, after all the other French forces have
1 Cited in Cunningham, Mexico, pp. 219-20
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been withdrawn in compliance with Article 2. From that time, the said Legion will pass 
into the service and pay of the Mexican Government. The Mexican Government reserves 
the right to determine the duration of the employment of the Foreign Legion in Mexico.
ARTICLE 4: The areas of the territory to be occupied by the French troops, as 
well as the military expeditions of these troops, if they occur, will be determined by joint 
agreement directly between His Majesty the Emperor of Mexico and the Commander-in- 
Chief of the French corps.
ARTICLE 5: In those areas where the garrison is not composed exclusively of 
Mexican troops, the military command will be devolved to the French commander.
In the case of expeditions combining French and Mexican troops, the senior 
command of these troops will also belong to the French commander.
ARTICLE 6: The French commanders may not intervene in any branch of the 
Mexican administration.
ARTICLE 7: As long as the requirements of the French army corps necessitate a 
transport service between France and the port of Vera Cruz every two months, the cost of 
this service, fixed at 400,000 francs per return voyage, will be bome by the Mexican 
Government and be paid in Mexico.
ARTICLE 8: The naval stations that France maintains in the Antilles and in the 
Pacific Ocean will regularly send ships to show the French flag in Mexican ports.
ARTICLE 9: The costs of the French expedition to Mexico which are to be 
reimbursed by the Mexican Government are fixed at the sum of 270 million for the entire 
period of the expedition up to 1 July 1864. This sum will incur interest at the rate of 3 
per cent per annum.
Commencing from 1 July, all the expenses of the Mexican army remain the 
responsibility of Mexico.
ARTICLE 10: The compensation to be paid to France by the Mexican 
Government for expenditure, involving pay, provisions and maintenance of the troops of
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the army corps, will remain fixed at the rate of 1,000 francs per man per year, 
commencing from 1 July, 1864.
ARTICLE 11: The Mexican Government will immediately pay the French 
Government the sum of 66 million as security for the loan at the rate of issue, that is: 54 
million deductable [sic] from the debt specified in Article 9, and 12 million as payment of 
compensation due to French nationals as laid out in Article 14 of the present convention.
ARTICLE 12: In payment of the surplus costs of the war and in settlement of the 
expenses mentioned in Articles 7,10, and 14, the Mexican Government agrees to pay 
France annually the sum of 25 million in legal tender. This sum will be defrayed to: (1) 
the amount owing in virtue o f the said Articles 7 and 10; (2) to the total, in interest and 
principal, o f the amount fixed in Article 9; (3) to the compensation which will still be 
owed to French subjects as laid out in Articles 14 and following.
ARTICLE 13: On the last day of each month the Mexican Government will pay to 
the army paymaster in Mexico City the amount necessary to cover the expenses of the 
French troops in Mexico, in accordance with Article 10.
ARTICLE 14: The Mexican Government agrees to compensate the French 
subjects for the losses they have unduly suffered and which motivated the expedition.
ARTICLE 15: A joint commission, composed of three French and three 
Mexicans, nominated by their respective governments, will meet in Mexico City in three 
months to examine and settle these claims.
ARTICLE 16: A commission of review, located in Paris, composed of two French 
and three Mexicans, designated in the same way, will carry out the final settlement of the 
claims already admitted by the commission designated in the preceding Article, and give 
a ruling on those for which it is the final authority.
ARTICLE 17: The French Government will release all Mexican prisoners of war 
when the Emperor of Mexico is fully instated.
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ARTICLE 18: The present convention will be ratified and the ratifications will be 
exchanged as soon as possible.
Concluded at the chateau of Miramar, 10 April, 1864
Signe: HERBET, JOAQUIN VELASQUEZ DE LEON
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
The principal primary source for this dissertation was U.S. Secretary of State 
William Seward’s State Department “Instructions” to his diplomats, especially those 
written to Ministers William Dayton and John Bigelow in France, Charles Francis Adams 
in Great Britain, Henry Sanford in Belgium, and Thomas Corwin and Lewis Campbell in 
Mexico. In the days before the telegraph was widely used, State Department clerks 
mercifully transcribed these “Instructions” before they were sent, because Seward’s 
handwriting was relatively illegible before the assassination attempt in 1865, almost 
totally illegible thereafter. The “Instructions” and most of the corresponding incoming 
“Despatches” are now available on microfilm at the National Archives and its regional 
branches. The National Archives and Records Administration’s (NARA) publication, 
Diplomatic Records: A Select Catalog o f National Archives Microfilm Publications 
(Washington, DC, 1986) is indispensable when using the microfilmed records. The 
principal primary source used in tracking the progress of Seward’s diplomacy with 
France concerning Mexico, particularly in the crucial year of 1866, was John Bigelow’s 
Retrospections o f an Active Life (NY, 1909), in three volumes, which contains both 
official diplomatic and personal correspondence. These volumes are both informative 
and entertaining, because, prior to becoming a diplomat, Bigelow had been a 
newspaperman (part owner of the New York Evening Post), and wrote quite well. He 
had been U.S. Consul in Paris before becoming U.S. Minister after the death of William 
Dayton in December 1864. He had also worked closely with U.S. Minister-Resident to 
Belgium, Henry Shelton Sanford, who was Seward’s spymaster in Europe, as described 
in Joseph A. Fry’s Henry S. Sanford: Diplomacy and Business in Nineteenth Century 
America (Reno, Nevada, 1982). Professor Fry was kind enough to provide this researcher 
with his original notes for his book, plus a quantity of valuable microfilm. Additional 
material on Sanford is housed at the Sanford Museum in Sanford, Florida.
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Bigelow also included relevant press clippings and texts o f speeches in his 
Retrospections. His observations on Seward, written in 1892 when he was seventy-five, 
were included because, unlike Seward’s other tum-of-the-century biographers like 
Frederic Bancroft, The Life o f William H. Seward, 2 vols. (NY, 1900), Henry Cabot 
Lodge, Historical and Political Essays (Boston, 1892), and Thornton Lothrop, William 
Henry Seward (Boston, 1899), Bigelow had actually worked closely with Seward.
Most of Seward’s private correspondence is housed in Special Collections at the 
University of Rochester, New York, and at the Seward House in Auburn, New York. 
Microfilmed copies of some of those personal letters and speech drafts were used in 
researching Seward’s trip to Mexico in 1869. The portrait gallery that adorns the walls at 
the latter location was most useful in providing visual representations of the many 
personalities that appear in the narrative. A particularly useful source for Seward’s trip to 
Mexico was Col. Albert Evans’ Our Sister Republic (Hartford, 1870). Evans was a 
member of Seward’s party, and his book is a detailed account of the entire trip, complete 
with engravings and transcriptions of speeches. On the Mexican trip, Evans’ work is 
complemented by Frederick Seward’s Reminiscences o f a War-Time Statesman and 
Diplomat (New York, 1916). That memoir discusses the Mexican trip, although in much 
less detail than Evans. Frederick Seward’s work appears to be one of only two sources 
on his father’s subsequent trip around the world, the other being Olive Risley Seward’s 
William H  Seward’s Travels Around the World (New York, 1873). Reminiscences also 
sheds light on the daily problems that both he and his father encountered running the 
State Department.
For keeping track of the internal workings of the Lincoln cabinet, nothing 
compares to the Diary o f Gideon Welles (Boston, 1911) for both for the breadth of his 
observations and the sheer biting quality of his prose. Welles had been a newspaperman 
in Connecticut before his appointment (editor and part owner of the Hartford [CT] Times 
from 1826-1836 and the Hartford Evening Press in 1856), and his writing skill benefits
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anyone researching this era. He kept meticulous notes of those attending meetings, and 
commented on the tenor of the discussions. Welles’s prejudices are obvious, but his 
Diary is indispensable for anyone interested in the main political players of the Civil 
War, and how Welles viewed their actions. Only Welles and Seward served for both the 
entireties of the Lincoln and Johnson administrations, so his entries also have the 
advantage of covering the same time period as that of this dissertation. Welles had a 
grudging respect for Seward, as evidenced in the brief quote that opens the dissertation. 
However, even in death, Welles continued to emphasize the importance of President 
Lincoln versus the relative unimportance of his Secretary of State in his Lincoln and 
Seward: Remarks upon the memorial address o f Chas Francis Adams, on the late Wm. H. 
Seward, first published in 1874 (reprint, Freeport, NY, 1969). An old family friend and 
former Minister to the Court of Saint James under Seward, Adams made a laudatory 
speech to the New York State Legislature in April 1873. The speech was lavish in its 
praise of Seward, but some of that praise was at the expense of President Lincoln. 
Essentially, Adams argued that Seward had been the moving force behind the Lincoln 
administration. The rebuttal, written by Welles originally for the magazine Galaxy in 
1873, was published in its entirety a year later. Disregarding the Latin motto ude mortuis, 
nil nisi bonum " (of the dead, say nothing but good things), Welles took it upon himself to 
“set the record straight.” Welles completely contradicted what Adams had to say about 
Seward, insisting that in almost all regards, Lincoln was the superior mind and more 
effective statesman. If, in the years following, Seward’s reputation has waned vis-a-vis 
that of Lincoln, this scathing critique written by a cabinet member who, like Seward, had 
served for eight years from 1861 to 1869, may be one of the reasons.
Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase’s diary, Inside Lincoln’s Cabinet: The 
Civil War Diaries o f Salmon P. Chase (NY, 1954), edited by David Donald, is also 
useful, partially as a foil to that of Welles, who had just about as low an opinion of Chase 
and he did of Seward. Chase’s entries, however, are quite brief and matter-of-fact, and
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whole issues, such as the start of the secession crisis, are not covered at all. An excellent 
secondary source that draws on both Chase and Welles is Burton Hendrick’s Lincoln’s 
War Cabinet (Boston, 1946), which discusses at some length Seward’s relations with his 
fellow cabinet members. This work is especially useful in providing the political context 
that lay behind Lincoln’s cabinet nominations. In trying consciously trying to achieve a 
philosophical and regional balance, while at the same time paying off political debts 
acquired at the Chicago nominating convention, Lincoln set the stage for some o f the 
internecine strife that would afflict his cabinet. Hendrick details all of that, and, in Book 
II, “William Henry Seward: ‘Prime Minister,”’ shows how and why that title seemed to 
fit Seward in the early years of the Lincoln administration.
It is somewhat surprising that the historiography on Seward is relatively thin and 
somewhat dated, given Walter LaFeber’s assessment that Seward “deserves to be 
remembered as the greatest Secretary of State in American history after his beloved 
Adams.” LaFeber’s opinion complements Dexter Perkins’ assertion that Seward’s 
Mexican policy was “one of the most brilliant in the annals of our foreign policy.”1 
When he returned from his final trip around the world in 1871, Seward applied himself to 
writing an autobiography, but only got as far as 1834, his thirty-third birthday, before 
passing away. What is to be learned about Seward comes from his public statements, 
contained in five volumes and his diplomatic correspondence, edited by George Baker, 
The Works o f  William H. Seward (NY, 1853-1884), and The Papers o f William H. 
Seward. Seward’s papers are at the University of Rochester, NY, and his collection of 
personal papers, manuscripts, letters, etc. has been microfilmed by the Department of 
Rare Books and Special Collections there. The principal Seward biography is that of 
Glyndon Van Deusen, published thirty-six years ago, William Henry Seward (NY, 1967). 
Van Deusen was an expert on New York politics, and also published biographies of
1 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire, An Interpretation o f  American Expansion 1860-1898, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell U. Press, 1971, p. 25; Dexter Perkins, A History o f  the Monroe Doctrine, Little, Brown & Co., 
1963, p. 132.
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Seward’s contemporaries Thurlow Weed, Thurlow Weed: Wizard o f the Lobby (Boston, 
1947), and Horace Greeley, Horace Greeley: Nineteenth Century Crusader (Philadelphia, 
1953). Van Deusen focuses almost exclusively on the political lives of the Protestant 
men who ruled the U.S. in the last century. Although Van Deusen’s works might be 
considered today as insufficiently sensitive to other historical currents of the time, his 
William Henry Seward is a treasure trove of details on his life, and an excellent source of 
other documentation. A more recent biography, the aforementioned John M. Taylor’s 
William Henry Seward: Lincoln's Right Hand (which has been made into a video), also 
stays largely within the parameters of political/military history and draws extensively 
from Van Deusen. Both works emphasize Seward’s domestic dealings, paying 
somewhat less attention to Seward the diplomat. The tum-of-the-century biographers of 
Seward, previously cited, are compelling to read, but unevenly sourced. The Life o f  
William H  Seward by Frederic Bancroft has an entire chapter on the French intervention 
and cites primary sources. Bancroft accords Seward the lion’s share of the credit for 
expelling the French from Mexico, and thereby alerting the Europeans that the Monroe 
Doctrine was not merely a rhetorical flourish. On the other hand, William Seward by 
Thornton Lothrop treats the French in Mexico in a cursory manner with only one citation. 
Henry Cabot Lodge wrote a very flattering depiction of Seward in Historical and 
Political Essays, that clearly gives the Secretary of State much of the credit for the 
achievements of the Lincoln administration. These older works generally suffer from 
Latinate prose and excessive editorializing.
In recounting the story of Seward in Mexico, much of what has been written 
about Seward and the French in Mexico in other volumes about other people or events 
has been collected in one place. Except for James M. Callahan’s “Evolution of Seward’s 
Mexican Policy,” (Morgantown, WV., 1909), there is no single published monograph that 
specifically discusses Seward and Mexico. A reprise of the same theme by the same 
author appeared as a chapter, “Seward’s Mexican Policy,” in American Foreign Policy in
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Mexican Relations (NY, 1967), first published in New York in 1932 and subsequently re­
issued. It is Callahan who characterized Seward’s policy in Mexico as “masterful 
inactivity (p. 292).” Chapter nine in the latter book replicates much of the earlier work.
J. Fred Rippy’s The United States and Mexico (New York, 1931) devotes Chapter XIV to 
“Seward and the French Intervention,” and uses the term “cautious moderation” to 
describe Seward’s approach. Like Bancroft, Rippy sees Seward’s Mexican policy as his 
“greatest achievement in diplomacy,” but is quick to add that other factors also led to the 
departure of the French.2
The Foundations o f  the American Empire (Ithaca, 1973) by Ernest Paolino and 
Desperate Diplomacy: William H. Seward’s Foreign Policy, 1861 (Knoxville, TN, 1976) 
by Norman Ferris, provide more modem treatments of Seward’s diplomacy. The latter 
focuses primarily on Seward’s bilateral diplomacy with the British, notably the Trent 
affair.3 Foundations makes the point that Seward was dealing with many multilateral 
issues that needed French input. Breaking or even straining Franco-American relations 
over Mexico would have jeopardized those projects. It also views Seward as the builder 
of an essentially economic empire. This view is consistent with that taken by LaFeber in 
The New Empire (Ithaca, 1963), where Seward’s extension of U.S. influence via other 
than military means is seen as defining his diplomacy. This idea is echoed in Thomas 
Schoonover’s Dollars Over Dominion: The Triumph o f  Liberalism in Mexican-United 
States Relations, 1861-1867 (Baton Rouge, LA, 1978), a phrase borrowed from Seward 
himself. This work shows how Seward’s diplomatic success in Mexico opened the door 
for extensive U.S. investment after the French departure. David Pletcher’s Rails, Mines, 
and Progress (Ithaca, NY, 1958) chronicles the specifics of how such investments came 
to be made. No research on this subject would be complete without reference to Dexter
2 J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico, NY: F.S. Crofts & Co., 1931, pp. 255 and 273-4.
3 A flareup between the U.S. and Great Britain in the winter o f  1861-62 when Confederate diplomats James 
Mason and John Slidell were forcibly removed from the British ship Trent by Union naval officers. The 
incident produced a firestorm o f protest in England, and its solution proved very challenging to Lincoln and 
Seward.
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Perkins’ The Monroe Doctrine 1826-1867 (Baltimore, 1933) and its later paperback 
revision, A History o f the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1963). Perkins was the first to point 
out in 1933 that Seward had implemented the Monroe Doctrine against France in Mexico, 
without actually ever referring to it by name. Seward was well acquainted with the 
author of the Doctrine, John Quincy Adams, and held him in high esteem. Seward was 
aware of the Doctrine’s applicability to the French situation essentially from the 
beginning. Yet he did not want to use it as the theoretical underpinning for an invasion of 
Mexico to oust the French. He saw the Monroe Doctrine as something essentially 
defensive, something that was not the case with many of his successors. Additionally, 
Howard Cline, Lester Langley, Karl M. Schmitt, and Peter H. Smith have written 
specifically about U.S. diplomatic relations with Mexico.
Lester Langley has written a number of books on general U.S.-Latin American 
relations. The Americas in the Age o f Revolution 1750-1850 (New Haven, CT, 1996), 
provides essential background for understanding why Juarez and his Liberals were so 
determined in their fight against the Conservatives. Langley’s Mexico and the United 
States: The Fragile Relationship (Boston, 1991) puts into perspective how these “two 
republics” have evolved differently. Peter Smith’s Talons o f  Eagles: Dynamics o f  U.S.- 
Latin American Relations (NY, 1996) is a synthesis that seeks to interpret overall U.S.- 
Latin American relations by seeking repetitive themes, searching for an “underlying 
logic” to past events. In doing this, Smith focuses on three periods. The first, from 1790 
to the 1930s he views as falling into imperialistic patterns. The second period, from the 
1940s to the 1980s, was defined by the Cold War. The third period, up to the present, he 
sees as being characterized by the “absence of clear-cut rules of the game.” Howard 
Cline’s The United States and Mexico (NY, 1973) is another classic that looks at the 
bilateral relationship from somewhat more of a political science perspective.
Several other monographs deal more generally with Union diplomacy 
during the Civil War. David P. Crook published the hardcover The North, the South, and
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the Powers 1861-1865 (Sydney, Australia, 1974) which he followed a year later with the 
paperback Diplomacy During the American Civil War covering the same material. 
Crook’s work detailed the wider European context in which Napoleon III was making his 
decisions, making a case for Napoleon III losing his nerve for his Mexican adventure in 
light of menacing developments on his own borders. Jay Monaghan’s Abraham Lincoln 
Deals With Foreign Affairs: A Diplomat in Carpet Slippers (Lincoln, NB, 1997) is a 
paperback re-issue, with a new introduction, of Monaghan’s 1945 book with the title 
reversed.4 This work makes only passing reference to the diplomacy of the Lincoln 
administration towards Mexico, ending as it does with a brief reference page and one-half 
reference to events in Mexico. Dean Mahin also gives the lion’s share of the credit for 
diplomatic success to Lincoln, not Seward, in his One War at a Time: The International 
Dimensions o f the American Civil War (Washington, DC, 2000). This dissertation 
contends just the opposite: that Seward formulated the U.S. foreign policy to which 
presidents Lincoln and Johnson generally acquiesced, particularly in the case of Mexico. 
That policy, reflecting a sense of history and the potential for future U.S. economic 
hegemony, achieved its goals and kept the U.S. on good terms with both Mexico and 
France for long after Seward died.
As far as the presidents for whom Seward worked, Eric McKitrick contends in 
1969 in his collections of essays, Andrew Johnson, A Profile (NY, 1969), that “no truly 
satisfactory biography of Andrew Johnson has ever been written.” It appears that Hans 
Trefousse’s Andrew Johnson: A Biography (New York, 1997) has rectified that situation, 
being both well written and well footnoted. Brooks D. Simpson’s The Reconstruction 
Presidents (Lawrence, KS, 1998) is another work that attempts to rectify the dearth of 
Johnson material. That being said, the University of New Hampshire’s library still only 
has twenty-two entries under Andrew Johnson as “subject.” Most of those are at least 
four decades old, and relate to either Reconstruction or impeachment. Johnson, Grant
4 Jay Monaghan, A Diplomat in Carpet Slippers, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1945
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and the Politics o f  Reconstruction (NY, 1973) by Martin Mantell focuses primarily on the 
political problems of Reconstruction and only mentions Seward in passing. In The 
Presidency o f  Andrew Johnson (Lawrence, KS, 1979), Albert Castel summarizes the 
reasons why Johnson needed Seward, and why he deferred to him in matters of foreign 
policy. The essays in McKitrick’s own work, particularly that of Howard K. Beale, also 
tend to reinforce the premise of this dissertation that Seward was firmly in charge of 
foreign policy during Johnson’s tenure.
On the other hand, there are thousands of books and pamphlets about Abraham 
Lincoln. Seward biographer John M. Taylor puts the discrepancy in the quantity of 
Lincoln versus Seward historiography front and center in the preface to his William 
Henry Seward: Lincoln’s Right Hand (NY, 1991):
There are, at this writing, several thousand books about Abraham Lincoln; the 
Louis A. Warren Lincoln Library, in Fort Wayne, Indiana, lists more than ten 
thousand Lincoln titles (although these include pamphlets as well as books). In 
contrast, there are no more than a dozen about Seward, of which only two -  
Burton Hendrick's 1946 volume, Lincoln's War Cabinet, and the 1967 biography 
of Glyndon Van Deusen -  have any place on a contemporary bookshelf, (p. ix) 
Taylor’s own book could now be added to his own very short list, as it does 
provide many insights not contained in Van Deusen. Volume four of J.G. Randall’s and 
Richard N. Current’s Lincoln, The President: Last Full Measure (NY, 1955) was 
consulted to see how Lincoln biographers viewed the interplay between Seward and 
Lincoln on Mexico. The authors’ assertion that, by early 1865, Lincoln “still took an 
occasional hand in diplomatic affairs” reinforces the idea that Seward was the principal 
architect of the administration’s foreign policy. The ten-volume John Nicolay and John 
Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History (NY, 1890), and Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected 
Works o f  Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols., (New Brunswick, NJ,1952-55) contain firsthand 
accounts of events in the Lincoln administration. In Nicolay and Hay, Chapter XXVI,
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volume three was valuable for the details of Seward’s “April Fool’s Memorandum,” and 
chapter XIV on Maximilian in volume seven also proved instructive. In the latter, 
Lincoln and Seward are viewed as collaborating on the policy towards France in Mexico, 
particularly the neutrality adopted by the U.S. during the Civil War, but all of the quotes 
are from Seward’s messages. More about Lincoln and Seward was culled from James 
McPherson’s Battle Cry o f  Freedom: The Civil War Era (NY, 1988). Battle Cry was 
used essentially as an indispensable reference book for the many battles and personalities 
involved in the Civil War.
Both McPherson and David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights o f Man (NY,
1970), tend to emphasize that Seward tended towards political manipulation, due, in part, 
to his close association with New York political boss, Thurlow Weed, and his years as an 
elected official. There is no doubt that Seward took politics into his calculus when 
making decisions, but in his appointed role as Secretary of State, he did not bow often to 
congressional pressure, as is shown by the consistency over time of his approach to 
Mexico.
On the military front, the second volume of General Philip Sheridan’s Personal 
Memoirs (NY: 1888) was particularly useful in sorting out the relatively confused 
situation on the Rio Grande in 1865-67. Sheridan considered Seward dilatory, and took a 
good deal of the credit for getting the French out of Mexico because it was his troops 
who were rattling sabers on the border. Although self-serving, the Personal Memoirs 
provide much of the detail necessary to understand the complexity of the problem that 
Seward was trying to solve.
Another military memoir, General John M. Schofield’s Forty Six Years in the 
Army (NY, 1897) tells his side of his diplomatic mission to France in the winter of 1865- 
66. Seemingly unaware of his co-option by Seward, Schofield dutifully recounts his 
essentially meaningless mission in the French capital, although he himself did not 
perceive it as such. His reports were useful in providing another perspective concerning
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the Mexican crisis from his French interlocutors. His speculations about Napoleon Ill’s 
strategy in Mexico were also revealing, but minimized somewhat in importance when 
juxtaposed with Seward’s and Bigelow’s comments on what Schofield was actually 
doing in Paris. In terms of the overall diplomatic initiative regarding Mexico, Schofield’s 
role was primarily symbolic.
The French Army in Mexico 1861-1867 (The Hague, 1963), by Jack A. Dabbs is 
an excellent source of statistical data on the deployment of French forces in Mexico, and 
the many command and control problems that force encountered. His work is important 
in that it shows the initial commitment of the French forces, especially their 
determination to avenge the May 5,1862 defeat at Puebla. The gradual deterioration of 
that resolve in the face of the political wrangles between the force’s high command and 
Maximilian is also documented, along with the demoralizing effect that guerrilla war in 
hostile topography had on the French over time. Dabbs even has a section on the way in 
which the French army presence affected Mexican culture. A valuable supplement to 
Dabbs’ work is Gustave Niox’s Expedition du Mexique 1861-1867 (Paris, 1874) in 
French. The eleven appendices at the end provide a wealth of statistical data on the 
Intervention, particularly numbers of troops, and financial details of the French presence 
in Mexico, including the particulars of the infamous Jecker loans.
Brooks Simpson has written extensively on this period, and his Ulysses S. Grant 
(Boston, 2000), and Let Us Have Peace (Chapel Hill, NC, 1991) were both useful in 
acquiring an understanding of how Grant's meteoric rise in the inner circles of 
Washington became the principal threat to Seward’s cautious policy. Part One of 
Simpson’s The Reconstruction Presidents, cited above, was useful for showing how the 
complex problems of Reconstruction arose just as Seward’s policy towards Mexico was 
reaching a critical stage.
Several works in Spanish and two corresponding translations were consulted. 
Thomas Schoonover’s Mexican Lobby: Matias Romero in Washington, 1861-1867
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translates passages from Mexican Minister to Washington Matias Romero’s 
Correspondencia de la legation mexicana en Washington durante la intervention 
extranjera, 1860-1868 (Mexico City, 1870-1892). Mexico frente a los Estados Unidos 
by Josefina Zoraida Vasaquez and Lorenzo Meyer, which poses the hypothesis that the 
benign economic vision that Seward had for Mexican-American relations based on trade 
turned into a nightmare for many Mexicans, can be found in English as The United States 
and Mexico (Chicago, 1985).
Romero wrote copiously, although the hardcover ten volume complete set is not 
readily available (this researcher initially consulted a copy in Special Collections at the 
library of La Universidad de las Americas, in Cholula, Mexico; the entire set, as o f this 
writing, is available on microfilm through Inter-Library Loan). In many ways it provides 
in-depth perspective on events and personalities relating to the French intervention in 
Mexico, similar to those contained in Welles’s Diary, although Romero’s tone is much 
more formal. His Correspondencia served as the dissertation’s principal source for the 
Liberal Mexican perspective on the problem of the French intervention.5 O f particular 
interest was the way in which Romero gained access to the Lincoln and Johnson 
administrations, and to members of congress willing to support republican Mexico’s 
cause. Not only is the Correspondencia a great record of political reporting, it is also a 
probably one of the first written records of how a foreign government went about 
influencing U.S. policy, and how a foreign diplomat was able to affect U.S. domestic 
politics. Although probably not the first foreign lobbyist, Romero certainly has to be 
among the first to leave such detailed records of how he went about his business. The 
excerpts from the Correspondencia that were used in the translation by Thomas and Ebba 
Schoonover in Mexican Lobby (Lexington, KY, 1986) have been double-checked against 
Romero’s original Spanish, using the microfilmed version. Romero’s words themselves
5 Matias Romero, Correspondencia de la legacion mexicana en Washington durante la intervencion 
extranjera, 1860-1868,10 vols., Mexico: Imprenta del Gobiemo, 1870-92.
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provide a Mexican perspective on political events in the U.S., one that occasionally 
differs markedly from that of his U.S. counterparts. Professor Schoonover’s brief chapter 
introductions to the years covered in Mexican Lobby, are succinct summaries of the 
specific historical context in which Romero was working.
Harry Bernstein published a complete biography of Romero in Spanish in 1973, 
Matias Romero 1837-1898 (Mexico City, 1973). This work is good in tracing the 
Oaxacan connection among the Mexican Liberal leadership, and especially good for 
detailing how Romero occasionally worked outside of traditional diplomatic boundaries. 
Romero’s Diario personal de Matias Romero 1855-1865 (Mexico City, 1960), edited by 
Emma Cosio Villegas contained valuable notes about Romero’s pre-inaugural trip to 
Springfield to present Mexico’s case directly to president-elect Lincoln. In addition to 
Romero’s La Correspondencia, Bernstein’s biography of Romero, and Emma Cosio 
Villegas’s edited Diario of Romero, several other works in Spanish were consulted. 
Archivos privados de Benito Juarez (Mexico, 1928), edited by J.M. Puig Casauranc is 
Juarez’s own correspondence to his son-in-law Pedro Santacilia, who was looking after 
Juarez’s family when they evacuated to New York in August, 1864. It provides valuable 
insights into the Mexican president’s thinking, particularly about Maximilian’s execution. 
In these very personal letters, Juarez shows his deep concern for his family, even as he 
was being forced to escape the French who were intent on his capture and probable 
execution. Juarez’s letters are also used in Emesto de la Torre Villar’s La Intervencion 
Francesay el Triunfo de la Republica (Mexico City, 1968) in two volumes which 
emphasizes the importance of the Mexican Republic itself when it came to evicting the 
French. Some of the details of how Juarez conducted governmental affairs are contained 
in Jorge Pedraza’s Juarez in Monterrey (Monterrey, Mexico, 1970), which complements 
nicely Frank Knapp’s The Life o f  Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada (Austin,TX, 1951) which 
also provides many fascinating glimpses of life inside a government on the run.
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U.S.-Mexican bilateral relations are always topical for Mexican writers. Martin 
Quirarte’s Historiografia Sobre El Imperio de Maximiliano (Mexico City, 1970) provides 
a general overview of the Mexican and French writing on the Intervention. On a more 
general plane, Luis G. Zorilla’s Historia is a two-volume treatment of U.S. relations with 
Mexico from 1800 to 1958 that contains a wealth of statistical data. Juarez himself is 
controversial, particularly in light of his anti-clericalism. The classic treatment of Juarez 
in Spanish is Justo Sierra’s Juarez, Su Obra y  Su Tiempo (Mexico City, 1905-1906), a 
massive work published in 1905-06. Its five hundred folio pages tell Sierra’s version of 
the Juarez story, unfortunately with neither footnotes nor bibliography. The book itself is 
practically a work of art, containing thirty-two hand-tinted portraits of all the principal 
actors and the author himself. Fernando Benitez’s Un indio zapoteco llamado Benito 
Juarez (Mexico City, 1998) is a hagiography that tries to overcome the image of Juarez 
as a passionless stoic. On the other end of the spectrum lies Celerino Salmeron’s Las 
grandes traiciones de Juarez (Iztacalco, Mexico, 1986), which is brutally critical of 
Juarez. This book, which has gone through ten printings, sees Juarez as a traitor to 
Mexico for what he was willing to bargain away to foreigners, particularly in terms of 
economic concessions.
The research for this project necessitated triangulation between the U.S., Mexico 
and France. Except for one new publication, the historiography on Napoleon Ill’s 
involvement in Mexico is also somewhat dated. An extensive overview of all of France’s 
diplomatic relations with the U.S. during the Civil War is contained in The United States 
and France: Civil War Diplomacy (Philadelphia, 1970) by Lynn Case and Warren F. 
Spencer. This work was particularly useful in detailing Napoleon Ill’s duplicity 
concerning France’s role in building ships for the Confederacy. Published at almost the 
same time, Alfred and Kathryn Hanna’s Napoleon III and Mexico (Chapel Hill, NC,
1971), provides an excellent narrative of France’s involvement in Mexico.
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Almost all works on the subject depict Napoleon III as deceitful to some degree.
A recent exception to this is a monograph by Michele Cunningham, Mexico and the 
Foreign Policy o f  Napoleon III {NY, 2001). Cunningham takes the position that 
Napoleon Ill 's  motives were more altruistic than self-serving, and that Napoleon III was 
not only badly served by his advisors, but lied to by many. Her work is valuable in that 
she cites many archival sources in the original French. This dissertation, however, does 
not see Napoleon III as benign, and views his abandonment of Maximilian and his wife 
as despicable. There are a raft of quasi-historical books on the demise of Maximilian and 
his wife Carlota. Their story has long been grist for the mill of romantic literature. 
However, Jasper Ridley’s Maximilian and Juarez (NY, 1992) stands out among them. 
The footnoting is a little unorthodox for scholarly history, but Ridley’s grasp of the entire 
story is impressive. His work also contains excellent pictures of all the principal 
participants in the drama.
The dissertation treats Confederate diplomacy only as it relates to that of the 
Union in Mexico, although the Confederates were very active in Europe early on in the 
Civil War trying to gain diplomatic recognition, and in Mexico trying to ally themselves 
with the French. The principal work on this subject is Frank Owsley’s King Cotton 
Diplomacy (Chicago, 1931). Robert May’s The Southern Dream o f a Caribbean Empire 
1854-1861 detailed the plans, developed well before the Civil War, to extend slavery to 
the Caribbean and Mexico. It cites the edict of Maximilian that would have effectively 
reintroduced into Mexico a form of labor that was tantamount to slavery.
A number of relatively contemporary works were used to comment in the 
Conclusion on what has transpired in Mexico since Seward’s visit 1869-70 visit. Diaz 
(NY, 1917) by David Hannay tries to take stock of the Mexican leader a few years after 
he had been ousted from power. In The United States Versus Porfirio Diaz (Lincoln, NB, 
1963), Daniel Cosio Villegas focuses on how Porfirio Diaz initially annulled foreign 
contracts made my his predecessor as Mexican president, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada,
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then relented. It is a good complement to David Pletcher’s Rails, Mines, and Progress 
cited above. Barbara Tuchman’s The Zimmerman Telegram (NY, 1994), Robert Quirk’s 
The Mexican Revolution, 1914-15 (NY, 1970) and John Eisenhower’s Intervention: The 
United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917 (NY: 1993) are excellent sources 
on how Seward’s vision of amicable relations between the U.S. and Mexico were 
transformed by the meddling of U.S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, and the 
moralizing o f President Woodrow Wilson. Twentieth Century Mexico (Lincoln, NB, 
1986) is a collection of essays on a variety of subjects, and was used for its observations 
on the role of the Catholic Church, and its excellent concluding essay on Mexico’s view 
of the U.S. by a famous scholar of U.S.-Mexican bilateral relations, Michael C. Meyer. 
Four other books brought the researcher right to the present. Distant Neighbors: A 
Portrait o f the Mexicans (NY, 1985) chronicles the perception of a New York Times 
correspondent with long experience in Mexico, that “probably nowhere in the world do 
two neighbors understand each other so little.”6 Lester Langley’s MexAmerica: Two 
Countries, One Future (NY, 1988) shows how the two countries are starting to meld 
along the Rio Grande, as the title implies. Ramon Ruiz’s On the Rim o f  Mexico: 
Encounters o f  the Rich and Poor (Boulder, CO, 1998) also discusses the “borderlands” 
and the havoc raised there by economic dislocation, especially fluctuating exchange rates 
between the two countries. Finally, Sam Quinones True Tales from Another Mexico: The 
Lynch Mob, the Popsicle Kings, Chalino, and the Bronx (Albuquerque, NM: 2001) 
provides a reporters view of how U.S. popular culture has infiltrated and been 
transformed in modem Mexico.
Numerous other books and articles contributed to this research, and the 
bibliography contains full citations. Given the growing importance of Mexican-U.S. 
bilateral relations in both a hemispheric and global context, this dissertation has 
endeavored to update both the narrative and historiography concerning the seminal
6 Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors: A Portrait o f  the Mexicans, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985, p xi.
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episode of the French Intervention between the two countries, and some of the long-term 
implications of the policies undertaken then.
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